

ETHNICITY

Ethnic Identities and Integration of the Society

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Ethnicity – a peer-reviewed journal was established by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology (University of Latvia). The journal publishes original works about ethnicity in different fields of knowledge – sociology, history, social linguistics, social psychology, law, political science.

Knowledge Base Social Sciences Eastern Europe (<http://www.cee-socialscience.net/journals/index.asp?stock=journals&select=Latvia>)

This issue is supported by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Latvia

ETHNICITY 2012/6

Ethnic Identities and Civil Society

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Denis Hanov, Valdis Tēraudkalns

**DENYING THE OTHER IN THE CYBER SPACE:
DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN LATVIA.
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNET CAMPAIGN “FOR MOTHER TONGUE”
(NOVEMBER 2011)**

*I need to return ...to some approximate memories which time has
deformed into certainty.*

Julian Barnes. The Sense of an Ending

2011 was the year of political radicalization in Latvia. The long lasting hidden discursive tensions between various ethnic groups, mainly Latvians and so-called “Russian-speaking” minorities, which make up 40% of the population, were intensified by the coalition-building process in autumn 2011, after the parliamentary elections. New possibilities of political participation, including the fast appearance of cyber communities stresses the development of a new dimension of the ethnic radicalization in Latvia’s democracy. In November 2011 the campaign for the collection of signatures concerning the referendum of making the Russian language an official one, was initiated. More than 180 000 signatures were collected (required were slightly more than 150 000 signatures). The referendum took place on February 18, 2012 and the majority voted against making Russian the official state language in Latvia.¹ This article continues the analysis of the political discourses on the Latvian internet in 2011.

1 Provisional data viewed at the day of completing this article (19.02.2012.) show that 74.8% of those who participated in the referendum (70.73% of citizens) voted against the proposal to amend the Constitution. See: <http://www.tn2012.cvk.lv/>

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After having analysed the right-conservative electoral campaign for parliamentary elections in September 2011 (see previous issue of *Ethnicity* 2(5)/2011²) this article concentrates on the internet campaign “For Mother Tongue”, which can be interpreted in the frame of extremist political discourse on the internet. The authors observed that both of the political campaigns (“National Alliance” in summer 2011 and the campaign “For Mother Tongue” in November 2011) show the presence of primordial nationalism within the Latvian and Russian speaking, diaspora-conservative politicians and their followers. The content of the campaigns illustrates the uncertain borders of ideological frames – how is the minority nationalism to define? How are the visual forms applied to the materials on the web page to analyse – as an expression of political discourse on political mobilization of minorities or rather an aesthetical frame of self-image of a minority, which includes signs of self-exclusion? These and other questions have been analysed in the present article. The authors have stated that the building of a local Russian political identity is marked by beliefs, pictures and symbols from the so called The Great War for the Fatherland 1941-1945. Discussions about this war still continued on the internet during the campaign, using the war symbols to underline the idea of mobilization of minorities.

Keywords: Exclusion, campaign “For Mother Tongue”, Linderman, Osipov, internet activism, war, minorities, Russian language

Introduction: Integration of the Latvian society: Steps, results, deficits

Already before regaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Latvia’s political elite started protests against the regime and founded the Popular Front in the late 1980s and thereby contributed to a critical reconsideration of the ethnic policies of the Soviet Union. After gaining independence the political elite in Latvia as well as in Estonia and Lithuania had to deal with the Soviet heritage in several areas of politics and economy. Under many problems of redesigning Latvian society, the question of how to deal with ethnic minorities was one of the most topical. 20 years later one can even say this issue is the one with the least efficient solutions. The initial position in the beginning of the 1990s can be seen as a crucial factor of further integration policies. More than 40% of the population belonged to minorities. Until now the Russians make up the biggest minority group as well as the highest number of so called non-citizens (In Latvian: *nepilsoņi*

2 This issue of “Ethnicity” can be accessed for downloading at: http://du.lv/lv/fakultates/szf/strukturvienibas/instituti_zinatniska_darbiba/spi/izdevumi/Eth

– see table 1.), who are in accordance with legislation norms not allowed to participate in either parliamentary or communal elections. This situation affects the interethnic dialog as well as the general civil engagement of minorities negatively. The term non-citizen was formed within Latvian legislation of citizenship: those inhabitants, whose ancestors entered after occupation in 1940, were declared non-citizens. This status puts various restrictions to work for the public sector and military service. At the same time there are no limits to the naturalization process. Sociologists have identified a gap in the support for the traditional ethnic nationalism and its elements, such as state symbols and Latvian language between Latvians and non-Latvians. The issue of Latvian language and culture as the basis for the integration politics has been one of the most differently perceived: 89% of Latvians and only 46% of Russians supported this thesis. The sociologists summarised the results with the question still almost non-existing in the public space: “...whether attempts to create the integration policy based exclusively on these values can bring the expected fruits?” (Pārskats par tautas attīstību 2010/2011, p. 25). As a possible solution the analysts offer the suggestion to combine ethnic and civic nationalism values³.

Table 1. Latvian inhabitants listed by ethnicity (Data for 01. 07. 2011.)⁴

	Inhabitants	%	Citizens	%	Non-Citizens	%
Latvians	1323713	59.5	1321437	99.83	1198	0.09
Russians	606,972	27.3	364,529	60.06	209934	34.6
Belarusians	78,052	3.51	30,991	39.71	43172	55.3
Ukrainians	54,398	2.45	18,383	33.79	30625	56.3
Polish	50,960	2.29	38916	76.37	10845	21.3
Lithuanians	29174	1.31	18328	62.82	8412	28.8
Jews	9474	0.43	6236	65.82	2764	29.2
Roma	8517	0.38	7999	93.92	468	5.49
Germans	4562	0.21	2225	48.77	1227	26.9
Tatars	2689	0.12	835	31.05	1471	54.7
Armenians	2660	0.12	1147	43.12	1068	40.2
Estonians	2336	0.11	1423	60.92	473	20.2
Others	50,723	2.28	38,929	76.75	10986	21.7
Total	2,224,230	100	1847618	83.07	319,267	14.4

³ Ibid.

⁴ <http://www.am.gov.lv/lv/latvia/integracija/integracijas-politika/kultura/>

An important element of the development of integration policies was Latvia's accession to the European Union in 2004, which was in addition to the membership of NATO the most important aim regarding foreign affairs. Juris Rozenvalds, who analysed the long-term perspectives of Latvia's integration policies, noticed that the domestic opposition of the integration process was slowed down by the right-conservative politicians through political tensions during pre-accession talks. The first steps for promoting integration policy were not taken until these obstacles were overcome by external pressure from European institutions (Rozenvalds 2010, p. 49).

Already in 1999 there was the attempt of encouraging integration policies in Latvia, when on December 7, the Council of Ministers passed the “Concept of Integration”. The following thesis was formulated as the main aim of the new politics: *The goal of integration is a democratic and consolidated civil society which is based on shared values. One of the basic values is Latvia as an independent and democratic state.*⁵

The question of shared values was the most difficult within this concept and remained problematic within the following two decades when integration policies were intensified and institutionalized since 2002. The concept became a program with its own budget. In the end of 2002 the Office of Special Tasks Minister for Integration of Society (further in the text – Ministry) and the Foundation of Integration were founded, which since then were able to support several projects in the field of integration, as well as to help developing the civic society initiatives among minorities' NGOs. On May 31, 2005 the parliament after 10 years of debates finally ratified the “Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”.

One of the most important questions of the Latvian integration politics is until now the concern, how to ensure an equal and qualitative participation of the minorities in Latvia's politics. How can one unite the concept of the ethnic nation, which is widely spread among intellectuals and the Latvian population, with the idea of an inclusive multiethnic society?

The Ministry offered institutional support for the participation of minorities by creating and financing some policy programs towards inclusion of minority groups. Within this policy framework programs like “Program for the encouragement of tolerance” (2003), “Program for the support of Roma in Latvia” (2007) were developed. Many initiatives of the Ministry got interrupted by the end of 2008 – the Ministry was closed and instead a small Department for Integration was first placed in the Ministry for Children and Family, then in the Ministry of Justice and afterwards, since 2011

⁵ http://www.politika.lv/temas/sabiedribas_integracija/4104/

in the Ministry of Culture. After a couple of years and working on several different versions, the Ministry of Culture designed a new integration program in October 2011 which is supposed to be the representative document of integration policy until 2018. The program continues to make the ideological mistakes of the former integration policies and includes ideas of dividing people in old and new immigrants, other exclusions and ethnic determined hierarchies (More on this issue see: Hanov 2011b, p. 33-54).

The last two parliamentary elections in 2010 and 2011 already showed a growing radicalization of the parliament, an increase of the popularity of right-wing political groups as well as an intensified use of multimedia-based instruments for the electoral campaign. Before the parliamentary elections in September 2011, internet and multimedia-based protests as instruments for political propaganda came into action. The instrumentalization of the ethnic stereotypes and the collective political construction of the “we-community” and of the political and ethnic Other by the right conservative “National Alliance” was analysed in another article (Hanov 2011a, p. 24-42).

Within the present article there were new phenomena of interethnic tensions to be analysed, which were indicated in 2011 – the radicalization of political discourses of the ethnic minorities using the example of the internet campaign “For Mother Tongue” (Russian: За родной язык). Furthermore political activities on the internet will be analysed as a new tool for the spread of diaspora nationalism as well as a tool for creating collective identities.

According to the views of P. Gerstenfeld, D. Grant and C. Chiang, the internet serves as a tool for political extremism in many ways – by providing tools for political recruitment for excluded individuals, who thus become linked to others and small groups may become better linked among themselves. Another aspect provided by the internet and used by political extremists is the possibility to create, control and correct public image of the group, leaving extremist aesthetics and symbols behind and acquiring a socially more respectable image (Gerstenfeld, Grant, Chiang 2003, p. 38-40).

Spanish scholar Victor Sampedro writes that these challenges are a sign of changes in the role of traditional media. “Public television systems and the prestige press are not the platforms socializing citizens into imagined national spaces anymore. The contemporary media cannot fulfil the promise of melding and crystallizing a national identity fixed in a specific geographical territory; put differently, the media no longer address audiences as members of a single nation and space-bounded polity” (Sampedro 2011, p. 432).

Virtual communities have not been analysed sufficiently, mainly be-

cause the methodological approaches to the virtual empirical data are placed in the interdisciplinary approaches which take longer to be used by academia, still framed by disciplinary limitations. Although internet contents are analysed by political scientists, including conflict researchers, sociologists and historians, interdisciplinary approaches are still rare. Bowman-Grieve states that virtual communities are not isolated from physical realities and are as such to be analysed. The same author offers a definition of the term discourse applied to the content produced by virtual communities – following the concept of T. van Dijk, Bowman-Grieve views discourse as an event and event as such is a multi-media happening, which involves various actions of groups – this definition seems to the authors of the article the way into interdisciplinary research of internet political discourse (Bowman-Grieve 2009, p. 990, 995).

This time it is the discourse of minority groups which will be analysed further. The campaign which took place in the virtual reality, so our hypothesis, was intended to recruit Russian speaking minorities not only to put the signature, but to mobilize certain minority groups for political participation in terms of ethnic nationalism, which in this article will be described by the term *minority nationalism*. How this task should have been performed via cyber space? How were potential participants of the campaign addressed?

„The war is not over...“ How identity of the Russian speaking population in Latvia is constructed on the internet.

A pop-song by the Latvian duet Valters & Kaža which became popular a couple of years ago (they represented Latvia in Eurovision of 2005) includes the phrase “The war is not over...” as refrain. This song can be used to describe the current situation in Latvia because the period of the Second World War and the Soviet occupation still dominate political discussions concerning minorities. The discourse about the occupation period becomes visual in several festivals, days of commemoration, mass traditions and memoirs literature. The concept of occupation often collides with an alternative discourse about liberation rather than occupation, promoted by some left-wing politicians, such as member of the European Parliament Alfrēds Rubiks, who denied the occupation in his interview during the election night in September 2011. Another channel for the distribution of the discourse of liberation are Russian speaking printed media and also some associations. Within her analysis about divided memories, media expert Vita Zelče put it into the following thought: „In the frame of the confronta-

tion one sees the level of development of the State policy, the reception of democracy, conflicts and unity of interests, perceptions and beliefs” (Zelče, Muižnieks 2011, p. 170).

Conflicts concerning the interpretation of Latvian history are present within political discourses, including cyber space. The latest developments on the internet, which have been interpreted within this article, can be considered as a growing *cyber radicalization* or growing *virtual diaspora - nationalism of ethnic minorities*, partly developed as civic response to the right-wing Latvian discourses on ethnic minorities in modern Latvian society.

The following contents and forms of the campaign for the signature collection interpreted in the article show the political perspectives on minority participation shaped by Russian minority politicians and civil activists in Latvia. The campaign was analysed using the following structure: 1) *Logistics of the campaign* via internet resources, 2) *Ideological theses* and visual forms of protest discourse of the campaign.⁶

1. How the signatures were collected – Logistics of the Protest

The collection of signatures lasted one month, November 2011. The responsible government agency – Central Election Commission announced information about the procedures and addresses of the constituencies on their website.⁷ The mentioned non-citizens were not allowed to participate in this signature collection either.

Leader of the association “Mother Tongue” (Russian: Родной язык), Vladimir Linderman, ethnic Russian, national-Bolshevistic politician Eugene Osipov and Russian activist Alexander Gaponenko were those representatives of the Russian speaking civil activists in Latvia, who arranged the supportive campaign via website.

What means were designed and instrumentalized for the campaign? In addition to those classical tools like flyer, the speeches of the initiators of the campaign were published on the website – not only written but also video speeches.

The flyer, printed in Russian language, accumulated the technical information about the process of the collection of signatures: the necessary number of signatures, addresses of the constituencies and required docu-

6 All the internet materials have been analyzed during the period of 1-31 January 2012.

7 Address of the Commission: www.cvk.gov.lv

ments for participation (valid ID etc.). Despite the fact that non-citizens were not allowed to participate, the *concept of total political involvement* was formulated. The flyer was designed as a global project: it contained tasks for foreign citizens and non-citizens as well: The task of the Latvian non-citizens and foreign citizens consists of the conviction of as many Latvian citizens as possible, to put their signature.⁸

Since there is a large number of Latvian citizens that have emigrated to foreign EU countries for decades, this task was shaped as a global protest of those who support the rights of Russian language to become a second official language. The global character of the action was supported by usage of internet as the effective tool to create political networks of both citizens and non-citizens of Latvia, combining political activism with threatened ethnicity and the source of the threat was seen in the state language policy. Another important element of the logistics of the campaign was the initiative for founding a network of the “agitators” – volunteers that were able to inform and convince their neighbours to participate in the collecting of signatures. This possibility of political engagement was formulated within the call “Become activist in your apartment building!” (Picture 1).

Picture 1: Information about the spreading of flyers.

СТАНЬ АКТИВИСТОМ СВОЕГО ДОМА!

Поэтому нами, обществом «Родной язык», и была придумана схема распространения информации, которую мы назвали «Активист своего дома». Задача активиста проста: он распространяет наши листовки в своем подъезде, доме, среди друзей, родственников, коллег по работе. Это по силам любому человеку, поскольку не требует от него как-то ломать свой ежедневный маршрут. Все, так сказать, по пути.

Общество «Родной язык»

Stylistics as well as the content of the flyer, allow to interpret the information letter as an example of *ethnically shaped social activism* – not only is there the founding of a political network planned, but, moreover, the contacts among neighbourhood and colleagues as well as pedestrians on the street were intended to be used for the campaign.

Another communication tool, which could be defined as agitation elements of the campaign, were various interviews with ethnic Russian politi-

8 <http://www.za-rodnoj-jazik.lv/list1.jpg>

cians, businessmen and historians, which were published on the website. These texts, visual and printed, acoustic and multimedia-shaped – videos or music clips – can be considered the second most important element of the internet campaign – the ideological message of the initiative.

II Russian language or more? Contents of a political discourse about exclusion

Let us return to the already mentioned flyer. The content of the message is only one part of the planned effectiveness of the virtual campaign. In addition to the information about questions like “where” and “how” the signature of a proponent of the campaign can be placed, there was also information on the question “why” the campaign is of importance for members of Russian speaking minorities. The flyer illustrates some semiotic elements of the discourse of the protest and contains intertextual connotations, which can be interpreted as referring to the ethnic campaign of protest, awakening and “last fight”.

Picture 2 shows a young blond-haired woman in a black leather jacket that is pointing with her index finger towards the recipient of the message and therefore can address the recipient directly. Her gesture is not merely a call for support, it is an order. The design of the picture gives an obvious hint, that the authors of the poster made use of propaganda pictures of the Second World War: Mother Russia (picture 3) is the most obvious reference for the poster of the campaign.

Picture 2. Flyer “Have you set your signature for the Russian language?”



ЗА РУССКИЙ ЯЗЫК?

за родной язык

- Пункты сбора подписей будут работать **КАЖДЫЙ ДЕНЬ** с 1 по 30 ноября, воскресенья и праздничные дни.
- Пункты будут работать только по 4 (ЧЕТЫРЕ) ЧАСА в сутки (см. на обороте)
- При себе необходимо иметь ПАСПОРТ. За подписи ничего платить не над, где человек задекларирован, - подписаться можно на любом пункте сбора под
- Подписаться могут только граждане Латвии. Задача награжден ЛР и гра стран — убедить как можно большее число граждан Латвии пойти и по подписать за русский язык.
- Всего по Латвии надо собрать 154 379 подписей. Собранные на первом этапе подписи уже засчитаны. Подписавшиеся на первом этапе могут не идти под но это не значит, что они должны сидеть сложа руки. Ваша задача, как и у не убедить максимальное число граждан Латвии подписаться за русский язык.
- Не откладывайте поход на пункт сбора подписей на последние дни. Лучше с уже в первых числах ноября. Если хороший темп будет вост с первых дней, энергии всем неуверенным и сомневающимся, и они тоже подпишутся.

Дополнительная информация — на сайтах www.cvk.lv и www.za-rodnoj-jazik.lv
Тел. «Родного языка»: 22088157, 26698104.

Давайте наконец покажем правящему жулику и заре националистам, что у русских жителей Латвии есть гордость родной язык и чувство собственного достоинства. Вместе!

Владимир Линдерман, председатель общества «Ро
Евгений Осипов, Александр

Picture 3. Poster “Rodina Matj zovyot” [Motherland calls]



The picture of the flyer, similar to the claims of the voluntary mobilization of the Soviet military iconography, contains elements that indicate the evolving threats coming out of the discourse of the fight. Leo Gudkov stressed within his typology of the enemies that the enemy makes up an existential threat (Gudkov 2005, p. 14-15).

In addition to the visual message, which simulates the personal and direct approach, the textual message is another part of the discourse about the awakening and fight against a common enemy:

Let us finally show those ruling thieves and nationalists that the Russians in Latvia are proud of their mother tongue and that we have honour. Jointly we will be victorious!

This quotation shows the combination of two collective images of the Latvian political elite to be spread among the recruited minority citizens: Firstly, the belief of total corruption of the governing elite, and secondly, the elite is of other ethnic origin as the virtual community, thus it is *per definitionem* not “ours”, is not legitimate to perform politics. Both ideas represent

9 <http://www.za-rodnoj-jazik.lv/list1.jpg>

a combination of ethnic and civic alienation which are placed at the core of the message of the campaign and the contemporary Latvian political elite is made responsible for this situation. The interviews with representatives of the Russian public and companies, for example the owner of the fitness studio chain Valery Komarov, support the core thesis of the campaign:

“The defence of the Russian language conjoins all of us.”¹⁰

Rhetorical victory over the “alienated and thus illegitimate” elite and discourse about the exclusion of minorities and their mobilization through internet campaign and change of the status of Russian language signify the idea of transition from the status of the suppressed into the new condition – liberation discourse is present in the content of the campaign and is shown in various videos: interviews with Linderman and Osipov and the music video “Tied through one chain”. The last video, a combination of song and political message will be analysed further.

The three minute video is loaded with discourse of oppression and liberation through political mobilization. Elements of civic liberation movement of Afroamericans have been involved into the visual content of the campaign¹¹. The choices of the melody and the text as well as the visual pictures which accompany the content illustrate the idea of political participation as interpreted by the leading personalities of the campaign. The video, which can also be downloaded on YouTube, can be interpreted as a visual, multimedia-based summary of the ideological concept of the political campaign. The video is called “Video clip of the association “Mother Tongue”” and shows an additional warning before one gets to see the video, which states: “To very sensitive Russophobes it is not recommended to watch this video”¹².

The song chosen for the video was written by the Russian poet Ilya Kormiltzev (Кормильцев) and the famous singer of the rock band *Nautilus Pompilius* Wjatscheslav Butusov (Бутусов) in 1986. The popularity of the Russian rock music and this song in the Perestroika period in the end of the 1980s was immense. The text of the song is as follows: (presented here in direct, not literary version of the translation from Russian):

¹⁰ <http://www.za-rodnoj-jazik.lv/arhiv/komarov/komarov.html>

¹¹ The allusion to the Afroamericans as a discriminated group is a usual rhetoric element in the Russian-speaking press. The terminus *negr* (Black American in its pejorative version) is an acronym for the *negraždanin* (non-citizen).

¹² <http://www.za-rodnoj-jazik.lv/> in You Tube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vcqz1iNzBWM&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.za-rodnoj-jazik.lv%2F&feature=player_embedded

*Круговая порука мажет как копать,/ Nepotism greases like coal
Я беру чью-то руку, а чувствую локоть./ I take a hand, but find the an-
con*

*Я ищу глаза а чувствую взгляд,/ I search eyes, but find glances
Где выше голов находится зад./ Where ass is higher than head
За красным восходом розовый закат./ The red sunrise is followed by a
pink sunset*

Скованные одной цепью, связанные одной целью,/
Forged to one chain/Linked through one aim

Скованные одной цепью, связанные одной целью. (Refrain)

Здесь суставы вялы, а пространства огромны/

*Here there are muscles weak but territories huge
Здесь составы смяли, чтоб сделать колонны./*

*Here there were wagons melted together to form rows
Одни слова для кухонь, другие для улиц,/*

*One word for kitchen, another word for street
Здесь брошены орлы ради бройлерных куриц./*

*Here there were eagles forgotten for chicken
И я держу равнение, даже целуясь на/ And I am standing, while kissing*

Скованных одной цепью, связанных одной целью./Refrain

Скованных одной цепью, связанных одной целью.

*Можно верить и в отсутствии веры,/ One can believe in the denial of
belief*

Можно делать и в отсутствии дела./One can be busy without work

Нищие молятся, молятся на

То, что их нищета гарантирована./

*Beggars pray for their poverty being guaranteed
Здесь можно играть про себя на трубе,/ Here you can play on the tuba*

*Но как не играй, все играешь отбой./ No matter how you play, you play
the end*

И если есть те, кто приходят к тебе/

*And when there are those, who are coming to you
Найдутся и те, кто придут за тобой,/*

There are also those, who will come to get you

Так же

Скованные одной цепью, связанные одной целью,/ Refrain

Скованные одной цепью, связанные одной целью.

Здесь женщины ищут, но находят лишь старость,/

Here the women are looking and only find age

Здесь мерилом работы считают усталость./ Here work is measured by tiredness

Здесь нет негодяев в кабинетах из кожи,/

Here there are no bad guys in the leathered cabinets

Здесь первые на последних похожи./Here there are the first similar to the last

И не меньше последних устали быть, может быть./

And are not less tired then the last ones

Скованными одной цепью, связанными одной целью./Refrain

The song reflects the ideological conditions of the Soviet society in the end of the 1980s and hereby the political rhetorics of the late communism – the conformity and double standards of party elite, the economic slowdown of the planned economy, political exhaustion and emptiness. It is interesting, that the song text does not only criticize today's political elite in Latvia (corruptive political culture, bourgeois politicians), but it goes to conform with the theses of the right-conservative “National Alliance” campaign in the internet about the corruption of established politicians, who lead society into the wrong direction.¹³

Commonalities of the modern political radicalism – both right-wing and left-wing can be seen in the negation of the modern, dominant liberal democracy – pluralism and lobbying of group interests is seen as wrong and threatening phenomena of the political culture. The radical interpretation, as formulated in the campaign “For Mother Tongue” sees the Latvian democracy as a Latvian ethnic democracy in which a large group of the population, the ethnic minorities, predominantly Russians are ignored, suppressed and therefore this democracy can not be legitimate. Both political wings are declaring Latvian democracy in the present quality as not legitimate, as a democracy to be changed radically, introducing “right order” concept, based on abstract moral values, collective, not individual identities, on being together rather than being individual. Integration policies and the judicial status of the ethnic minorities are the core elements of the negation of the democracy – the vision of a reciprocal threat (Latvians are threatened by the claims of the minorities and Russians are threatened by discriminating politics of the Latvian elite) is the interpretation pattern for the construction of collective, confronting identities of the illustrated conflict parties in virtual space. The content of the web campaigns of “Na-

¹³ See interview with Raivis Dzintars on: www.visulativijaidodu.lv (the interview is in Latvian)

tional Alliance” and “For Mother Tongue” can be defined as a response of traditionalistic political groups which intend to offer stability via collective identities and these identities are based in exclusiveness of own ethnic origin. Following the concept of fluid modernity defined by Z. Bauman, the internet campaigns of both political counterparts can be described as the simulation of collective escape from fluidity of identities, choices, responsibilities and global threats, which, according to Bauman is not possible in the individualized society of fluid modernity (Bauman 2008, p. 160).

Certain historical parallels with the weakness of the Weimar democracy of the late 1920s, which was attacked by the radical left wing groups as well as the right-wing politicians, find similarities within the virtual discourses of ethnic tensions in Latvia's modern democracy. The examples and the logic of the argumentation from the electoral campaign of “National Alliance” can be found in the video by Linderman in form of the idea of mobilization of Russians in Latvia. In this case, leaders of the protest campaign on the internet participated in the video which fixed the idea of resistance. It should be stressed, that the original song from the 1980s (especially the text, but also musical passages) has been reshaped and the original piece was changed according to more topical political messages for the campaign. The musical style had as well some changes – Rock tunes were replaced by recitative Hip-Hop style. Which visual and textual elements of the video can be identified as elements of political mobilization on the internet?

First, the **visual elements**: The video takes place at different locations: right in the beginning it takes place in Riga, where one can see the masses of people during the demonstration against the education reform 2003/2004. The protest against the reform, which planned that 60% of all subjects in schools of minorities were taught in Latvian and 40% in Russian, came into force in 2004. These protests became the first massive political instruments of the mobilization of the Russian speaking population, among which the activity “Hands off the Russian schools” should be mentioned. Reports of the marches of minority youth in 2003 in different cities of Latvia have been used in the combination with solo parts of the leaders of the internet campaign.

Second: The marching masses are followed by the figure of Vladimir Linderman on a meadow, standing behind a white desk with a microphone. He sings:

“We have been broken and our mouths have been shut for so long / this is the hour, which we dreamed of/ so that Russian becomes official language / forged to one chain / linked through one aim”

After the refrain, which is accompanied by the marching masses, the second leader of the campaign appears. Eugene Osipov sings:

“They raised the hand on the most holy / and transformed us into beasts and mutes / 20 years of chaos / the Nazi does not want to calm down / but the Russian word is beating in the hearts / we are not to be defeated / our chain is not going to break”

The song continues with the refrain, showing Osipov on a horse galloping along the seacoast. The second part of the video forms single arias into a duet of Osipov and Linderman. They sing:

“This is our hour / the enemies are not laughing anymore / let the Russophobes spill their poison / we are marching in one group / for Russian language / for our freedom... / we are not scared / we are united...”

The young lady from the flyer is the third major singer of the song – with aggressive gesture (fists are moved with the rhythm towards the audience) she sings the following:

“Brother for Brother / Son for father...”

After her performance a picture of the former Saeima deputy of the social democratic party union “Concorde” Valery Kravcov appears. He became known for not being able to speak Latvian although he was elected deputy. In this video he plays the role of a semi-cleric, who is moving the bell of an Orthodox church and finally makes it sound solemnly. Until the end of the video (total running time 03:29) the song is accompanied by the bells of the church. These allusions to religion are examples of transformation religion experiences in secular society where its symbols are taken out of the traditional religious context, reshaped and used by consumer culture, media and political actors for their needs.

The last 30 seconds the pace of the song is accelerated, the voices of the singers sound more piercing, the voice of the woman becomes even more hysterical. The change of visual symbols is becoming faster – all of the four performers appear more quickly after each other.

The video ends with the web address of the campaign “For Mother Tongue”. For the design of the video, paramilitary aesthetics and sepia colours were chosen. The website itself was designed and laid out like one about a quasi military conflict – the memorial for Soviet soldiers, which

was built in the 1980s in Riga at the Place of Victory (during the authoritarian regime of president Ulmanis from 1934 until 1940 song festivals and military parades took place there). The website shows a line of a poem by Anna Achmatova “The hour of braveness struck and braveness will not leave us...”

Picture 4. Streamer of the website “Za rodnoj jazik”



Summary: Virtual self-images of Russians in Latvia. No dialog in future?

Contents, visual, acoustic and multi-media based forms of the analysed internet campaign “For Mother Tongue” enable to draw certain theses about the image of the Latvian Russians as shaped by the leaders of the campaign. At the same time the formulated theses underneath are relevant for the current intercultural dialogue in Latvia.

Firstly: There are basic ideological similarities between the campaign “For Mother Tongue” and the electoral campaign of the “National Alliance”. Although the ideological constructions of both websites were created as forms of the modern political “urban radicalism” for technologically linked metropolitan youth, which is supposed to be ethnically homogeneous (only Latvians as target group of the “National Alliance” and exclusively Russians as audience of the campaign “For Mother Tongue”) there were only fragmented features that differed – both campaigns of the virtual radicalism are especially characterized by antipathy against the ethnic Other. *The ideologically defined elimination of a collective memory of the Other* (occupation or Latvia’s rescue during the Great War for the Fatherland against fascism) takes place in both political campaigns. The “we-community” is defined as the “remembrance community”. As Baiba Bela stressed in her research paper on ethnicity, it plays the predominant role in national identities of various ethnic groups in Latvia (Bela 2011, p. 50).

Linderman did try to include the “Latvian brothers” in his New Year’s greetings to the Russian speaking population and therefore to reduce the fear of the referendum on February 18, 2012. Still, his rhetoric is marked by the non-acceptance of those collective fears in the shape of the widely spread national-conservative discourses among ethnic Latvians which is the ideo-

logical basis for the Latvian conservative political discourse on minorities. Right wing ideology is not legitimate. It is basically wrong and oppressive and thus is close to being non-existent. This interpretation of the past of the Other is linked to the contemporary discourse of the rights of the Other – the past which is not accepted shapes the non-acceptance of the community in the present. This concept, which blocks the dialogue about the modernity of the interethnic relations, leads to a legitimacy of the discourse of an exclusion of the Other from sharing political power. Past helps to publicly accept the normality of the exclusion of the ethnic counterpart – both web campaigns illustrate the discursive pejorative status of the Other.

Political exclusion is based not only on the past traumas. It appears within several patterns which can be found in the contents of the campaign “For Mother Tongue” – the authors of the campaign have the notion of a society within which there exists ethnically shaped family, a close, homogenous group, which can be linked through similar memories.

Secondly: This tendency of close community is supported by the discourse about the threat of the ethnic community through the language politics of the Other: The version of the “National Alliance” makes the Russian language and the “Concorde” party the most dangerous threat to the Latvian language. And the other way around, the campaign for the collection of signatures draws the line of the language community as the certain border, which is constantly being attacked by the Latvian political elite. The language is considered as the basis of identity on both sides. In the case of the internet campaign one can see a basic change of the traditional Russian nationalism paradigm – in contrast to the all-embracing, integrative Slavophil nationalism, which is closely linked to the imperial territorial discourse – the internet campaign can be interpreted as a sign of radical forms of diaspora-nationalism developed in Latvia in the context of non-citizens, ethnic nationalism concepts and fragmented presence of civic elements of nationalism in integration politics. In this case Russian language becomes an instrument of struggle for political participation, for change of status and at the same time a tool for non-acceptance of predominant political culture. Dialogue as a political tool is viewed within the internet campaign as passé, as outdated. Various images of enemies have been created and articulated within the campaign.

Thirdly: Underlying the concept of threat to the community, the idea of a community is in a permanent status of crisis: Paramilitary aesthetics, masculine symbols, accessories or status elements (desk, horse, loudspeaker, leather jacket, etc.), as well as sacred, warlike connections with the Orthodox church (moving the bell as a symbol of mobilization of the suppressed, is contamination with the movie by Sergey Eisenstein “Alex-

ander Nevsky” (1938) – these elements construct ethnic community as a war community, including even women as amazons, or better *frontovije podruzi* (Russian: female soldiers in the Great War for the Fatherland).

In contrast to this image of a female participant in the political action online, the idea of community of the “National Alliance” is rather patriarchal, without political presence of women. Linderman’s call for ethnic awakening has been an effective ideological tool: because the Russian party “Concorde” did not succeed becoming part of the government, this failure supports the idea of a new beginning in terms of collective civic actions. This political failure is seen as a signal for the start of a certain social activism, including activities on the internet, which should lead to the political emancipation of the minorities.

To sum up the analysis of the web campaign, the elements of the radical political discourses can be interpreted as a sign of a growing interethnic radicalization on the Latvian internet. Such phenomena as ethnic communities, collective memories and other actual or imaginative artefacts of the identity indicate a consolidation of conflict based concepts of the radical politicians in Latvia.

This process runs along with the support of conflict-filled concepts and communication of the established, more moderate politicians – the signature of Nil Ushakov for the referendum, the stereotypical announcements of Kārlis Šadurskis, former minister of education during the education reform in 2003, etc. These public actions bring forward the media-shaped and performative virtual radicalism. The spread of acceptance of a dichotomic society concept among the political elite and a large part of the population, also via cyber politics especially among young people, distributes a basis and virtual resources for a more effective presence of the radical ethnic nationalism within the Latvian society. Sadly a part of intellectuals supported this dichotomic vision and saw the referendum as the test that shows who are “traitors” and who – “proper” citizens (this was rhetoric employed by internationally known stage director Alvis Hermanis).¹⁴ The same can be said also about people like lawyer and writer of popular histories Andris Grūtups who did not hesitate to point to the ethnic background of Linderman (Jew) thus adding to the debates anti-semitic flavour.¹⁵

14 Hermanis referendumu uzskata par testu Latvijas nodevējiem. In: http://www.satori.lv/raksts/3992/Hermanis_referendumu_uzskata_par_testu_Latvijas_nodevejiem

15 Grūtups: Ebrejs Lindermans cenšas sanādot latviešus un krievus. In: <http://zinas.nra.lv/latvija/66108-grutups-ebrejs-lindermans-cenas-sanaidot-latviesus-un-krievus.htm>

Of course, there are also other opinion makers in the contemporary Latvia who are trying to present in public space ideas of reconciliation between conflicting communities. One example of that is "Manifesto of Good Will" (Labas gribas manifesti) signed among others also by state president Andris Bērziņš.¹⁶ As the basis of this document served theses submitted by Latvian Lutheran theologian Juris Rubenis, a popular personality since end of eighties when he was involved in the leadership of the Popular Front of Latvia. The impact of such a document is lessened by the fact that it is too general and even ways how people can sign it (in the office of state president) were not designed for wider society. It also raises the question why such a document appeared too late and why religious groups have said so little about issues like justice and ethnic reconciliation.

The thesis of this article that Russian and Latvian right wings groups are similar in many ways proves itself again – Russian and Latvian right wing politicians were sceptical of these attempts. Linderman said that the manifesto will attract those Russians who are loyal to Latvian political elite.¹⁷ Right wing Latvian politician Raivis Dzintars said that even if he considers the manifesto a good and positive thing he will not sign it because it leaves some questions unanswered.¹⁸

Months after the referendum will show whether politicians and society will draw constructive conclusions from the referendum or further escalation of ethnic politics will be witnessed while the municipal elections are approaching in 2013. The minority nationalism will no doubt be a factor of the pre-election campaigns next year. The referendum and the cyber activities which shaped the pre-referendum period in 2011 gave a decisive frame for the forming of diaspora nationalism of the non-Latvian, Russian speaking minorities, combining issues of limited discursive participation of both, minorities citizens and non-citizens in the political process.

¹⁶ http://www.president.lv/images/modules/art_description/file/19117/manifests-pdfaa.pdf

¹⁷ Lindermans: Labas gribas manifesta mērķis ir atrast labos un lojālos krievus. In: <http://zinat.nra.lv/latvija/politika/66308-lindermans-labas-gribas-manifesta-merkis-ir-atrast-labos-un-lojalos-krievus.htm>

¹⁸ Arī Āboltiņa parakstīs "Labas gribas manifestu". In: <http://www.labdien.lv/tag/labas-gribas-manifests/>

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<http://www.am.gov.lv/lv/latvia/integracija/integracijas-politika/kultura/>

www.cvk.lv

<http://www.labdien.lv/tag/labas-gribas-manifests/>

<http://www.tn2012.cvk.lv/>

www.za-rodnoj-jazik.lv

www.president.lv

http://www.satori.lv/raksts/3992/Hermanis_referendumu_uzskata_par_testu_Latvijas_nodevejiem

<http://zinas.nra.lv/latvija/politika/66308-lindermans-labas-gribas-manifesta-merkis-ir-atrast-labos-un-lojalos-krievus.htm>

<http://zinas.nra.lv/latvija/66108-grutups-ebrejs-lindermans-censas-sanaidot-latviesus-un-krievus.htm>

www.visulativijaidodu.lv

Sébastien Gobert**KARTA POLAKA: IN THE INTEREST OF POLONIA OR POLAND?**

The Polish government has been openly trying to enhance the unity of a Polish “de-territorialized nation-state”, since the democratic transition in the early 1990’s. The adoption of the “Karta Polaka” (*Pole’s Card*) represents its latest and most far-reaching initiative toward Polish communities in the post-Soviet space. Despite its official design as a unifying tool between the Polish motherland and its diaspora, the Card is strongly criticized both by Polish communities abroad and their “host states”. Using some elements of definition on diasporas and statistics on the dissemination of “Polonia” across the world, the author describes the intensification of the relations between Poland and its diaspora after the fall of the communist regime, and analyzes the provisions and the impact of the “Repatriation Act”. In a second part, the author argues that the provisions of the “Karta Polaka” weaken features of the Polish ethnic identity instead of strengthening its integrity. Finally, the article demonstrates that, despite its negative impact on segments of “Polonia” and diplomatic relation with Poland’s eastern neighbours, the “Karta Polaka” is nevertheless designed to produce political and economic benefits for the country.

Key words: Pole’s Card, Polish motherland, Polonia, diaspora, de-territorialized nation-state

On 9 March 2009, an official ceremony took place in Baku, Azerbaijan, in the presence of the Polish ambassador, Polish association representatives and Ms. Helena Szejch-Zade, the oldest member of the Polish community

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in the country. She was handed the first “Karta Polaka” (translated as: *Pole’s Card*) in Azerbaijan. Perceived as a sign of strengthened bonds between Poland and its large and widespread diaspora, so-called “Polonia”, this event assumed a particular symbolic importance. Indeed, the Polish government has been openly trying to enhance the unity of a Polish “de-territorialized nation-state” (Basch, Glick-Schiller, Blanc-Szanton 1994), since the democratic transition in the early 1990’s. The adoption of the “Karta Polaka” in September 2007 by the Polish Parliament (*Sejm*) represents its latest and most far-reaching initiative toward Polish communities in the post-Soviet space.

Despite its official design as a unifying tool between the Polish motherland and its diaspora, the Card is strongly criticized both by Polish communities abroad and their “host states”. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the “Karta Polaka” is a better tool for Poland or for “Polonia”. One might expect that this initiative is a response to an actual demand by “Polonia” representatives. However, I argue here that it has been designed more in the interests of the Polish government, both in terms of international influence and of economic benefits through attracting skills and investment to the country. Furthermore, it has been poorly elaborated and without consulting the other parties concerned, namely Polish communities and their host states, which leads to a loosened concept of a so-called Polish ethnic identity and to increased international tensions.

Using some elements of definition on diasporas and statistics on the dissemination of “Polonia” across the world, I describe the intensification of the relations between Poland and its diaspora after the fall of the communist regime, and I analyze the provisions and the impact of the “Repatriation Act”. In a second part, I argue that the provisions of the “Karta Polaka” weaken features of the Polish ethnic identity instead of strengthening its integrity. Finally, I demonstrate that, despite its negative impact on segments of “Polonia” and diplomatic relation with Poland’s eastern neighbours, the “Karta Polaka” is nevertheless designed to produce political and economic benefits for the country.

Background information on “Polonia”

Takeyuki Tsuda defines diasporas as “ethnic groups that have been territorially dispersed across different nations because of ethnopolitical persecution or for economic reasons and are united by a sense of attachment to and longing for their country of ethnic origin (the ethnic homeland)” (Tsuda 2009, p. 1). In the same perspective, Gabriel Sheffer stresses the “bi-

ological” components of diasporas, which are “more rigid in identity” than other forms of ethnic minorities because of their “struggle for survival” as groups. In this sense, diasporas are “neither ‘imagined’ nor ‘invented’ communities. Their identities are intricate combinations of primordial, psychological, and instrumental elements. These identities may undergo certain adaptations to changing circumstances, yet they do not lose their core characteristics” (Sheffer 2006, p. 7). In Sheffer’s view, diaspora consist in what has been termed “deterritorialized social entities” (Sheffer 2006, p. 116), which are characterized by three major criteria: the “maintenance and the development of an own collective identity in the ‘diasporised people’ ... the existence of an internal organisation distinct from those existing in the country of origin or in the host country ... [and] significant contacts with the homeland”, either real (i.e. travel, remittances) or symbolic (i.e. political speech, cultural festivals, etc.) (Anteby-Yemini, Berthomiere 2005, p. 263). In a “shrinking world”, to use Allen and Hamnet’s expression (Allen, Hamnet 1996), one notices renewed and intensified contacts between diasporas and their homelands, as a combination of different factors makes it easier. Nevertheless, Sheffer notices that the “triangular relationships”, which are at the core of a diaspora’s interactions with its “host state” and its homeland are often determined by the latter’s “ambiguous attitudes” toward its communities abroad (Sheffer 2006, p.7).

The Polish nation has had a strong tradition of emigration for centuries. As a result of economic and political factors, as well as significant upheavals of history, approximately 15 to 20 million people throughout the world could claim Polish descent. This makes “Polonia” one of the largest diasporas in the world. The most significant communities are located in the United States (about 10 million), in Germany (about 2 million), in Brazil (about 1,5 million), in France (about 1 million), in Great Britain (about 1 million) and in Canada (about 850,000).¹ A large part of “Polonia” is also disseminated across the post-Soviet space. Indeed, there are between 1,5 and 3 million individuals of Polish descent residing in the 15 post-Soviet republics. Whereas the former group results mostly from successive waves of economic migration, the latter is almost exclusively a consequence of political factors, such as wars, border changes and political persecution by


¹ Rough estimations based on countries’ figures. As much as possible, this paper is based on the broadest perception of “Polonia”, so as to understand the diaspora problematic in its largest dimension.

the Tsarist and Soviet regimes.² Let us stress that the following figures, provided by the latest national censuses in the countries mentioned, are yet mere estimations. Indeed, a combination of political factors and issues of respondents' self-identification makes it quite difficult to obtain accurate numbers. Moreover, most of these censuses were carried out in the early 2000's, which does not reflect demographic evolutions in the last decade.

Hence, about 396,000 ethnic Poles were numbered in Belarus in 1999, although various NGOs believe that up to 800,000 inhabitants could claim Polish descent. About 235,000 ethnic Poles were recorded by census in Lithuania in 2001 (concentrated in the greater Vilnius area); about 173,000 in Russia in 2002; about 144,000 in Ukraine in 2001 (mostly in its western regions) and about 60,000 in Latvia in 2000.

Considering the category of post-Soviet states with a large Polish community, Kazakhstan is a particular case, which was at the heart of the 2001 "Repatriation Act", as I show below. Its territory was used by Tsarist and Soviet regimes as an open-air jail for political opponents and rebellious nationalities from all corners of the empire. Due to these deportations, the 1981 census showed that about 65,000 ethnic Poles were residing on the republic's territory. Yet, many of them enjoyed the relative openness of the "Perestroika" from 1985 onwards to migrate back to Poland. Thus, by 1991, this number had dropped to about 47,000. It is likely that this trend accelerated after the collapse of the USSR and the adoption of the so-called "Repatriation Act" in 2001. Krystyna Iglicka, when investigating the situation of Polish "fellow countrymen" in Kazakhstan, clearly states that "it seems impossible to determine the precise number of Kazakhs of Polish ancestry living at present in Kazakhstan" (Iglicka 1998, p. 6). Such a statement seems even more accurate at the time being. As these figures show, eastern "Polonia" is quite numerous and widespread across the post-Soviet space. Moreover, it assumes a particular symbolic dimension because of its intimate connection to the political history of Poland.

² With the most notable exception of Germany, where a large Polish presence is due both to economic and political factors.



"Polonia" & Poland: intensified relations after a "major reconfiguration of the relationship with the global system" (Smith 2003)

Diaspora awareness seems to have never been a fundamental issue for Polish émigrés. For example, Jeanine Ponty has demonstrated that inter-war Polish migrants to France were not expecting to be "denationalized" after their resettlement but were hoping to preserve and develop their community structures and identity (Ponty 2001). In a wider context, Donald Pienkos chronicles how worldwide "Polonia" has politically and financially

supported the Polish cause from 1863 until 1991 (Pienkos 1987; Pienkos 1991). Despite the evidence of cultural and political diaspora awareness, “Polonia” as a “deterritorialized social entity” (Sheffer 2006, p. 116) seems to have undergone a structural redefinition since the early 1990’s thanks to political developments in the former communist bloc.

It seems to be a part of a more global trend of what Anupam Chander coined “the rise of diasporas” (Chander 2001). Drawing upon Benedict Anderson’s language of an “imagined community”, James Clifford states that “the language of diaspora is increasingly invoked by displaced peoples who feel (maintain, revive, invent) a connection with a prior home”. According to him, three main features explain this phenomenon. As Anderson demonstrates, people first began to imagine nations as a result of the interaction between capitalism, print communication, and linguistic diversity. Clifford considers that diaspora consciousness has been strengthened in recent years because of the increasing wealth of diasporas located in prosperous, industrialized states; revolutions in transportation and communication technologies and a persisting feeling of difference, enhanced by a deepening sense of an individual right to define one’s identity in modern liberal societies (Clifford 1994; Chander 2001, p. 1023). Furthermore, Robert Smith argues that homelands “tend to redefine their relationships with their diasporas when they experience a major reconfiguration in their relationship with the global system that causes a domestic political crisis in national identity, under conditions within which emigrants are seen to have become potentially or actually of greater strategic importance” (Smith 2003, p.2). Indeed, the Polish state has gained renewed interest in enhancing its diaspora’s unity, thanks to both the collapse of the communist regime and to recent NATO and European Union (EU) memberships.

This interest in present-day Poland might be observed through a large set of institutions and associations. While the recreated Senate (*Senat*)³, the upper chamber of the Polish parliament, was officially put in charge of relations with “Polonia” in the early 1990’s, many cultural and business associations have emerged over the past twenty years, usually enjoying political support and public funding. For example, the largest non-governmental organization, the association “Polish Community” (*Wspólnota Polska*) is

³ The Polish *Senat* was abolished in a 1946 referendum organized by the communist regime, both because of the concentration of powers in the government’s hand and of its symbol as a former council of close advisors to Polish kings. It was re-established after the 1989 negotiations between Solidarność and the government.

dedicated to the general cause of retaining ties between Poland and its diaspora. More specifically, the “Foundation Aid to Poles in the East” (*Fundacja Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzie*) aims at providing support for Polish cultural and educational institutions in the post-Soviet space. Moreover, relations with “Polonia” have been encouraged by the establishment of symbolic events, such as “Polonia Day”, which is celebrated every May 2nd since 2002 and the so-called “World Polonia Games”, which are held in Poland every two years since 1997.

In this context of intensifying connections between Poland and its diaspora, the state has encouraged “diasporic homecomings”, to use Tsuda’s expression (Tsuda 2009). Christian Joppke interprets such a migration policy as a shift from negative to positive discrimination in ethnic selectivity, in order to encourage “ethnomigrants” to participate in the development of a “de-territorialized nation-state”. Such a policy is based on the assumption that immigrants returning to the homeland would be culturally similar, because of a common ancestry. Such similarities involve a responsibility of the motherland state regarding the unity of a “de-territorialized cultural nation of co-ethnics” (Joppke 2005, p. 159). Such a “re-ethnicization of membership” (i.e. the extension of membership on the basis of descent) appears to be a global trend (Joppke 2003, p. 442-454). Countries such as Mexico, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Spain, India and very recently Hungary have implemented ethno-policies, namely the extension of dual citizenship provisions, aimed at (re)asserting ties with alleged “co-ethnic” populations.

In the Polish case, this underlying logic led to the adoption of the so-called “Repatriation Act” in January 2001, expressively designed to govern the influx of ethnic Poles residing in Central Asia (which meant, in practice, Kazakhstan) who have experienced disadvantages due to deportation, exile or ethnically-motivated persecution. This law has been facilitating visa processes for selected applicants, combined with an automatic attainment of Polish citizenship upon arrival in the country. Not only does the “Repatriation Act” intend to make up for the past sufferings of deported Poles, but it is also based on a strict understanding of Polish ethnic identity. In order to be selected, applicants have to comply with a certain number of conditions, such as to prove that two great grandparents or one of their parents or grandparents were of Polish nationality; to demonstrate a clear commitment to Polish nationality by cultivating the language, culture and customs; and to prove a guarantee of sufficient accommodation in Poland as well as a source of maintenance, or an official invitation by a Polish municipality.

The success of this law has been quite limited. Indeed, the number of

visas issued each year to Polish repatriates has scarcely exceeded 300. One explanation might be the obvious difficulty for Kazakh Poles to secure accommodation and a source of maintenance in Poland before moving to the country. Furthermore, members of the younger generation display difficulties in mastering the language and the culture. Additionally, low budgets and economic problems have limited the ability of Polish municipalities to invite and take care of potential “ethnomigrants”. Iglicka also demonstrated that these ethnic kin did not fit into the idealized image of the Poles in the east. Most of them displayed scarce knowledge of the Polish language and customs as well as a deep disinterest in the Catholic religion. Furthermore, young generations seemed much more attracted to the Russian-speaking cultural features than to Polish-speaking ones (Iglicka 1998). Hence, ethnic repatriation led to integration problems and occurrences of racial and cultural discrimination once settled in Poland. Finally, EU membership forced Poland to tighten its visa requirements, which seriously undermined the impact of the “Repatriation Act”.⁴ This policy of “diasporic homecoming” has thus produced limited effects, which has strongly contradicted Poland’s ambition to foster the unity of the nation.

The “Karta Polaka”: strengthening Polish ethnic identity with loosened requirements

The semi-failure of the “Repatriation Act” and the “reconfiguration” of Poland’s “relationship with the global system” (i.e. the NATO and EU memberships) led the government to create a new tool to redefine its connections with the Poles in the east. Moreover, the post-EU accession coincided with a conservative and populist crystallization of the political sphere, mostly due to the frustrations resulting from the pressures that Western European countries had laid on Poland in the run-up to EU membership and to the economic and social conjunctures. It led to the elections of Lech Kaczyński in December 2005 as President and of his twin brother, Jarosław, in July 2006 as Prime Minister. Their political agenda was openly based on the idea of returning to a nationally homogeneous traditional society. Such circumstances corresponded to Smith’s argument of a “domestic political crisis in national identity”, which increased the “strategic importance” and the symbolic value of “Polonia” (Smith 2003, p. 2). Thus, the “Karta Polaka” bill was passed on 7 September 2007, as one of the last political successes of

⁴ The issues induced by such a constraint are best summarized in the controversy surrounding the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and the mobility of its residents. This remains a political headache even to the present.

the outgoing Prime Minister. It came into force on 29 March 2008.

Cards are deliverable to ethnic Poles in the 15 Post-Soviet states, in which they have no access to dual citizenship. The “Karta Polaka” is issued by consulate authorities and is valid for ten years, extendable upon the holder’s request.⁵ In order to obtain the Card, applicants have to demonstrate similar features of their Polish identity as the ones required for a visa under the “Repatriation Act”: to prove that one parent or grandparent or two great-grandparents were ethnic Poles and to demonstrate at least a basic knowledge of Polish. “The Warsaw Voice” expressively stressed the facility of the language tests, made up of “a simple text to read and asking a few commonplace questions about their family, the weather and the time”. In case these two conditions can not be fulfilled, applicants have to possess a certificate from an expatriate Polish organization stating one’s commitment to the promotion of Polish culture and language. This alternative condition makes the assertion of one’s identity quite flexible. Every application is coupled with a questionnaire, comprised of about 150 questions “about traditions, customs, literature and geography. For example, [applicants might be asked] where the Wawel Dragon “lives” (in Cracow), how elegant Polish men greet women (kiss them on the hand), and what Poles eat on “Fat Thursday” (donuts)” (W.Z. 2008). This set of questions leads one to wonder about the very relevance of the understanding of the ethnic and cultural Polish identity promoted by the “Karta Polaka”.

The provisions of the Card are clearly designed to allow more people to apply than for the “Repatriation Act”. The bill also instituted a five-person Council for Poles in the East (*Rada do Spraw Polaków na Wschodzie*), to which rejected applicants might appeal to contest the Polish authorities’ decision. Moreover, the new right-wing government passed an amendment in September 2008, which made some of the requirements more flexible, in order to enlarge the number of people entitled to hold the document. A first provision extended the eligibility to the Card to stateless individuals, which favoured the Polish communities in Estonia and Latvia. A second provision made demonstrating evidence of relatives’ Polish ancestry unnecessary: applicants might now just have to prove it on the basis of their own documents (i.e. birth certificate).

Hence, this reform tends to further loosen the “biological” content of the Polish diaspora and of the Polish ethnic identity, which corresponds to Tsuda’s idea. He recalls that after the second generation of emigrants,

⁵ One exception to this rule: In case the holder of the Card is over 65 years old, it is then valid for life.

“transnational ethnic ties are based on an imagined, nostalgic, ethnic affinity to an ancestral country that most have never visited” (Tsuda 2009, p. 25). In this sense, although the diaspora itself is not “invented”, the ethnic return migration is a type of “forged transnationality”, that is the creation of new transnational connections instead of the continuation of pre-existing linkages in the country of residence (Schein 1998). Tsuda states that ethnicity “is based on a collective consciousness of both shared racial descent and commonalities in cultural heritage that differentiate a particular social group from others” (Tsuda 2009, p.6). In this particular case, however, it seems that the notion of “collective consciousness” is not very appropriate, and I refer more to the notion of “subjective belief”, as it has been coined by Max Weber (Weber 1961). Indeed, according to Tsuda, “ethnicity is highly situational in practice, and perceptions of racial and cultural commonality and difference are constantly subject to redefinition depending on particular social contexts”. He notices that, during the process of “diasporic homecoming”, “ethnicity shifts from race to culture”: at first, individuals display a “subjective belief [in] ethnic affinities” that channels their migration toward a given “homeland”. Nevertheless, once settled in this country, they face cultural marginalization, sometimes even racial discrimination (Tsuda 2009, p.6). This implies that diasporic homecomings are not necessarily the “migrations of ethnic unmixings” that Rogers Brubaker described (Brubaker 1995; Brubaker 1998). Indeed, minority ethnic groups might move from one country to another because of ethnic affinities. Yet, they remain a minority once settled in their so-called “homeland” because of cultural and linguistic differences. Although the “Karta Polaka” is not meant to induce a massive return of eastern “Polonia” to Poland, its loose set of requirements threatens to undermine the integrity of the Polish ethnic identity.

As already stated, although fostering a “re-ethnicisation of membership” (Joppke 2003, p. 442-454), the “Karta Polaka” is not an ethnic repatriation program. It consists of acknowledging one’s belonging to the Polish nation and in granting some concrete privileges. A similar initiative was launched by the right-wing Hungarian government in June 2001, on similar grounds (i.e. the so-called Hungarian Status Law). Such an idea has also been suggested in Lithuania and in Russia, which face constitutional and political obstacles against the extension of dual citizenship provisions to segments of their respective diasporas. Such a symbolic document appears to be a convenient ethno-political tool to bypass restrictive legislations on citizenship, either on a domestic or an international level, and to grant preferential treatment to “co-ethnic” populations abroad.

In the Polish case, the “Karta Polaka” enables its holder to be reim-

bursed for the cost of a Schengen visa, offers access to Polish schools and universities, makes it easier to obtain state scholarships, get a job and conduct business operations in Poland and even grants some discounts in public transportation and national museums. Although it does not offer any kind of welfare to its holder, the Card still ensures access to medical care in emergencies or for any serious health issues (accidents, poisoning or childbirth). However, the possession of the Karta Polaka does not condition the granting of either a Schengen visa, or residence permit in Poland, or Polish citizenship. It is, nevertheless, based on the assumption that the holders share common national cultural features, do not require any cultural re-adoption in their interactions with Poland and might prove to be valuable assets for Polish economic development.

A powerful political tool

Despite the threat to the integrity of Polish ethnic identity, one might indeed perceive the “Karta Polaka” as a very useful tool for Poland. The Card better serves the interests of the “homeland” than the diaspora. Indeed, one of the expected advantages of the “Karta Polaka” is an influx of “co-ethnic” workers from the east to fill the job vacancies due to Polish migration westwards after EU accession. The news agency “Interia.pl” reported that Polish consulates in Ukraine foresaw that at least half of the applicants for the “Karta Polaka” expressed an interest in setting up a business or finding a job in Poland, where the average salary is more than two times higher. Nevertheless, over two years after the introduction of the Card, no accurate data is available on this issue.⁶

Apart from the economic fallouts, the political influence Poland might gain through the holders of the Card seems to have been an important point of Jarosław Kaczyński’s approach. Let us note that neither his government nor its successor consulted any of the countries concerned regarding the drafting or the implementation of the law. Speaking in reference to Lithuania in March 2010, Stanisław Cygnarowski confirmed that no talks had ever been conducted between the two governments, despite a clear call from Vilnius for intergovernmental consultations⁷. Hence, the introduction of the Card has been perceived as pure interference in post-Soviet states’ domestic affairs.

⁶ Answers received from Stanisław Cygnarowski by e-mail on 26 March 2010.

⁷ Stanisław Cygnarowski works at the Department of Cooperation with Polish Diaspora at the Polish Foreign Ministry. Answers received by e-mail on 26 March 2010.

In Belarus, the Polish initiative has thus provoked nervous reactions from the government, which officially demanded the Polish consulates to suspend issuing the document until “the dispute is resolved by international lawyers.” It evoked the possibility to take the case to the Council of Europe and to renegotiate the “Karta Polaka” within the framework of the Venice Commission (W.Z. 2008).⁸ As a justification for this request, the Belarussian authorities pointed out that introducing the Card might “seriously destabilize relations between the two nations, increase tension in Belarussian society, and breed mistrust between Belarussian citizens of different nationalities” (Telegraph. by: 08.02.2008). As the press reported, though, it was quite obvious that the actual reason was the anxiety of the authoritarian government to lose control over Polish communities living in its western regions. Moreover, should the Card be delivered to ethnic Poles in large numbers, one might foresee that the official demographic figures would be proved wrong and that Polish cultural and political influence would be significantly reinforced. Indeed, given the Belarussian political context, the Polish kin-state would strengthen its moral obligation to meddle in the country’s domestic affairs. Such a perspective might unbalance the “triangular relationship” between a diaspora, its host state and its homeland (Sheffer 1986; Sheffer 2006, p. 7). The recent row between the two countries in February-March 2010 and the Polish intervention, which was supported by the European Parliament, tend to confirm this possibility.⁹

More generally speaking, and independent from intervention on behalf of Polish kin, the political impact of the introduction of the Karta Polaka is more likely to be translated into an increased and legitimized Polish influence on its neighbours’ affairs. This possibility would first apply to Ukraine, regarding which the Polish government has publicly expressed its interest and support after the 2004 “Orange Revolution”. It is likely that a large number of “Karta Polaka” holders residing in Ukraine would reinforce the

⁸ The “European Commission for Democracy through Law” is an advisory body of the Council of Europe, specialized in constitutional assistance both to the member states of the Council and to third states (since 2002). It was established in May 1990 and it meets four times a year in Venice.

⁹ In early February 2010, the Belarussian police organized a crackdown on the Polish minority in the country, namely in imprisoning Polish representatives and in taking over a building owned by the Union of Poles in Belarus (*Związek Polaków na Białorusi*), which is backed by Warsaw but not recognized by Minsk. Poland instantly recalled its ambassador and took the case to the European Union. The “Europeanization” of this issue resulted in a much stronger pressure on the Belarussian government.

Polish government’s commitment to support the country’s drive towards EU and NATO membership, although recent political developments in Ukraine might challenge such a trend.

In terms of diplomatic relations, the very relevance of the post-Soviet space as a field of implementation of the “Karta Polaka” seems questionable. Indeed, the law does not take national differences into account and considers these states as if they were a single, coherent bloc of governments that have “deprived” ethnic Poles of their fundamental freedoms. Hence, the Polish governments have ignored the structural differences between states such as Lithuania, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which stirred up many tensions. In this respect, Lithuania, a NATO member state, one of Poland’s closest strategic partners within the EU and hosting a large Polish community, has been one of the states to react most vehemently, even considering imposing sanctions on holders of the Card. In February 2009, Gintaras Songaila, a conservative Member of Parliament (*Seimas*), publicly stated that two MPs who represented the Polish minority should resign for having applied for the “Karta Polaka”. He was supported in his pledge by a large number of MPs as well as by Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius. During an interview conducted in April 2010 in Vilnius, Songaila stressed that such a political row was first provoked by the lack of consultation from Polish officials, which he interpreted as a sign of disdain. According to him, this was a part of a larger process of instrumentalizing Polish communities abroad in what Katarzyna Korzeniowska coined a “friendly re-polonization” (1999). Apart from this anxiety, the problem that Lithuanian officials pointed out is the issue of Lithuanian Poles’ loyalty to the Lithuanian state, and the risk of undermining the integrity of Lithuanian citizenry (*Rzeczpospolita*: 20.02.2009). This specific case highlights one more idea: if the introduction of the “Karta Polaka” seems to be quite valuable for Poland and its government, it does not necessarily support ethnic Poles living abroad in improving relations with their states of residence.

One more example in Lithuania confirms this assumption: in the drafting of the “Karta Polaka” bill, the Polish minority representatives have had to repeatedly appeal to the Polish government for the name of the Card holder to be written in two versions: as written in the holder’s ID, and with its Polish spelling. Initially, the personal data on the Polish Card was to be written only in the form on the person’s ID. “A distorted form of a Polish name on the Polish Card runs contrary to our battle for the Polish spelling of Polish names, which we have been fighting for decades”, said Michał Mackiewicz, president of the Association of Poles in Lithuania (*Warsaw Voice*: 16.04.2008). Hence, initial Polish drafts of the “Karta Polaka”, meant

to support the Poles in the east, could have undermined their claims for minority rights.

The “Karta Polaka” appears thus to be an ambiguous way to strengthen the links between eastern “Polonia” and the Polish “motherland”. Rather, it seems to be designed more to serve Poland’s economic and political interests than to support Polish communities abroad in asserting their identity or in intensifying their connections with Poland. Furthermore, it is based on the idealized assumption of an ethnic trans-national community, which ignores cultural and linguistic differences among different generations of migrants. It is likely that the loosened requirements in proving one’s ethnic belonging are a response to the semi-failure of the “Repatriation Act”, denounced as too strict in its application requirements. Nevertheless, the “Karta Polaka” has not been met with overwhelming success in terms of the number of applications. According to the Polish Foreign Ministry, by early February 2010, Polish consulates had received 44,000 applications and had delivered just over 25,600 Cards.¹⁰ As for the share of applications by countries, the most recent data dates back to November 2009 and concern mostly Ukraine (about 20,500) and Belarus (about 11,000) (Krezy24.pl: 20.11.2009). Thus, most of eastern “Polonia” remains so far indifferent to the government’s initiative, which shows a manifest disapproval. As Scheffer stated, in an open and globalized world, the “scope and intensity of diaspora-homeland contacts... [depends] solely on the intentions and strategies pursued by diasporas”, and on their responses to the homeland’s ethnopolitics (Scheffer 2006:98). After several attempts to foster the unity of Poland and “Polonia”, one might come to wonder whether diaspora communities share the same vision of the Polish nation as their homeland.

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Ilga Apine

RESEARCHERS OF SOCIAL PROCESSES IN LATVIA ABOUT POLITICAL NATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN 1995-2010

In the development of a political nation idea in the works of Latvian scientists we can distinguish four stages.

I. In the middle of the nineties all the main ideas about the necessity of a political nation in Latvia appeared in the works of scientists. The book “National Politics in the Baltic States” (1995) was the first announcement of Latvian researchers.

II. Responding to the objections and lack of understanding in the society, the scientists more widely outlined the historical, theoretical and practical considerations about political nation in Latvia in the conference (1996) and in the book “Civic Consciousness” (1998).

III. After 1998, research work continued in the framework of the integration politics of Latvian society, not losing the perspective of the political nation.

IV. In 2010 a new extensive research programme has been started: the way of Latvian society towards the formation of national identity. It is reasonable to declare that during 15 years the researchers of the social processes in Latvia haven't stepped back from the necessity to see the civic nation in Latvia, the political nation as the basis of the state. There has been neither a break, nor stillness in this research and explanation work.

Key words: researchers of social processes, political identity, national identity, national state, minorities, integration politics

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The transition from the totalitarian to democratic regime implied pulling down the old identities. The resumption of previous identities existing during first Latvian Republic was impossible. The revival of the independent Latvian state after 1991 and formation of its structures was accompanied by the search of new political reference-points and new identities. In this process the role of scientists was of great importance.

The analysis of published books and materials allows putting forward a hypothesis:

1. Researchers of social processes in Latvia haven't lingered bringing forward a daring strategic aim – the formation of a political nation in Latvia.

2. Large population masses were not ready to accept this idea and it set in the public consciousness very slowly.

3. The political elite of Latvia hasn't promoted the formation of new political identity. The authorities didn't offer the scientists tangible support.

Latvian scientists started the analysis of the new situation in social relations already during the period of Awakening, before the resumption of independence. Philosophers and sociologists of the Latvian Academy of Sciences in the conference in 1990 and later in publications discussed interrelation between human rights and rights of nations (*Demokratizācija un nacionālās tiesības* 1990). After the retrieval of independence a practically urgent question came forward: how to join the safety of Latvian ethnic nation with the interests of Latvian ethnic minorities (Apine, Vēbers 1992, p. 1-3).

In 1992, in the conference "Democracy and Ethnopolitics" alongside the idea of national state and support programme of minorities an idea of political nation is already defined. Among scientists it declared itself very quickly and with certainty. The European understanding of modern democracy and distribution of ethnic relations entering Latvia together with the works of foreign scientists, heretofore getting to know only fragmentary, stimulated it. Direct contacts with the scientists from Europe and America, as well as their collaboration in the work of Latvian scientists was of great importance; among them – politologist from Chicago Rasma Kārklīņa, Norwegian scientists Tore Lindholm and Pol Kolsto. In the conference in 1992 Tore Lindholm introduced the participants with his understanding of a civic nation integrating all the loyal citizens.

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First stage of researches

The book "National politics in the Baltic States", as well as the conference (1994) mirrored the ethnopolitical experience of all the three Baltic States at that time. The rates of democratization and ethnopolitical practice (for example, the idea of cultural autonomy) were similar in all three states. The idea of the political nation wasn't in the centre of attention of Estonian and Lithuanian authors. It was mentioned by Juozas Lakis, who expressed the opinion that the political nation in Lithuania are only Lithuanians, and they should assume "responsibility for the rules of existence of national groups" (Lakis 1995, p. 209). Estonian scientists (S. Kaplan, K. Hallik, R. Rutso) described the ethnical situation in their country in very dramatic colours emphasizing that Estonians and Slavs have no everyday contacts (Kaplāne, Breidijs 1995, p. 19) and non-citizens are excluded from political life (Hallika 1995, p. 47). The possibility for Estonians to make one political nation together with Slavs seemed highly doubtful (Rutso 1995, p. 61).

In the articles of Latvian researchers the idea of political nation was declared straight away as a future aim and signpost of ethnopolitics. Such statement appeared in the article of the project leader E. Vēbers. He ascertained that the foundation of the political nation will be national identity (Vēbers 1995, p. 147) and that it shouldn't be mistaken with the ethnic identity of ethnation (Vēbers 1995, p. 147). He is convinced that ethnic life of Latvians will continue also incorporating into the political nation. Leo Dribins focuses on the development of the idea of the political nation in the European scientific literature during the 20th century. In his article we find also the definition of the political nation: "The foundation of the

state is the political nation ... integrating all the citizens of the state (apart from their ethnic origin). This nation is characterized by uniting state language, powerful political and economic interests, patriotic attitude towards the country they are living in, respect towards its national history, traditions, folklore.” (Dribins 1995, p. 90).

Ilga Apine considers the prospect of minorities in Latvia and possibilities to incorporate in the political nation of Latvia. Ina Druviete – language and education politics in Latvian Republic, which should stimulate the formation of political nation. Brigita Zepa and Rasma Kārklīņa using the showings of sociological studies outlined the identification picture of Latvians and non-Latvians. For example, the place of national identity. The authors optimistically concluded that, when the years pass, the viewpoint of Latvians and non-Latvians become closer, not move apart (Zepa, Kārklīņa 1995, p. 180-181). The conclusions of Nils Muižnieks and Artis Pabriks were not so optimistic. N. Muižnieks analysing the metamorphosis of a power hierarchy pyramid in independent Latvia came to a conclusion that as a result of passed laws non-Latvians are squeezed out of administration and government (Muižnieks 1995, p. 115). A. Pabriks evaluating the life in Latvia through the retrospection of citizenship ascertained a very high degree of social disintegration (Pabriks, p. 132).

Such was the common view of researchers in the middle of nineties. The development process of the political nation was at the very beginning. Proposing the idea of political nation the scientists didn't daydream. Their view of reality in Latvia was realistic. But they noticed the perspective of the development, wanted to convince Latvian society and they were not wrong. Nonetheless they didn't anticipate the wave of resistance the idea of political nation brought about in Latvian society. At first the researchers encountered an emotional reaction against the notion “political nation” itself – with furious speeches in meetings and even pickets. People tried to judge about these scientific categories on the level of their everyday consciousness, through the prism of their bitter historical experience. For many of them the thought about one common nation with the “occupants” was unacceptable

The principled representatives of radical nationalism Visvaldis Lācis, Oļģerts Dzenītis, Jānis Birzkops and others, propagated ideological opposition. They consider the political nation as much an unreasonable notion as citizenship and integration of non-Latvians. The main arguments in their publications: all non-Latvians a priori are politically hostile to Latvia. Non-Latvians are willing to include Latvia into Eastern empire, but meanwhile “to make Latvia a Russian satellite where Russian capital will dominate”

(Dzenītis 1997). The lecturer of Liepāja Pedagogical University Jānis Birzkops called the defenders of political nation idea L. Dribins, I. Apine, J. Peters and others “schemers”, but the so called civilians of the occupied state offered to make ready for repatriation (Birzkops 1998).

Despite the appreciable opposition, the researchers in their publications offered methods of how to overcome disintegration of the society. The politicians must try to make ethnopolitics “including, not isolating” (Pabriks 1995, p. 133). But the recommendations of scientists were ignored. The suggestion to establish a special department of integration in Latvia was heard only after 7 years. The only political party demonstrating some interest about the idea of political nation was “Latvijas Ceļš” (Way of Latvia). Cabinets of ministers administered by LC tried to guide ethnopolitics along the way of integration – establishing the Department of Naturalization and bringing in the so called “Law of non-citizens”, which was enforced in 2000 and broadened the rights of non-citizens.

A consistent opponent of political nation and integration was the party “Tēvzemei un Brīvībai”, later TB/LNNK. Its programme (1997) envisaged developing Latvian Latvia, to restrict naturalization of Latvia non-citizens and to promote “repatriation of immigrants and their descendants” (Etnopolitika Latvijā 2001, p. 43). Secretary General of the party Aigars Jirgens appealed to make ethnical nationalism the ideology of Latvian state (Dimants 1996). In the press of Latvia a discussion developed about the essence and usefulness of a political nation in Latvia. The scientists were supported by part of the journalists and some politicians: J. Lorencs, J. Urbanovičs, J. Peters, A. Dimants, S. Točs, L. Fedosejevs, N. Ločmele and others.

Why putting forward the idea of political nation met such lack of understanding and opposition? The idea wasn't totally unfamiliar to Latvian people. After November 18th, 1918, the independent Latvian state had started its way to the formation of political nation. Apparently in World War II and during decades of existence of the Soviet regime painful memories sank in the consciousness of people, new stereotypes and historical myths have formed. Latvians were concerned for the maintenance of nation and language, and fear of Russia increased. At the basis of such concern – sense of minority and inferiority complex of Latvians. During twenties and thirties of the 20th century Latvians had no such fear and concern.

Political nation – a result of society's integration, wanted, conscious, continuously stimulated from above and supported from below. In the nineties there was no such support in Latvian society.

Second stage of researches

Scientists continued research and explanation work, already knowing the objections against the idea of political nation and understanding its reasons. A serious contribution in this process was a book "Civic consciousness" (1998), but before it a wide discussion took place in the international conference "The Process of Political Nation Development in the Baltic States" (1996). It was direct continuation of the started work with wider historical justification and theoretical deepening. Egils Levits introduced readers with the genesis of political nation in Europe. There two ideal types have developed historically: state orientated in France and ethnically orientated (ethno-culture) in Germany. E. Levits declared that the notion of nation of Latvians is closer to the "ethno-culture model" (Levits 1998, p. 65).

The genesis of political nation idea could be viewed more broadly. In fact, all the states in the world, regardless of the political structure, try to consolidate different social and ethnical groups of the population. In tsarist Russia only Russians were taken for the political nation. This process could be noticed very well in the russification period started by Alexander III (Miņins 2011, p. 11-13). Putting forward and imposition of the notion of soviet people were the efforts of soviet ideologists to fuse multinational population mass of the USSR. In the history of Latvia the possibility to form political nation on the basis of Latvians and Latvian Germans, similarly as in Finland consensus between Finn nation and Finland's Swedes succeeded, stayed unused. In Latvia it didn't succeed due to national intolerance of both parties. Leo Dribins in the book "Civic Consciousness" analyzed experience of political nation in pre-war Latvia, mentioning contribution of Miķelis Valters, Kārlis Ulmanis, Pauls Šīmanis. The author concludes that a common economic environment had already been established, but political nation with common political culture and national consciousness hadn't yet grown up (Dribins 1998, p. 91).

Among theoretical questions the authors of the book turned to, the very sensitive question for Latvians about the compatibility of political nation and ethnical life took an important place. E. Vēbers, A. Pabriks, R. Kārliņa write about it in the book. Rasma Kārliņa emphasized that it is a mistake to oppose one another, because there are different levels of consciousness and practice. Both are compatible and it is proved by the practice of ethnical life in the entire world. Latvian ethnical nation has its future; it will develop and enrich the hierarchy of its identities (Kārliņa 1998, p. 302). At the same time a political nation unites loyal citizens of several ethnoses. Artis Pabriks tried with a help of a scheme to depict graphically the struc-

ture of political nation in Latvia, with the core of Latvians in the centre and integrated minorities around it (Pabriks 1998, p. 113).

The central theme of the book is civic consciousness. It was important to elaborate an adjusted system of terms, because mixing up terms often caused incomprehension. In the article of R. Kārliņa a group of notions is explained: state consciousness, civic responsibility, state virtue and other participation forms of conscientious citizen in the support of his state. The authors of the book were of the same opinion that the notions political nation, state nation, citizen nation and nation of Latvia basically are synonyms and with some nuances mean the same. The life will show and people will choose which to give preference (Vēbers 1998, p. 47).

However in some theoretically terminological explanations the authors of the book were not absolutely of the same opinion. Egils Levits, though he agrees that Latvia is a multinational state, but as a state nation considers only Latvians, and the minorities will gather around them (Levits 1998, p. 79). Leo Dribins, on the other hand, in his justification "modern political nation or state nation" brings together all the citizens (Dribins 1998, p. 92).

The authors of the book didn't evade touching prejudices and delusions existing in the society, for example, confidence spread among Latvians, that it is impossible to make political nation together with "occupants", understanding by it all the post-war immigrants. Researchers (for example, E. Vēbers in the afterword of the book) tried to make the readers understand how complex is the mosaic of the Latvian population, how different are the categories of soviet period immigrants and how dangerous for the peace of society could be thinking in black and white (Vēbers 1998, p. 297).

The idea of participation as a factor of political nation formation sounds with certainty in the book. Brigita Zepa wrote about it. It will also henceforward take a significant place in sociological studies under her guidance. The theme of participation will continue to sound in many publications on integration and ethnopolitics. In the book "Civic consciousness" the group of authors offered their vision of state language politics in Latvia to promote the consolidation of population: Dzidra Hirša, Aija Janelsiņa-Priedīte, Moscow linguist Mark Dyachkov.

A. Janelsiņa-Priedīte was the head of the state programme of mastering Latvian language (LVAVP) and she most precisely motivated one of the tasks of state language politics. Teaching the Latvian language to non-Latvians one must try simultaneously educating them as citizens and integrating in Latvia society. Not "that only the language promotes integration, but it is the tool to start this process" (Janelsiņa-Priedīte 1998, p. 172).

Finally the authors of the book tried to consider the attitude of groups of population in Latvia towards the idea of political nation and their ability to incorporate in it. E. Vēbers, A. Janeliša-Priedīte, A. Pabriks and other authors had to recognize that the largest opposition to this idea shows ethnocentrically orientated part of Latvians, who have difficulties to accept the fact of equality of all citizens. They would like to divide the citizens by their ethnical belonging. A negative position could be sensed also from the exile Latvians (for example, in the publications of Aivars Ruņģis). I. Apine, on the other hand, analyzing consciousness peculiarities of Latvia minorities, saw there factors backing off the integration – stereotypes of soviet thinking. The moment contributing to the life together was the type of geographical location of non-Latvians ensuring close everyday contacts with Latvians. To overcome the arisen estrangement the dialogue of authorities and minorities is necessary, especially with intelligence and with youth (Apine 1998, p. 248). V. Volkovs also agreed this thought; he had carried out sociological studies among Russian speaking youth. He made certain that this group of population seeks its place in the life of Latvia yet and its attitude towards the values of Latvia is expectant (Volkovs 1998, p. 141).

The authors of the book “Civic Consciousness” motivated the necessity of civic nation. With their study they tried to convince Latvian society that only in such a way would internal political stability be created, because the interests of basic nation and minorities will be combined optimally. The progress towards the European Union will be ensured, because it is also made up of a combination of national states and political nations.

Third stage of researches

The beginning of the 21st century dictated the theme of integration to the researchers of social relations in Latvia, and in 2000-2008 it takes the central place in the studies of politologists and sociologists. It was dictated by the conditions of foreign policy, and a strong desire of Latvia to become a member of EU. European politicians and experts asked all the post-soviet countries to go steady on the way to integration. It was required also by the situation of home policy in Latvia. The high level of disintegration and estrangement of the part of society couldn't last for ever. So in the political environment of Latvia there arose initiatives to liberalize ethnopolitics. President Guntis Ulmanis established the Advisory Council of Nationalities (1996) and stimulated changing the law of citizenship. The Cabinet of Ministers of Latvia entrusted a group of researchers to elaborate conception of the Social Integration Programme.

The facts allowed thinking that not only researchers, but also part of politicians didn't submit the influence of radical nationalists and in political rhetoric the themes of naturalization and integration began to dominate instead of decolonization and repatriation of non-citizens. The population of Latvia admitted the idea of society's integration was more well-disposed than the idea of political nation. The elaboration and start of the integration programme gave hope that political stability will be ensured in Latvia, estrangement will be overcome and the conditions created for the participation of all the citizens in the life of the state. If all these hopes were fulfilled – we will judge later. Since 2001 the integration programme of Latvian society became a state programme. Corresponding mechanism was created: Department of Special Tasks Concerning Integration and Integration fund of the society.

Wasn't the idea of political nation lost in this wide range of studies and publications on integration (2000-2008)? We can surely assert that it wasn't. The researchers bringing forward this conception in the middle of the nineties didn't allow it to vanish. The idea of political nation didn't disappear, but was transformed according to the requirements of the time and it yet sounds as a natural result of integration and future perspective.

Two collective studies on the link between integration and ethnopolitics were published one after another (in 2000 and 2001). The core of author collective was made by the group of researchers of the LU Institute of Philosophy and Sociology under the guidance of Elmārs Vēbers, but also researchers of other research institutes, as well as foreign authors took part. The book “Integration and ethnopolitics” has a wide range. Rasma Kārklīņa dealt with the problems of integration theory showing that the process has a complex character. A functional, structural and also approach dimension of the integration could be distinguished. Every country can have its peculiarities in the structure of dimension succession (Kārklīņa 2000, p. 75-76). The other authors of the book paid great attention to the theory too. Latvian researchers, as well as scientists of other post-soviet countries in the nineties hastened to master the conceptions of E. Gellner, E. Smith, J. Rothschild and many other scientists on the regularities of ethnical life, which were known in the world long before. In the beginning of the new century this stage was already behind. Beginning the studies of political nation researchers in Latvia besides the works of other authors used also the ideas of Jurgen Habermas on civic nation, thoughts of Rodger Brubaker on the perception of civic and ethnical nation in Europe.

Integration theme made researchers in Latvia turn to the experience of Canada in the implementation of multiculturalism. Several authors of the

book grounded on the acculturation strategy offered by Canadian scientist John Berry and others. In the adoption of other cultures different strategies could be used: assimilation, segregation, marginalization and integration (Kasatkina 2000, p. 78). Successful integration (biculturalism) – adoption of another culture could take place not losing one's ethnical identity, but only in the case, if the dominant nation will be open and ready to accept. It was the right moment of popularization of such ideas, to make it clear that integration could be only mutual. The turning of Latvian researchers to the problems of multiculturalism was also in time. It will for a very long time be the object of discussion in Latvian society.

The study surely reveals that state ethnopolitics can promote integration, but ethnocentrically orientation prevents it. The authors of the book in their articles remind strategically aim of integration process – political nation. So the emphasis is made on the political, civic integration. In the introduction of the book E. Vēbers wrote: "Ethnopolitical solutions concerning integration are not problems end in itself, the task of these solutions is to reconcile ethnical interests to one united aim of civic integration." (Vēbers 2000, p. 10). The book reveals the mechanism of the integration process: it is promoted or is not promoted by state language politics, as well as politics in the sphere of education and culture.

I. Druviete, V. Porite, Dz. Hirša, V. Volkovs declared the opinion on language politics. The attitude towards state language mastering process among non-Latvians, about obligatory bilingualism of minorities was common. Disagreement was aroused about the integrative function of Latvian language. Linguists considered that a state language must have not only an instrumental role, but also an integrative function: the integration must happen on the basis of Latvian language and Latvian values. (Druviete 2000, p. 186-187). Other authors declared an opinion that at the basis of this integration should be new, common values (T. Liguta, V. Volkovs). There an analogy should be drawn with the imposition of soviet nation concept in the Soviet Union. However, it was declared, that it is social and not ethnical community. But in fact the USSR was a Russian country and the state culture was Russian (Pabriks 1998, p. 107). Such a version of community was adopted neither by Russians, nor by Latvians. So how was it possible to ask that non-Latvians in Latvia should without objections adopt integration on the basis of Latvian values? A sceptical attitude towards the integration programme arose, and part of non-Latvians considered it as assimilation.

A very important facet of integration mechanism is education politics. G. Catlaks, S. Valdmaa, T. Liguta, I. Maslo and others wrote about it in the book. The system of bilingual education has already gained recogni-

tion in Latvia. It functioned and began to give results. Worry was aroused by emerging Education reform envisaging that very soon, in September 1st, 2004, all the secondary schools of non-Latvians will have to pass over to study in Latvian. Scientists on the basis of the results of their studies warned, that the schools and teachers would not be ready for it neither methodically, nor psychologically. Several authors defended the thought, that Russian schools are able to bring up Latvian citizens and fully teach them the state language (Liguta 2000, p. 363). The questions stayed unanswered: is bilingual education necessary only for non-Latvians? Will the integration succeed, if the process will not be mutual? (Maslo 2000, p. 370). The serious warning of scientists was not taken into consideration in the corridors of power and in 2003-2004 Latvia was on the edge of ethnopolitical conflict.

A year later, close in the tracks, the society was informed about the results of the next study on the role and place in this process of the main integration performers (state institutions, political parties, non-governmental organizations, public information means). The conclusions were not pleasing. State institutions are not open to dialogue with minorities of Latvia, they don't show initiative to support integration, but spontaneously take up the side of Latvian interests (Etnopolitika Latvijā, p. 37). Political parties (15 objects were evaluated) also haven't promoted integration of the society (it was supported by the party Tautas Saskaņas centrs), wherewith the minorities – a large part of society in Latvia – have stayed outside the political support (Etnopolitika Latvijā, p. 58). Only the activities of the non-governmental organization section were effective. For example, cultural societies of minorities have become active, proving that in this environment the process of ethnical mobilization is carried out. The study of LU FSI researcher group "Ethnopolitics in Latvia" (2001) gave a possibility to see strong and weak places of integration.

The studies on the view of social stratification in Latvia are closely connected with the perspective of political nation. Nils Muižnieks in 1995, Artis Pabriks in 2002 and Mihails Hazans in 2010 wrote about it. The changes in the employment of ethnical groups, as well as some constant tendencies appeared. N. Muižnieks has fixed the primary view on stratification after the retrieval of independence in Latvia. Latvians in the number of inhabitants at that time were 54,2%, but in the number of citizens – 78,7%, among deputies – 88% and in the highest level of administration – 100% (Muižnieks 1995, p. 115). The main cause of rejection of non-Latvians from politics was the nature of adopted laws (Laws of Citizenship and State Language), as well as the shock of the Russian population after the collapse of the Soviet Union and political passivity at that time.

Artis Pabriks in his study recognizes some positive changes determined by the process of naturalization. New citizens started to give an increase in the number of non-Latvian deputies – at first in self-government. In the 7th Saeima there were already 16 non-Latvians. But in state budget organizations and departments Latvians still maintained absolute predominance (Pabriks 2002, p. 25). Economist Mihails Hazans, considering the place of ethnical minorities in the job market in 2010 admits that integration had succeeded in this sphere. There is no striking ethnical discrimination (Roms feels such discrimination); the ethnical gap of wages is moderate. That's true that during the crisis unemployment has affected the representatives of minorities more – mainly due to an insufficient skill of the state language. But in state administration non-Latvians are less than 20% (Hazans 2010, pp. 128, 143, 155). It is a negative tendency, which has not changed in 15 years. Ilze Brands-Kehre and Ilvija Pūce correlating the development of political nation in Latvia with the requirements to obtain the citizenship process, but non-citizens at all “are denied a possibility of wholesome political participation” (Brands-Kehre, Pūce 2005, p. 25). The lack of political participation bore witness of a serious deficit of democracy in Latvia.

The question of unchanging participation remained as one of the main research directions in the Baltic Social Investigation Institute (Brigita Zepa and others). After collective studies by the Institute on the participation of non-Latvian young people in integration, on the level of ethnical tolerance in the society, on the way of Latvia to civic society and other, the sociologists warned the society that lack of political participation makes a threat of chronic tension in Latvia. And it happens at a time when Latvia objectively has very positive preconditions for ethnical harmony. Using the conception of Joseph Rothschild, it came to the view that in Latvia the reticulate mixed model of stratification is typical. Every ethnical group is represented in many different trades and carries out distinctive economic functions. It diminishes the possibility of ethnical conflict (Etnopolitiskā spriedze 2005, p. 9). But this objectively given possibility one must want to use.

On the contrary, researchers in their publications systematically have to recognize that the political elite in Latvia has an obstructive role in the integration of society. The ignoring of warnings made by researchers and non-governmental organizations due to education reform led to the edge of ethnopolitical conflict. Another important sphere of life, from which we could expect justified analysis of ethnopolitical situation, was the daily press. But in Latvia in the period, when a conflict situation already had loomed ahead (in 2003 and 2004) the press, instead of orientating the soci-

ety towards tolerant ethnical relationship, fanned the flames yet more with hostile rhetoric. It was recognized by media researchers Sergejs Kruks and Ilze Šulmane (Šulmane, Kruks 2005, p. 56-57).

Therefore several programmes with intentions of considerable scale meant to strengthen civic society (both elaborated by state institutions, and created under the wing of ĪUMSIL – Department of Special Tasks concerning the Integration of Society) couldn't fully succeed, because there was missing political will and real support for their implementation in corridors of power. In 2009 the Department of special tasks concerning the integration of society was liquidated at all and degraded to a small structure under the guardianship of Department of Culture. The offer of an integration programme in the beginning of 21st century gave big hopes to the society. Were they fulfilled? When the delay of the process came in view, researchers hastened to find out deeper causes of difficulties. Collective studies of the LU FSI researcher group (published in 2007 and 2008, editor Leo Dribins) are dedicated to the tendencies and counter-tendencies of integration, as well as analysis of the causes of opposition.

As it is ascertained in these studies, integration has neither fallen through, nor stopped, because it is impossible to stop. But the process is very contradictory (Dribins (ed. 2007, p. 5). It is prevented by the growing social inequality, polarization of society, and inability of the state to unite the society around long-term future aims. A very serious obstacle for integration – essential differences in understanding of the most important events in the history of Latvia. These differences turned up more striking exactly in the 21st century and they increase internal confrontation in society (Dribins (ed.) 2007, p. 137). The researchers with regret ascertained that the role of Latvians in the integration process is not positive (Dribins (ed.) 2008, p. 68). The psychological position of non-Latvians in total is more favourable, because they see their future in integration. But their role in the process couldn't be as leader. The leading role must belong to the dominating nation.

Society in Latvia is not fully integrated – ascertain in their study the group of researchers from LU Institute of Political and Social Studies. In the publication “How integrated is society in Latvia?” published in 2010, editor Nils Muižnieks, it is proved. The process of integration, if it succeeded, will naturally lead to the development of political nation. “In the process of integration a purposeful development of political nation hasn't taken place.” (Cik integrēta ir Latvijas sabiedrība? 2010, pp. 279-286).

Fourth stage of researches

An essential feature of political nation is the domination of national identity (and not ethnical feeling) in society. In Latvia it hasn't occurred yet. The researchers of social processes themselves were the first, who acknowledged the necessity to turn to wider studies of national identity. In the congress Letonika III in October 2009, several leading scientists and public workers made out a need to widen the framework of Letonika and to also involve politologists and sociologists in the studies. The famous film director Jānis Streičs emphasized that Letonika should form the state consciousness of citizens in Latvia. This process is prevented by the inferiority complex of Latvians, but the science in Latvia is free from inferiority complex (Letonika 2009, p. 340-341).

Indeed, serious research projects have been started in the Latvia Academy of Sciences, including the programme of national identity. Maija Kūle saw in the study of national identity a direct continuation of studies lasting in the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology on ethnical processes and integration of the society (Letonika 2009, p. 335). Since 2010 national identity is one of the five study directions supported by LR Cabinet of Ministers. In October 2011 the 3rd United World Congress of Latvian Scientists and the 4th Letonika Congress "Science, Society and National Identity" took place.

What is the understanding of the national identity essence in the society in 2010 and 2011? Long time ethnicity dominated in Latvia over the ideas of statehood and citizenship. The inheritance left by the soviet regime is the sense of fatal danger of the Latvian nation and its language. Therefore Latvian intelligence has "intensified a feeling of ethnical identity significance" (Etnopolitika Latvijā 2001, p. 6). It is yet apparent even in the opinion of the intellectual elite. In July 2010 the publicist Voldemārs Hermanis wrote an interview on national identity with the head of LU Latvian Language Institute Ilga Jansone. It becomes clear that I. Jansone in this national identity sees only the Latvian dimension and the Latvian language, "from which we in no case dare to step back". The third participant of the interview was the head of LU Institute of Social and Political Studies Nils Muižnieks, who pointed out, that it is only the story of Latvians in national identity, but it is a wider notion and also includes other stories (Hermanis 2010).

The researchers of national identity have difficulties to find common language with the representatives of the political elite. In 2008 polemics developed with the Minister of Culture Helēna Demakova about the essence of multiculturalism. In the beginning of 2008 Department of Integration introduced the society with the improved Integration programme, where

the thesis about integration on the basis of the Latvian language and culture was substituted by integration on the basis of common values. "Latvijas Avīze" turned against it in very fighting spirit, at the same time negatively evaluating multiculturalism, which Latvian researchers mentioned as a future perspective in Latvia. "Latvijas Avīze" incited politicians to express their opinion, apparently awaiting support for their position. But neither Ivars Godmanis, nor Māris Riekstiņš, nor Edgars Zalāns or Eiženija Aldermane didn't hurry to stand apart from the idea of multiculturalism. The Minister of Culture Helēna Demakova saw in multiculturalism a threat to the Latvian national state. Likewise she didn't agree the new redaction of Integration programme seeing as the best version the integration on the basis of Latvian language and culture (Mūrniece 2008).

The questions of integration came under the guardianship of the Department of Culture. The Minister of Culture in Latvia Sarmīte Ēlerte commented on the new integration conception elaborated in the department. S. Ēlerte expressed a certainty that "the basis of nation and integration is the Latvian language and Latvian cultural space". The Minister of Culture considered that state nation is only Latvians; the others have to adopt Latvian values (Bojārs, Lūsiņa 2010). Ilze Kehre, who has been the head of Human Rights Study Centre for a long time, characterized the opinion of S. Ēlerte as archaic and outworn. With such conception a version of assimilation is offered to Latvia (Odiņš 2011). The specialist of Oriental cultures Leons Taivāns saw in this position of the Minister of Culture national parochialism and provincial thinking, while 21st century requires overtness towards other cultures (Lulle 2011). The opinion of Sarmīte Ēlerte about the essence of integration is fully reflected in the declaration of the party "Vienotība" before the elections of the 11th Saeima: the nation is only Latvians with their language and culture. From other nations living here only the contribution of their cultural originality is awaited ("Vienotība" 2011). Political participation isn't envisaged.

A special place in the formation of mass opinion always has the opinions of state first persons. Americans are very sensitive to the fact, that Barack Obama pays his respects to the traditional American values. The opinion consistently expressed by V. Putins about united nation of Russian state (Rossijane) – the analogue of political nation, noticeably influences public opinion in Russia. Presidents of Latvia in the 20th century till 1933 in their speeches in state celebrations always addressed the whole population of the state thus respecting the notion of the people of Latvia uniting everybody.

In the summer of 2011, when the elections for State President took place, the population of Latvia very carefully evaluated the posture of

candidates. Ex-President V. Zatlers defining the ideology of his prospective party (ZRP) declared that he sees one cluster of inhabitants in Latvia – the people of Latvia. In the declaration draft offered by his party it is spoken about “united, civic and incorporating society”. The new president A. Bērziņš pragmatically highlighted and characterized the questions connected with the national problem (for example, he didn’t avoid using Russian in conversations with Russian media). President Andris Bērziņš in his opening address in the national development report 2010-2011 “National Identity, Mobility and Legal Capability” called upon the nation of Latvia, trying to be educated and a can-do nation on the shore of the Baltic Sea (Bērziņš 2011).

The most courage, going against the stream, in her time was shown by Vaira Viķe-Freiberga. In the beginning of her Presidency she, coming from the circles of exile Latvians, in her speeches habitually addressed the Latvians, fellows of her nation. It didn’t stay unnoticed. Russians living in Riga took it, that non-Latvians are ignored. Then on November 18th, 2000, V. Viķe-Freiberga offered an innovative idea. She was said to be proud with prominent Latvians, regardless of which nation they belong to or what is their native tongue. With the word “Latvians” V. Viķe-Freiberga tried to indicate everybody, who speaks in Latvian, who is a citizen of Latvia and feels he/she belongs to it. Later in the interview she explained that she wanted to strengthen the model of Western democracy in Latvia, but there was a lack of corresponding words due to linguistic reasons (Viķe-Freiberga 2000). V. Viķe-Freiberga formulated the idea of political nation, but her boldness came too soon and it wasn’t evaluated. Latvians didn’t accept it; also non-Latvians took it for an attempt of assimilation.

An insight into the studies about the political nation during the last 15 years leads to the conclusion that strict definitions made by scientists were not followed by an understanding of the society in these questions. It is still delayed, and it is proved also by the contradictory position of the political elite in Latvia.

The hypothesis brought forward in the beginning of the article has proved true. Maintaining the part of Latvians (also representatives of political elite) in the traditions of ethnical identity is with great certainty explained by Hungarian researcher Georg Schopflin (2000). Small nations in all the post-socialist space still feel fear about survival. So the civic consciousness is developing very slowly and the so-called ethnicization is observed (Latvija 2010/2011, p. 17).

How do the researchers react realizing this difference between modern scientific understanding of national identity and the position of society?

The question was discussed in the 3rd United World Congress of Latvian Scientists and the 4th Letonika Congress in October 2011 (report of Nils Muižnieks). It is correct neither to adapt to this level, nor to criticize it. It is impossible to artificially speed up the complex alteration process of society’s consciousness. There is competition of different identities, and individuals and collective chooses either one or another. The formation of co-national civic identity means also overcoming former views. It is a long-term process, and the science must be one step forward, it must show the perspective of development of the society.

In the latest Western studies the term “political nation” appears more seldom, because political dimension is only one of several. The researchers M. Giberno, M. Kastella, D. Miller and others more often use the names – state nation, civic or state community. In the case of Latvia corresponding synonyms are – people of Latvia, nation of Latvia.

In all Europe new opinions on national identity are developing, because life has brought new problems. In Western Europe it is the mass presence of immigrants Muslims, whose integration goes with difficulties. The collapse of the USSR, on the other hand, created vast Russian diasporas beyond Russia, and also in Latvia. It will most directly influence the formation of co-national civic identity on the way to political nation.

The understanding of political nation as inevitable future of the society requires great political maturity and overcoming of many former views. It is a long-term process, but in Latvia it is going on and the scientists are at its avantgarde.

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Valerijs Makarevičs

PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH OF ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE CONTEXT OF THE LATVIAN INTEGRATION

In 2002 the United Nations Organization started the practical implementation of the idea of sustainable development. Social sciences are first of all interested in investigating the social constituent of sustainable development where three levels can be distinguished. They are the overall planetary, the national – state and the subjective individual levels. As for the subjective individual conception of sustainable development, the personality and its activity are in its centre. At present, the programme of social integration is being implemented in Latvia. It notes that the aim of integration is the creation of a democratic united civil society based on the general main values. These aims are impossible to achieve without providing sustainable development at the subjective individual level. One of the most important preconditions of a person's sustainable development are his/her identities, i.e. personality, social and professional ones. In multiethnic society the process of ethnic identity formation acquires a special importance. Two stages can be clearly seen in the latest history of psychological research of ethnic identity in Latvia.

Key words: sustainable development; social integration; multiethnic society; research of ethnic identity in Latvia.

Introduction

In 2002 the United Nations Organization started the practical implementation of the idea of sustainable development which had been formulated already in the 80s of the 20th century. This term denotes providing

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full conditions for life and personality development within the framework of one generation and keeping these conditions for future generations. Sustainable development includes three components which are interrelated. They are social, economic and ecological components.

Social sciences are first of all interested in investigating the social constituent of sustainable development where three levels can be distinguished. They are the overall planetary, the national – state, and the subjective individual levels.

At the overall planetary level sustainable development presupposes the dialogue of civilizations. Until recently this dialogue was based on the idea of the concept of multiculturalism which, taking into consideration the latest events, is not a universal means for the success of this dialogue.

At the national state level with the aim of solving the tasks of sustainable development, the integration of society and the formation of the political nation are being put forward. As for the subjective individual conception of sustainable development, the personality and its activity are in its centre.

At present, the programme of social integration is being implemented in Latvia. It notes that the aim of integration is the creation of a democratic united civil society based on the general main values (Sabiedrības integrācija Latvijā 2001). These aims are impossible to achieve without providing sustainable development at the subjective individual level.

One of the most important preconditions of a person's sustainable development are his/her identities, i.e. personality, social and professional ones. In multiethnic society the process of ethnic identity formation acquires a special importance. Globalization seems to sharpen this problem (Batrajeva 2009). The ever increasing processes of virtual and real contacts between people demand quick adaptation to the new social and cultural environment. Since identification is one of the adaptation mechanisms, the need for adaptation to another social and cultural environment may cause the feeling of loss of one's personality and social identity acquired earlier.

Social identity is formed within the framework of the individual's personality time. Ethnic identity, according to the view of ethnic psychologists, is a variety of social identity (Stefanenko 2003). Nevertheless, ethnic identity is essentially different from social identity: its contents are conditioned by the personality's historical time. Therefore, ethnic identity is connected with the deep-laid psychic structures to a much bigger degree than social identity. Thus, ethnic identity is a connecting link between an individual and a big social group – ethnos.

In ethnopsychological literature, especially published 15-20 years ago,

one can come across the cases where the described phenomenon is called both ethnic identity and national identity. At that, both names are used as synonyms. Undoubtedly, these phenomena have much in common. But there are essential differences as well. According to E. Smith, the main criterion here is the form of social conditions providing the preservation and transfer of historical experience to the succeeding generation. For ethnos this is a tradition, but for the nation it is legislation (Smith 1997).

The difference between ethnos and nation can be reflected in the language, especially in the cases when several ethnic groups, e.g. all the inhabitants of Russia and Russians (the accessory to ethnos forming the nation is designated as *russkie*; an accessory to the nation - as *rossijane*), all the inhabitants of Latvia and Latvians, live in the territory with common jurisdiction. At that, the identification with the ethnos can be more important for an individual than the identification with the nation (Catalonians and Basques in Spain).

In the history of mankind nation-centric processes have existed and exist alongside with the ethnocentric ones. Thus, Alans as a nation and Alans's culture today, seven centuries after the disappearance of the state, are represented in separate ethnoses – the Ossetic, the Balkar and the Kabardian ones. By the way, Alain Delon's name confirms his Alans's origin.

Further on we will start analyzing the most important research of ethnic identity which was carried out in Latvia within the last ten years. In the process of the analysis we will take into account the considerations mentioned above.

Research of ethnic identity in the latest history of Latvia

At the beginning of the 90s of the previous century the rise of interest in ethnic problems was observed in the Latvian science. There appear a number of works where the authors make an attempt to comprehend the peculiarities of the Latvian features of similarity and difference with the other peoples including the neighbouring ones (Apine 1996; Apine, Volkovs 1998; Brice 1990; Gāle – Kārpentere 1990; Šuvajevs 1990; Viķe-Freiberga 1990 and others). The first serious theoretical and experimental research is published in which the author does not only give a detailed characterization of the level of investigating the ethnopsychological problems in the world, but also presents and analyzes the results of her own research into the peculiarities of the national character of Latvians (Karpova 1990). Ethnic identity is revealed in the people's character as well, therefore Karpova's research can be considered to be the first experimental psychological inves-

tigation of this phenomenon in the latest history of Latvia. At that, it should be noted that in the author's work the notion of ethnic identity is replaced from time to time by the notion of national identity which testifies to the fact that the author does not distinguish these two phenomena which are different in their essence.

Special attention in the work has been drawn to the process of the formation of the Latvian identity. While describing the conditions of this identity formation the author uses A. Rungis' definition: „Latvians are those who originate from Latvians (at least one of the parents should be Latvian), who speak Latvian, who were educated in the Latvian traditions, who consider themselves to be Latvian by origin and views and who are aware of the fact that Latvia is the historic motherland of its people” (Karpova 1990, p. 23). It should be noted that in this definition a big importance is given to the intrapsychological manifestations of ethnic identity alongside with the social ones.

This feature, i.e. giving special attention to intrapsychic aspect of ethnicity, is characteristic of Karpova's work on the whole. She notes down that „the task of the nearest future is the creation of genuinely „psychological” ethnopsychology of the same level where there are other psychological disciplines...” (Karpova 1990, p. 61). Thus, the work under consideration can be classified as „psychological ethnopsychology”.

In 2001 I. Apine's book „Politology: introduction into ethnopsychology” appeared. In this work the author analyses in detail both interpsychological and intrapsychological manifestations of ethnic identity. From the interpsychological point of view, ethnic identity is revealed in the national (ethnic? – V.M.) character. Mentality constitutes the deep basis of the character. „The national character depends on the changing social and historic conditions, but the mentality is encoded in archetypes” (Apine 2001, p. 19). Mentality is „the system of moral and aesthetic evaluations, the peculiarities of the world outlook of a person belonging to a specific ethnos” (Apine 2001, p. 19).

From the intrapsychological point of view, the phenomenon of ethnic identity includes the peculiarities of national (ethnic? – V.M.) self – consciousness. National consciousness is a connecting link between mentality and national character. It means that different aspects of mentality can be actualized in the national consciousness under the influence of concrete sociohistorical conditions.

I. Apine uses these theoretical considerations while analysing the conditions of the formation of the Latvian ethnos, ethnic identity and national character. Here the author touches upon one of the main problems of eth-

nic identity formation, i.e. the danger of ethnocentrism manifestation or the problem of acceptance or non – acceptance of “others”. Let us turn to the author’s text. „By not accepting „otherness”, referring to other cultures and language, other skin colour or different mentality a person gets in captivity of xenophobia. By admitting the right of an „other” to defend his/her rights and by accepting this, we approach the ideal of tolerant relations” (Apine 2001, p. 75). Thus, the author shifts the actual present-day problem of tolerance from the sphere of interpersonal relations into the sphere of sociopsychological problems of formation and manifestations of ethnic identity, in this way attributing to it one of the central places in the ideal structure of the national (ethnic) character.

Describing the conditions which influenced situationally the actualization of ethnocentric tendencies in the post-Soviet space, the author uses the point of view of the Russian researchers upon the sociopolitical processes taking place in the Soviet Union before its collapse and in the first years after it (let us note that the book was published in 2001). They note that the nationalistic tendencies increase at this time. The character of their manifestations can be classified into five types: classical nationalism with the priority of ethnic values; nationalism of parity type; economic – trade nationalism; defensive nationalism and reformative modernization nationalism (Drobizheva and others, 1996). As the author notes, for the Baltic countries the reformative modernization nationalism was characteristic as „an aspiration to cut themselves from the process of stagnation of the metropolity” (Apine 2001, p. 77).

In the given work the author considers the problem of the formation of ethnic identity and its manifestation in behaviour from different sides discussing, without any avoidance, a lot of sharp issues connected with this phenomenon. At that, the emphasis is placed on the social side of the phenomenon. Therefore, the theoretically substantiated and practically implemented approach to the investigation of ethnopsychological phenomena including ethnic identity, can be called sociopsychological ethnopsychology, using the terminology, suggested by K.Graunmann (Graunmann 2001).

The given works are significant for understanding the tendencies of studying the problem of ethnic identity in Latvia in the last two decades.

The first work, that by A.Karpova, was carried out within the framework of psychological approach. It realised the expectations of many representatives of the Latvian ethnos in the need of being aware of their differences from the others which are important for the people’s existence. It also awakened the interest of representatives of different sciences in the research of peculiarities of the ethnic character.

After the publication of I. Apine’s book „Politology. Introduction into ethnopsychology” the works carried out within the framework of the socio-psychological paradigm gain the priority.

Psychological approach to studying the ethnic identity in Latvia in the 90s of the 20th century

As noted earlier, in the last decade of the 20th century the social thought concentrated its attention on revealing the peculiarities of the Latvian character as one of the constituents of the ethnic identity. Due to specific socioeconomic and political reasons, areas of compact residence of Latvians who emigrated from Latvia were formed in the last 150 years in different regions of the world (Western Europe, North America, Australia, Russian Siberia, Scandinavia). The reasons for leaving the Motherland were often tragic. Nevertheless, the ability to adapt to the new social environment which put forward its own requirements, not always clear to the new adherents, was based on certain features of the ethnic character which is intensively studied nowadays. Showing the need for such work, I.Apine writes: ”The mass character of the 20th century emigration determined the necessity of investigating this process, at that namely in... the psychological aspect. The history itself made a ruthless experiment with millions of people and with whole peoples. As a rule, diasporas appeared as the result of unfavourable factors (fugitives from war, victims of political or religious persecution). For a long time, emigrants remained the bearers of negative identity and psychological trauma. It is necessary to investigate the results of emigration from the point of view of science and practice. The destiny of the groups of people in the foreign land is a part of the history of any nationality. The politicians and researchers who live in their Motherland need to know the collective psychological peculiarities of these groups as well as the borderline manifestations of their adaptation and integration processes. This issue is connected with the understanding of one’s origin, of one’s roots and with the self-consciousness of present descendants of emigrants” (Apine 2003, p.7).

The peculiarities of the ethnic character are studied by writers, publicists, philosophers, anthropologists, psychologists. Among psychologists, there are V. Vike-Freiberga and S. Sebre who are well-known not only in Latvia but far beyond its borders as well.

In the 90s of the 20th century one of the most interesting researches of the Latvian ethnic identity were the joint projects of philosophers, anthropologists, historians, sociologists and psychologists carried out under the

guidance of Mara Zirnite: "The story about the life in Latvia" and „Stories about the life in exile” (Zirnite 2001). Narrative – the method of oral or written storytelling by respondents about their life – was used in this research.

The main features of the ethnic character were reflected in the stories: being industrious; ability to overcome life hardships; aspiration to preserve the language, culture and traditions, calmness and understanding the importance of good education for life of full value. Thus, Alexandra Eihe, whose father left for Siberia at the beginning of the 20th century, as she says „in search for happiness”, writes in her story that her mother used to say to her and her sister: „Take a book into your hands, not a needle. Handwork steals your time” (“Ņemat grāmatu rokā, ne adatu. Rokdarbi laupa jums laiku”) (Eihe 2001, p. 153).

Here an explanation should be given. The point is that in translation and out of the context a very subtle meaning of this phrase is lost. Undoubtedly, a woman is a keeper of the hearth, but she should not retire only into housework. She should develop herself in many aspects. A woman's perfection is in her own hands.

The storytellers also note the role of the religious factor in preserving the ethnic identity. Summarizing the results of the research, I. Apine points to the fact that preservation of the ethnic identity, or ethnic stability, is observed in the areas of Latvians' compact residence both in America and in Russia (within 4-5 generations). The aspiration to separate themselves from the other peoples and pride of their ethnic belonging promotes this preservation. In these conditions a new form of self-identification is formed (for instance, Siberian Latvians). Among the ethnic features the first place is occupied by the Latvian language followed by the preservation of ethnic peculiarities of behaviour and ethnic character. At that, the peculiarities of ethnic self-consciousness are more characteristic of women. It can be said that women are the keepers of ethnic identity.

In the conditions of diasporas inner ethnic processes continue: the differences between the representatives of different regions fade (Latvia consists of four ethnographic regions – Kurzeme, Vidzeme, Zemgale and Latgale; the inhabitants of these regions have minor differences in the culture, language and behavior – the author's note). Simultaneously the features characteristic of the whole ethnos are being developed (Apine 2006).

Study of ethnic identity in Latvia in the first decade of the 21st century

In the 21st century, as we have already noted, the study of ethnic identity is focused on the social side of this phenomenon. In 2001 the State Programme of the Latvian Society Integration (Sabiedrības integrācija Latvijā) was elaborated. It stated, in particular, that Latvia is a national democratic state where every inhabitant has the right to form and keep the national (i.e. ethnic – V.M.) identity. The integration programme envisages the development of concrete mechanisms which will be able to guarantee the right of the Latvian people for self-determination as well as to secure the same rights for the national minorities (Latvija ir demokrātiska, nacionāla valsts, kurā katram Latvijā iedzīvotājam ir tiesības uz savas nacionālās identitātes veidošanu un saglabāšanu. Integrācijas programma paredz izstrādāt konkrētus mehānismus latviešu tautas pašnoteikšanās tiesību garantēšanai, kā arī mazākumtautību tiesību īstenošanas nodrošināšanu (Sabiedrības integrācija Latvijā 2001)).

The appearance of the Programme stimulates the research in this field. There appear theoretical articles devoted to this problem (Nikiforovs, 2005). The research groups are created which apart from psychologists, include representatives of other scientific disciplines: pedagogues, anthropologists, sociologists, philosophers.

The presence of the representatives of other scientific disciplines in research groups hampers the identification of the study results, i.e. their belonging to the concrete scientific discipline. Therefore, in the cases of difficulties in the identification of the scientific direction we will pay attention to the subject of the research. If the ethnic identity is studied in the context of the psychological paradigm (peculiarities of ethnic perception, attitude to the representatives of other ethnoses, mentality, peculiarities of ethnic character, ethnos and language and others) or the social paradigm (social conditions of identity formation, behaviour, social involvement or isolation and others), then the results of this research will be reflected in our article.

One of such multidisciplinary researches where psychologists participated alongside pedagogues was the project called „Promoting the formation of ethnic identity with the students of educational establishments which implement the programmes of education of national minorities.” This project was carried out within the framework of research programmes of the State Centre of Quality of Education (VISC). The research was carried out in 2007. 2000 schoolchildren, as well as their pedagogues and par-

ents from 4 cities of Latvia, participated in it. The research was conducted at the junction of pedagogy and pedagogical psychology.

According to the results of this research it was stated that schoolchildren have an opportunity to develop their ethnic identity and tolerance to other ethnic groups living in Latvia at the optional classes and in classes according to their interests. However, the analysis of the study courses and their influence upon the formation of ethnic identity showed that there are unused reserves here. Therefore, it has been suggested to introduce changes into the education standards of several subjects of the primary, basic and secondary schools. These changes, first of all, refer to such aspects of ethnic identity as ethnic culture, language and history of ethnos living on the territory of Latvia (VISC. Projekti. Pētījumi 2010).

The problems of the ethnic identity formation of other peoples living in Latvia are also researched at the multidisciplinary level. Thus, fulfilling the tasks of the Integration Programme, in the first decade of the 21st century a lot of attention is paid to studying the ethnic identity of Gypsies. This research is often conducted at the junction of ethnic psychology, pedagogical psychology, pedagogy and anthropology. The ethnic needs of Gypsy children are analysed with the aim of their integration and learning in a multicultural class in the conditions of interaction of different cultures. The ethnic identity of Gypsies is being researched (Krastiņa, Bērziņa, Zaķe 2005).

There appears a number of researches where ethnic identity, not being the main aim of the research, is studied in relation with other phenomena.

A noticeable work in this field is the work of I. Plotka, M. Vidnere and E. Sokol „Tolerance of interpersonal relations and positive ethnic identity. Experience of research”. The authors come to the conclusion that „a person's confidence in his/her own positive ethnic identity is the basis for respect of other ethnic groups with which he/she comes into contact. Doubts and loss of positive identity leads to ethnic intolerance” (Plotka, Vidnere, Sokol 2006, p. 112).

Here we should mention another research. Studying the problem of psychological safety, S. Sebre and I. Bite note this it is very important for the representatives of the Latvian ethnos to feel themselves as a part of their people. This increases the level of psychological safety. Thus, one of the respondents notes: „Latvianness (Latvietība) is a way of perceiving myself through the language and culture; I can't imagine myself outside Latvianness. I don't know what will remain if my ethnic part is taken away, though something will remain.” (Latvietība ir veids, kā caur valodu un kultūru es sevi apzinu – nemaz nevaru sevi iedomāties ārpus latvietības. Ja manu etnisko daļu noņemtu nost, es nezinu, kas paliktu pāri – kaut kas

jau paliktu). For the representatives of the Russian ethnos the given connection is not so significant (Sebre & Bite 2002/2003, p. 6).

One of the most noticeable works in the field of studying the identity of representatives of other ethnoses living in Latvia was T. Grishkina's master paper circulating in many publications (Grishkina 2004).

In her master paper entitled „The connection between ethnic identity and self-determination with young people of different ethnic groups” T. Grishkina investigates the levels of ethnic identity formation with young people from different ethnic groups. The connection of the indicators of ethnic identity with other factors (gender, knowledge of the state language, citizenship, presence of friendly relations with the representatives of the title nation) is studied as well.

Ethnic pride and ethnic differentiation were chosen as the indicators of the level of ethnic identity formation. At that, ethnic pride means belonging to one's ethnic group supported at the level of emotions, as well as being interested in the culture, history and traditions of the social group to which the respondent has an emotional and hereditary connection.

The second criterion is ethnic differentiation. It is manifested in the unconscious desire of limiting the contacts with the representatives of other ethnic groups, whose appearance and manners of behaviour cause rejection (Grishkina 2005).

In her research the author uses the result of the study of Estonian scholars. Let us note that here, maybe for the first time in the Latvian psychological science, the attention to the methods of the study of the phenomenon was concentrated on the research instruments created in the Baltics (The scale of ethnic identity (Ethnic Identity Scale: EIS) used in the research was elaborated in Tartu University in Estonia by Anne Valk and Kristel Karu – Kletter (Valk, Karu 2001). Every social phenomenon (and ethnic identity is not an exception here) has its regional peculiarities which should be taken into consideration while studying it.

The merit of the paper was the choice of the respondents' age. It is namely at the age of 17 that the personality and social identities are intensively formed. The awareness of one's ethnic identity starts. But the work has a very serious shortcoming as well: the number of the sample constituted only 90 respondents (30 respondents from the Latvian, Russian and Jewish ethnoses). This shortcoming, however, is characteristic of practically all the researches of ethnic identity carried out within the framework of the psychological science in Latvia.

The result of Grishkina's research showed that the indicators of the level of ethnic identity formation are higher with the representatives of the title

nation (the ethnos forming the state) than with those of national minorities. At that, according to Grishkina's data, the basis of ethnic identity of the groups under research is national pride, but not striving for ethnic isolation (Grishkina 2005). Considering separate indicators, the highest value along the criterion of national pride was stated with the representatives of the Jewish ethnos (3,02 out of 4 possible points), but the lowest one – with the representatives of the Russian ethnos (2,93). The result regarding the Russian ethnos is explained by the transformation of the social status of the Russian ethnos: being the majority in one country – the USSR, it became the minority in Latvia after the collapse of the USSR.

The results obtained by T.Grishkina contradict the data of the ethnic identity research received some years earlier by Y.Dimdin. According to his conclusions, the level of ethnic identity formation is higher with the representatives of ethnic minority (Russians) than with the ethnic majority (Latvians) (Dimdin 2002). In our view, this contradiction appeared in the result of using different methods for studying the phenomenon. These methods took into consideration different indicators of the level of ethnic identity formation. These contradictory data could also appear as the result of certain transformations in the respondents' self-consciousness which might have taken place within the period between two researches. The third possible reason may be connected with different points of view of the authors upon the phenomenon under research.

At that, in different languages, the verbal interpretation of unconscious sensual feelings of connection to one's ethnic group can have considerable differences in content. Ethnic identity belongs to the class of particularly complex phenomena. At present in psychology there are no adequate research instruments for measuring the whole spectrum of indicators connected with the verification of content-related, structural and dynamic peculiarities of this psychological phenomenon.

In the light of the above mentioned, the researches of I.Plotka, M. Vidnere and their colleagues are of rather significant interest (Plotka, Vidnere, Blumenau, Strode 2008; Plotka 2010). The aim of the research was to determine the connection between different components of the respondents' ethnic identity and the ability of social adaptation in different cultural environments. The peculiarities of the ethnic identity of Russians living in Latvia and those living in Russia were investigated. The Latvians living in Latvia and Russia constituted the second sample, čšē respondents with higher and secondary education at the age from 18 till 28 participated in the research. It was stated, that there are no significant differences in the structure of ethnic identity with the Russians living in Latvia and with the

Latvians living in Latvia and in Russia. At that, the positive aspect of ethnic identity prevail in all these groups.

On the contrary, significant differences in the structure of ethnic identity were recorded with Russians living in Russia as compared to other groups. The indicators of hyperidentity prevail here, such as ethnic fanaticism, ethnic isolation and others. Soldatova's scale (Soldatova 1998) was used to determine the structure of ethnic identity in the research.

It is to be noted that it is I.Plotka who carries out the psychological research of ethnic identity in Latvia most consistently. Her latest works are connected with the research of ethnic stereotypes. The author and her colleagues are trying to determine the sources of origin of ethnic stereotypes on the unconscious level (Plotka, Igonin, Blumenau 2009; Plotka, Igonin, Blumenau, Bambulak, Ozola 2011). And it is namely with this approach that the major methodological shortcoming of the research can be connected. As Freud pointed out, for the processes in It (i.e. in a person's unconscious – V.M.) there are no logical laws of thinking, first and foremost, there is no thesis about contradiction. And further: „The opposite impulses exist one near the other without abolishing each other or moving away from each other (Freud 1989, p. 345-346. Quotation in Makarevičs 1999, p. 12). Investigating human unconscious reactions which are revealed in laboratory conditions and are not included into real everyday life, it is rather difficult, and often merely impossible, to determine clearly the cause and consequence relation.

Perspectives of development of ethnic identity research in Latvia

As many authors note, there are no big ethnic differences in Latvia. Moreover, if a common goal appears, the ethnic differences move to the background. Ivars Austers, Professor of Psychology of the Latvian University, states that during the studies in the higher school it is much more important to belong to the students' group, to master the study programme and to obtain the desired qualification or scientific degree, i.e. to achieve a certain aim. This aim unites everybody and becomes a motivating element which for a definite time gives bigger importance to belonging to the students' (social) group than to the ethnic group (Austers 2010).

Another problem appears and becomes rather actual in the reality of modern life. According to the data of the Latvian Language Agency (Latviešu valodas aģentūra – LVA), the Latvians who left for Ireland often point out that they have difficulties in using the Latvian language in the conditions of

the English speaking environment. It is noted as well that recently the situation has been observed that while integrating into the Irish community and communicating mostly in English, children and teenagers extremely quickly lose both the communication skills in Latvian and the feeling of belonging to the Latvian community and to Latvia as a state (Pētījums: Īrijas latvieši sāk apzināties nacionālās identitātes zudumu 2009). This problem is a matter of concern for Lithuanian scholars as well (Orlov 2011).

The connection between the language of communication and ethnic identity is one of the central problems of ethnic psychology. There is no psychological research in this field in Latvia. Therefore, we will turn to the results of the research which was carried out in another scientific field.

Since 2004 the staff of the philology department of Rezekne Higher School have been studying the connection of ethnic identity with linguistic identity. The research was conducted in the eastern part of Latvia – Latgale. The native inhabitants of Latgale – Latgalians are a subethnos of the Latvian ethnos. Apart from them, representatives of many other nationalities live in the region, i.e. it is multinational and multilingual. This fact makes the region attractive regarding the study of peculiarities of ethnic identity.

9139 respondents took part in this research which points to representative results. The method of research was conversation. According to the results, 46,7% of the respondents pointed to their belonging to the Latvian language while only 40,7% replied that they belonged to the Latvian ethnos. 29,3% of the respondents noted their belonging to the Russian language and 25,9% to the Russian ethnos. In the group of the Latgalian language the figures were correspondingly 21,1% and 27%; in the group of the Polish language – 0,4% and 1,5%, but in the group of the Byelorussian language – 0,2% and 3,5% (Lazdiņa 2009).

The data received show that the connection between the linguistic and ethnic identity is not simple. In multilingual regions, apparently, more significant factors of ethnic identity formation are religion, traditions, culture and the mentality connected with them (in Latgale Latgalians and Polish are Catholic; Russians and Byelorussians, as a rule, are Orthodox or Old Believers and Latvians are either Catholic or Lutheran).

In Ireland a homogeneous linguistic, religious and cultural environment is dominating. Serious religious differences disappear, the Catholic religion is predominant in the country. To all appearances, the formation of historic ethnic identity is hampered under these conditions. The socialization processes, and in this case they are connected with the adaptation to the new language and cultural environment, appear to be subordinate to the assimilation mechanisms to an ever growing degree. Moreover, modern

young representatives of the Latvian ethnos do not exhibit the tendency of ethnic isolation, as T.Grishkina's research showed.

The language problem in Latvia has another peculiarity. The Russian children studying in the Latvian schools do not acquire the skills of mastering the state language to the full, at that, they do not master the mother tongue fully either. Undoubtedly, this fact influences the formation of ethnic identity with Russians and can give rise to uncertainty in one's status. Unfortunately, the Latvian scholars do not pay attention to this phenomenon, at least up to now (Krasnā 2005).

It should be pointed out here that in present Latvia the psychologists' voices are not taken into consideration in solving problems which are important for society. Suffice it to say, that among the heads of 12 research programmes in the State research programme "National identity" adapted in 2010 there are 4 philologists, 3 sociologists, 2 historians and 1 representative in philosophy, pedagogy and politology. One head has scientific degrees in the fields of sociology, politology and law at the same time. However, there is not a single psychologist. (State research programme "Nacionālā identitāte" 2010). There is a certain explanation to that.

Up to now psychological research of ethnic identity is not coordinated in Latvia. The existing researches use the tests on the result of which the conclusions about the development level of a concrete people's ethnic identity are drawn. However, these conclusions are not sufficiently substantiated as different criteria of determining this level are used in different tests.

For carrying out a full-scale research of the formation level and peculiarities of ethnic identity of peoples living in Latvia, it is necessary to verify several of the existing psychological tests with a sufficiently big selection (not less than 1000 respondents). They should be compared with the results of sociological research which, as we suppose, may give a more adequate result. Then such indicators of the phenomenon have to be selected according to which the data of psychological and sociological research will not contradict each other. At that, special attention must be paid to different types of relations of an individual's dominant language of communication and his/her experiencing the ethnic identity peculiarities. Only after such comparison one may draw the conclusions about the adequacy of separate test methods meant for studying the phenomenon and the complexity of ethnic identity manifestations.

Conclusions

1. Two stages can be clearly seen in the latest history of psychological research of ethnic identity in Latvia. The first period started with the appearance of A.Karpova's book "Introduction to ethnopsychology" (Karpova 1990). At this stage the researchers' attention was mostly drawn to the intrapsychological manifestations of ethnic identity. In these researches the focus is on the ethnic identity peculiarities of the Latvian ethnos. The method of narrative research frequently used at this stage gives a possibility to study the phenomenon in the cultural and historical aspects and to determine the conditions of ethnic identity preservation in a different language and cultural environment.

In 2001 I. Apine's book "Politology: introduction to ethnopsychology" is published (Apine, 2001). With the appearance of this book the paradigm of studying the phenomenon is changed: more and more researches are directed towards the interpsychological manifestations of ethnic identity. The circle of ethnoses under research is broadened. Now it includes other peoples living in Latvia: Russians, Jews, Gypsies, Polish and others. The repertoire of studying the phenomenon is widened as well (Latvians in Latvia, Latvians in Russia, Russians in Latvia, Russians in Russia). The researchers start applying a complex of psychological methods for studying ethnic identity.

2. In 2001 the State Programme of social integration is adopted. This arouses additional interest in the problem of ethnic identity. Mixed research groups including philosophers, anthropologists, pedagogues, sociologists and psychologists are formed. A number of researches is carried out at the junction of sciences. This adds to the value of the results as the subject of the research is common, i.e. ethnic identity. Its essence, ethnic peculiarities, connection with the culture and language, as well as the problem of ethnic identity formation are enriched with the new colours. At the same time, there appears the problem of selection (separation) of the results of researches with the psychological and non-psychological contents for the journal review article. In all disputable cases we were guided first and foremost by the presence of psychological contents in the subject and tasks of research. In particular, this refers to E.Krastiņa, Zh. Bērziņa and Zake's work "Gypsies' identity in a multicultural school" which was written at the function of pedagogic psychology, ethnic psychology and pedagogy (Krastiņa, Bērziņa, Zake 2005).

3. The problematic side of ethnic identity researches in Latvia is the absence of their coordination; we have already noted that there is not a

single psychologist among 12 heads of subprogrammes in the Programme of national identity formation. It is a researcher's personal interest, not the state order, that often appears to be the motivation for choosing this theme for the research (it was T.Grishkina's case who took up the research willing, first of all, to answer the question "Who am I?"). The second essential problem is a small amount of research samples, as well as the tests with different criteria of ethnic identity which does not allow comparing the results correctly and to formulate the general theoretical conclusions. However, one conclusion can be made on the basis of the researches under consideration. If several ethnic groups have been living and interacting on the same territory for a long time, in the self-consciousness of one people there appear the elements which were characteristic of other peoples earlier. This conclusion is also confirmed by the results of the author's research carried out at the end of the 90s. (Makarevičs 2001).

4. Present-day ethnic psychology has to pay attention to the problems of ethnic identity in the rapidly changing world: ethnic identity and the language of ethnos, ethnic identity and globalisation processes, and others. At that, an important methodical problem needs to be solved, i.e. to compare the results of different tests related to ethnic identity and received on the basis of one big sample (exceeding 1000 respondents) with the aim of determining the criteria which are common for these tests and which allow comparative analysis of the results to be carried out. It is obvious that these results need to be compared with the results of sociological research of this phenomenon. It will allow development of the psychological methods of ethnic identity research involving the most complicated interdisciplinary aspects of this phenomenon.

Besides, these methods should take into consideration the possibility of such phenomenon of multiethnicity.

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Leo Jansons

ALL WE HAVE LEFT: UNDERSTANDING AND THEORIZING BALTIC STATEHOOD IN THE AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF 1950 s

The postwar *Baltic question*¹ has been a subject of numerous disputes, researches and speculations during the last two decades, though logical borders of interpretation of this concept as a complex historical, socio-legal and political phenomenon have not yet been clearly defined. Moreover, the understanding and theorizing of the particular discourses of this concept might mark the potential contradiction between its fully historical or politically mono-dimensional and multidisciplinary, none politically aligned, paths.

There are many possible starting points for exploration of the *Baltic question*'s internal evolution during the *Cold War* and beyond. There are various trends of internal teleology set for such explorations, but in almost all cases the historical positive factology plays the major role, with the political reconstruction of the Baltic statehood being its central axis. The political basis of “the strange existence” of the Baltic States after their annexation by the USSR carried out in June, 1940 and the reaffirmation of the post World War II (WWII) *status quo* in Eastern Europe in 1945, has been highlighted in the historiography rather widely, but in many aspects such highlights express the prevalence of the imaginary imperative of “moral obligation” over other issues of the same importance. According to this imperative, Western democracies like the US, Great Britain and France had to establish and keep some kind of non recognition policy regarding the Baltic, which later on would be actively presented as the legal and political regularity.

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But keeping certain elements of the Baltic statehood functional after the end of WWII can hardly be seen as a legal and political regularity: nor according to the development of the international law, neither in the light of the global geopolitical interactions of the early *Cold War*. The Baltic statehood after 1940 as it is known in global political history and particularly – in history of diplomacy, remains a significant example of the certain imaginative anomaly (McHugh, Pacy 2001, p.4).

The aim of the research is to bring forward some points of interest in understanding and theoretical interpretation of the Baltic statehood reflected in the American institutional sources² of 1950s – the period, which justifiably can be called crucial in the practical, ideological and conceptual shaping of the postwar *Baltic question* in the contemporary *format of cognition*.

In the current research the selective primary sources based overview of the Baltic statehood's nature, genesis and preservation during the 1950s in the US is presented in order to try to mark the main trends in its theory and practice.

Key words: the *Baltic question*, the Baltic statehood, American sources studies, exile communities.

All we have left – that is a phrase that could immediately come to one's mind, when the *Baltic question* is explored in the historical writings or reviewed in the political debates. But, what actually is *the left behind thing*, and how it should be studied and reconstructed, is not always clearly defined. It is not always clarified also that the *Baltic question* as the multidisciplinary phenomenon of the historical background has various ways and formats of manifestation and therefore – of exploration and reconstruction, too, where theoretical and practical issues form a dominant pair of the methodological frame.

They both deal with statehood, geopolitics, rhetoric and ideology, and surely with an anthropological path – the exile people, societies and communities in different forms of their (self) organization. And only taking into account all these particularities with regard to the leading role of the primary sources, it is possible to make an attempt to understand and theorize the *Baltic question in toto*.

Theory and practice of the Baltic statehood after 1940. Theory: *de jure* and *de facto*

The political and legal issues of the state power emerge from one general source – the natural rights of nations to possess sovereignty within their ethnical territories, which normally result in the establishment of the state according to one or another political framework.³ The general basis of such a formation lay in the level of national (state) law (Kelsen 2009, p. 181), but its legal consequences – on the level of the leading doctrine of the international law at the period of the formation of a new state.⁴

The national laws form the general foundation of the state as such, but only international recognition validates it as the lawful subject and a full member of the international society.

Notable reviewers of the international law and explorers of the concept of sovereignty Winston P. Nagan and Craig Hammer present such quintessential formulation regarding emerging of new states that generally agrees with the following statement: “New States are emerging as the result of political and juridical developments in the international community to stabilize global conditions of independence, statehood, and governing sovereignty” (Nagan, Hammer 2003, p.1).

It is also proverbial that the process of liquidation of the states has not been the subject of international law, and the annihilation of sovereignty in every particular case can be viewed differently by every single member of international society or by the majority of this society (for example, on the level of the United Nations).

The annexation of three Baltic States was the case where such liquidation took place, and also it is a glaring example of contradictive attitudes within the international society towards the designated action.

There were countries which:

1. recognized the annexation both in *de jure* and *de facto*;
2. did not recognize *de jure*, but did *de facto*;
3. did not issue a clear statement in this regard.

A rather complete account of the exact states' position regarding *de jure* and *de facto* recognition of the annexation of the Baltic is given in the memorandum of the Acting Secretary to Charles Kersten, the Chair of the House Select Committee to Investigate the Incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the U.S.S.R.:

“On the basis of such information as is available to this Department, it appears that the Vatican and Spain have not recognized ei-

ther *de jure* or *de facto* the incorporation of the Baltic Republics into the Soviet Union. Great Britain has not recognized the incorporation *de jure* but appears to have done so *de facto*. The position of France and most other countries with whom the independent Baltic Republics maintained diplomatic relations appears similar to that of Great Britain. In the case of the Netherlands, recognition of incorporation appears to have followed inevitably from the fact that the Netherlands extended *de jure* recognition to the Soviet Union at a time when the Soviet Union has already absorbed the Baltic Republics. Sweden recognizes the incorporation *de jure*.

In the circumstances of the relationship which existed in 1940 between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other, the German and Italian Governments closed down the diplomatic and consular offices of the independent Baltic representatives. While it is not considered that the German Federal Republic and the Government of Italy recognize *de jure* the incorporation of the Baltic Republics into the Soviet Union, they have extended full recognition to Baltic diplomatic or consular representatives as official representatives of the Baltic countries.”⁵

In rare cases, selective attitude towards three countries appears, as it is seen in the institutional memo of Eastern European Division, Bureau of European Affairs, the Department of State, where the quotation from a secondary source is given with explanation of Canada's position. According to this quotation, the position of the US regarding the Baltic, in comparison with Canada, is

“...somewhat easier, since Canada has recognized the incorporation in the USSR of one of them (Estonia) *de facto* but not *de jure*, but has made no decision regarding the other two (Latvia and Lithuania)”⁶

Later such, as American sources state, opportunist position was criticized in rather high and sharp words, for instance in the draft Statement of the Secretary of State [John Foster Dulles] before the Kersten Committee, November 1953:

“The fact of the matter is, however, that very few governments have seen fit to extend *de jure* recognition to this “incorporation”. Some governments without illusions as to whether the Baltic peoples freely chose the fate that has temporarily befallen them, have given

de facto recognition to this result of Soviet aggression. I believe that few, if any, of those Governments expect any important practical advantages from extending *de facto* recognition to Soviet rule over the Baltic States”⁷

Still, it must be pointed out that *de jure* recognition is an aspect where uncertainties of the legal and political origin are rare in comparison with *de facto* recognition. If the sense and the manifestations of *de jure* non recognition of the Baltic annexation are more or less clear – based on formal legal references – , the nature of *de facto* non recognition leaves many questions without answer. The reviewed documentary sources contain some explanations and discussions of *de facto* non recognition, but most of them do not reflect the *very official* attitude of the US regarding this issue.

There are files that show the classification frame for the so called *de facto* annexed territories in Central and Eastern Europe, but again – they do not relate directly to the US’ political position towards the phenomenon of *de facto* annexation itself.

According to the necessity to clarify *de facto* annexations practical geographical implications in postwar Europe as it was required for the provision of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, the list of *de facto* annexed territories/countries was created by the State Department officials, with such territories/countries falling into three major categories:

- 1) formerly independent states incorporated into USSR. The United States has stated publicly that it does not recognize the incorporation of these states into the Soviet Union
 - a) Estonia
 - b) Latvia
 - c) Lithuania
- 2) Territories placed under the administration of the USSR or Poland as the result of the decision of the Potsdam conference (1945). In the view of the United States Government’s final determination of sovereignty over these areas will not be made until there is a Peace Treaty for Germany
- 3) Territories incorporated into the USSR as the result of agreements to which the United States was not a party.⁸

One might assume that the formulation “the United States has stated publicly that it does not recognize the incorporation of these states into the Soviet Union” clearly marks its position toward both *de jure* and *de facto* annexation of the Baltic States (as the formulation lacks specification whether it is applied to only one form of non recognition), but still it does

not explain why such statements were not ever made in a more incontestable manner.

The discussions at the highest political and international level with references to the international treaties or particular declarative documents – like the Atlantic Charter of 1941 or the Charter of the United Nations of 1945, marking the general modern principles of the rights of the nations to self-determination and to the preservation of state sovereignty, are always regarded as integral parts of the theoretical discourse of the *Baltic question*, too. These references as purely theoretical applications, of course, make a lot of sense, but in a practical aspect they have rather little merit.

If even the major framework act of the international law in postwar period – the Charter of the United Nations signed on July 26, 1945 in the article 2, point 4 states that

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”,

this principle is flexible enough to be applied selectively. Especially, taking into account the fact that the United Nations was created five years after the initial act of Baltic annexation, and the legal obligations included in this document cannot be applied retrospectively.

There are other documents which, in contrary, refer to the existence of the treaties signed at the time when the Baltic States were sovereign and lawful subjects of international society. They mostly were created in order to prevent actions of annihilation of the sovereignty of the state by force or by means of force. For example, the Convention for the Definition of Aggression signed on July 3, 1933, in London is an example to such a treaty. The Baltic States and the USSR are both co-signers of the convention, where articles 2 and 3 read:

“Article 2

Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements on force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions:

- 1) declaration of war upon another State;
- 2) invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;

- 3) attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
- 4) naval blockade of the coast or ports of another State;
- 5) provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

Article 3

No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article 2.”⁹

Undoubtedly, this document and the others of its type mark the general line of non-aggression policy that can be followed in modern international law, but in the case of the *Baltic question* in the period of 1940s-1950s, they had only declarative meaning.

Theory: Kersten Committee, lawfulness of annexation and the Cold War trend

Very soon after death of Joseph Stalin, when certain political changes were expected to happen in the USSR both in scale of internal and foreign affairs, massive and unprecedented political investigation on the lawfulness of the Soviet Baltic annexation was carried out by the US Congress, House of Representatives, between July 27 1953 and December 31 1954.

For this purpose, the special committee was created upon the adoption of H.RES. 346, and it was officially known as the Select Committee to Investigate the Incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the U.S.S.R. (also called: Kersten Committee (after its Chair, Congressman of Wisconsin Charles Kersten), The Baltic Committee and the Committee on Communist Aggression).

The following committee members were chosen to perform the political investigation of communist crimes in the Baltic: Fred E. Busbey (Chicago, Illinois, R), Alvin M. Bentley (Owosso, Michigan, R), Edward J. Bonin (Hazleton, Pennsylvania, R), Ray Madden (Gary, Indiana, D), Thomas J. Dodd (West Hartford, Connecticut, D) and Thaddeus M. Machrowitz (Hamtramck, Michigan, D), with Republican Congressman of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Charles J. Kersten as the chair.

Along with re-examinations of the legal documentation – bilateral and multilateral treaties where the Baltic States were signing parties, hearings involving top American officials, several former American diplomatic representatives in the Baltic, namely E.T. Bailey, Montgomery H. Colladay, Bernard Gufler, Bertel E. Kuniholm, Walter A. Leonard, E.A. Lightner, Basil MacGowan, Owen Norem, Earl L. Packer, G. Frederick Reinhardt, Angus Ward, S.W. Washington and John Wiley, were carried out in order to collect their first – hand eyewitness recalls about the days of the annexation and situation in their station cities before and during this process.¹⁰

The massive informative campaign among the Baltic refugees in the West also took place, and people were asked to share their experiences and specific information about the Soviet deeds in the Baltic: a) during and immediately after the Soviet annexation of 1940, b) on repressions of 1941, c) on creation of the legal basis for the large scale industry nationalization, d) on creation of the legal basis for the Baltic incorporation into the Soviet Union, e) on the techniques and practical manifestations of the rigged elections of so called Peoples Parliaments, f) on the Soviet social and socio-economic policy in the Baltic after 1945 with all the following consequences (as “kulak” deportations of 1949, forced collectivization of the agricultural sector, overall sovietization of the industry etc.).

The committee accumulated about 300 eye witness testimonies of the Baltic refugees on above mentioned and another matters. The main amount of testimonies was collected in the US, Canada, Australia and in several European countries – primarily, Western Germany and Sweden.

As the creation of the Kersten Committee was a rather significant political act, the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was the first of top rank American officials who were asked to make the statement before it, and his statement marked the path between the Baltic annexation non recognition policy of early 1940s and one of mid 1950s.¹¹

However, in late 1954 the title of the commission was officially changed to the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, and its investigative authority was broadened to all the countries and territories, which actually were impacted politically by the Soviet Union and its territorial claims. Mostly, the investigations of the communist aggression involved so called European USSR’s satellites – like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia.

Regarding the Baltic issues, the committee was active since its creation (with hearings begun on November 30, 1953) till the presenting of the final reports in December 1954.

According to some authors, the anti communist agenda of 1950s had a vast majority of manifestations on the federal level of the domestic policy

(Schrecker 2002, pp. 25-26), and the speculation here could be made that the creation of such a committee harmonized quite well with this agenda. Even possibly with the most radical views within it – those close to the concepts of the classical “reds under the bed” policy and, therefore, – to a *McCarthyism* ideology and axiology as well.

Particular rhetoric elements of this policy had significant manifestations in the papers of the committee (or regarding the committee), such as the multi factorial concept of the “anti communist crusade”. The institutional documents even contain offers to use Baltic émigrés in the US as the workforce in such crusades – of course, without further explanation what actually the concept of “workforce” means in the designated context, and what was expected from the Baltic people to do in the epic battle against communism as *McCarthyism* ideologists saw it.¹²

The primary political aim of the creation of the Kersten Committee dealt with the investigation of the lawfulness of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States originally carried out on June 1940, but the secondary – with an examination of the forms and actual scale of mistreatments of the Baltic people by the Soviet authorities.

If the reaching of the secondary aim helped to construct a more complete image of the Soviet annexation’s social and political impact in the Baltic by collecting numerous eyewitness accounts as well as processing of the informative inputs of former US diplomatic officials stationed in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania¹³, the primary aim, in its turn, seemed a bit unusual. Such a conclusion could be drawn mostly because of the “timing anachronism”. The investigation was initiated thirteen years after the act of aggression, and it was not very credible that the political action of that kind might have some tangible or long-lasting effect in actual Soviet– American bilateral relations. Of course, some propositions that might have a long –lasting and tangible impact on these relations were made – like a proposition to a breach of diplomatic relations with the USSR if it refuses to eject its military forces from the territory of former Baltic Republics and let the three countries re-establish their national independence¹⁴, but they had no practical manifestation after all.

It must be also pointed out that social impact of the annexation was interpreted not only from the standpoint of the past events; it also contained some element of teleological predisposition, as it is shown, for instance, in the letter by Thurston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary, to former Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Latvia and Estonia to Latvia, John C. Wiley:

“It is understood that Committee has examined voluminous documentary evidence and testimony contributed by Baltic émigré individuals and organizations, illustrating Soviet techniques of intimidation, deceit and fraud in effecting “incorporation” through Soviet–style rigged elections, and communist class warfare, terrorism, genocide and related violations of human rights practiced thereafter. [...] It is expected that the Committee’s exposure of the Soviet techniques used in seizing and exploiting the Baltic States, and used again in other countries of Eastern Europe, will help free people better to understand and more effectively to resist further Soviet attempts at aggression.”¹⁵

The overall importance of the social trends of the investigation is marked in rather numerous other documents like memorandum, Walworth Barbour to Harold C. Vedeler on the status of the work of Representative Kersten’s Committee on Communist Aggression that read:

“Representative’s Kersten Committee on Communist Aggression (formerly the House Baltic Committee) appears to be concerned at present with preparations for possible future hearings in Europe. The hearings would deal generally with extension of Communist domination over the captive people now behind the Iron Curtain.”¹⁶

The quotation shows the development of the *Baltic question’s* socio-lingual rhetoric, where the *Cold War* lexicological invention of the 1950s – the concept of “captive people/s” or the “captive nations” appears. This concept is significant mostly because it marks the definitive line between two crucial elements of the *Baltic question’s* inner content – shows the actual semantic split between its territorial or geographic and anthropological items. The split between *the people* and *the land* becomes rather visible in the declarative and other documents since early 1950s.

The solidarity and willingness to help and assist people in the Soviet sphere of interests is manifested much more like theoretical and cognitive than the practical category. The willingness to ensure practical support – to perform practical actions that lead to the practical, beneficial results – was usually overpowered by principal refusal to help the hostile or unfriendly regimes. Like it is declared in the negotiations on possible potatoes importation from Lithuanian and Estonian SSR:

“We [the EE stuff – L.J.] reached the agreement, the general informal agreement that the position of the Department of State is that we would prefer to see potatoes imported from some place more friendly to us than the Soviet Union.”¹⁷

It means that talks about the necessity to support captive people and efforts to help them practically were somehow divided by the potential helpers themselves, as they saw in provision of any practical assistance as an opportunity for the Soviet manipulations. And danger of manipulations and fears of helping unfriendly regime almost always step forward. It was regarded as a much more reasonable consideration than willing to do something good and useful for people left behind in the former Baltic States. Even, if the planned actions were more like a gesture of a good will, not a permanent and huge practical support.

Practice: preservation of elements of the Baltic statehood

Soon after the Baltic annexation, the general decision was made by the US Government to deny publically the incorporation of the three states into the USSR.

It was agreed to keep certain elements of the Baltic statehood functional in the territory of the US and protect them by means of power of the federal authorities. The principal agreement was reached to recognize the Baltic diplomatic missions as the only bearers of the Baltic statehood in the United States.¹⁸

The practical implementation of this general political line was realized in the following manner – firstly, the American position was made known to the Baltic diplomatic officials, to the USSR and the rest of the international society¹⁹, secondly, the diplomatic privileges and immunities of the Baltic diplomats were ensured by the US federal authorities²⁰, thirdly, the diplomatic missions were proclaimed the only bearers of the Baltic statehood in exile²¹, and, fourthly, the practical foundation of such a system was guaranteed by means of blocking of the Baltic dollar accounts and golden reserves in the US banks.

Blocking of assets kept in the US banks in the name of Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian governments carried out in 10 (15) of July, 1940, was regarded an urgent action that prevented their transition into the Soviet possession.²²

After the US position towards the Baltic annexation was proclaimed and the above mentioned practical actions taken, American authorities kept monitoring the international response.

As a certain political continuity of the lost sovereignty of three states was insured by the Baltic diplomatic personnel and mission left behind in the US and several other Western countries, the question regarding the establishment of lawful exile governments was never seriously discussed in the higher American political circles. At least, there is no evidence in the reviewed documental holdings that would prove the existence of such discussions or consultations. On the contrary, it was always stressed that the three Baltic States did not have governments in exile and such establishments should not be mentioned in the institutional documentation, even if it was done without intention.

There are several examples, for instance, dealing with the establishment of the Kersten Committee, where the Department of State urges to make corrections of the text of certain documents, by deleting words referred to non existing Baltic exile governments.

Thus at least one source shows that Department's demands were neglected:

“On June 4, 1953 Representative Kersten called at the Department to discuss House Resolution 231, providing for the creation of the Committee under reference. With reference to the text of HR 231, Mr. Barbour suggested the deletion of the phrase “the Governments of” in the introductory clause, “Whereas, the Government of the United States of America maintains diplomatic relations with the Governments of the Baltic nations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia...” since no such Governments now exist. Mr. Kersten noted such a change in a copy of the resolution which he had with him. On July 20, 1953 Representative Kersten's resolution was submitted to the House as HR 346. The phrase “Governments of the Baltic nations” remained in the introductory clause of the resolution, without having been amended as suggested”.²³

According to the above mentioned recognition of the extraordinary status of the Baltic diplomatic representatives in exile, the practical foundation of their power was ensured by the money and the golden assets from the blocked funds. The actual blocking of these funds took place shortly before the statement of July 23. On July 15 (or 10) the Baltic funds of about 15 million dollars in monetary equivalent were blocked in Riggs Bank in Washington, Federal Reserve Bank in New York and National City Bank of New York respectively.²⁴

The procedure of the release of the money from the blocked funds was

described rather precisely by stating that the United States Government would authorize the release of limited sums from the blocked accounts only to enable the Baltic diplomatic and consular officials in the United States and in a few other specified countries to carry on their work.

“Acting under the authority contained in Section 25 (b) of the Federal Reserve Act, the Secretary of State each year issues appropriate certification for release of the necessary funds, the amount of each case being determined on the basis of a budget submitted by the respective missions in the United States for the Department’s approval. The actual de-blocking is accomplished by the issuance of licenses by the Office of Alien Property, the Department of Justice.”²⁵

Few accounts with much smaller amounts of money kept in the name of the Baltic Governments were recovered in several American banks till the mid 1950s.²⁶

No clear documentation proves in reviewed documental holdings are found so far regarding usage of the blocked funds for another purposes – such as social care/support projects. For instance, the documentation includes requests of the Baltic émigrés to give financial support for some particular social projects in the US or in Europe.²⁷

These requests were addressed to the legations of the states in the US, as it was known that they have a direct connection with the distribution and maintenance of the Baltic funds. But almost always these requests were denied. As it is seen in the case of Latvian émigrés in Great Britain, who addressed their request to the Latvian Legation in the US, and asked to provide a certain sum of money for establishment of the facility for mentally unsound refugees. This particular request was rejected with an explanation that blocked funds were not meant to be used for purposes like that.²⁸

Also, the statement made in several historical writings regarding provision of direct financial help by the US authorities to the Baltic diplomatic missions (McHugh, Pacy 2001, p. 5) is not reinforced by the facts from reviewed archival sources.

Practice: pillars of statehood

At least five general trends (or pillars) in understanding and theorizing the Baltic statehood in exile could be named as the results of the review of the American archival documents, but only one of them can be interpreted as fully valid – these are the Baltic diplomatic services as the only successors of the annihilated Baltic statehood.

For Latvia, the link between the lost and remained statehood was insured by means of extraordinary power granted to the head of the diplomatic corps, Consul General of Latvia in the United Kingdom Karlis R. Zariņš (Charles Zarine) by the last legitimate Government of the Republic of Latvia via the State Chancery on May 17, 1940.²⁹ He was therefore regarded as the “senior Latvian diplomat”, who in this capacity was empowered to defend the interests of Latvia in all countries except Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Germany and the USSR. In London, Minister Zariņš enjoyed personal diplomatic privileges, but had no anomalous legal position since Great Britain recognized *de facto*, but not *de jure*, the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States.³⁰

At the same time, Baltic legations in the US regarded themselves fully independent from the formal executive centers, and demonstrated therefore the actual decentralization of the power – like establishments based on the extraordinary authority granted to the Baltic diplomatic services both by the last legitimate governments of the three republics and the federal authorities of the United States.

“The Lithuanian Minister tells me that his mission is quite independent of the Lithuanian Legation in London. He said that he would make any appointments necessary in this country, but that he could not appoint any officer above the rank of Vice Consul since, by the law of Lithuania, any appointment above that rank would require presidential and parliamentary approval. [...] The Estonian Consul in charge of the Legation in this country says that his mission is quite independent of the Estonian Legation in London. [...] It is known that the Latvian Minister considers his mission to be completely independent.”³¹

The other four pillars are as follows:

- a) the formation of the exile communities (visa regulations, Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and Baltic emigrants, discussion regarding so called non eligible persons (former members of the proscribed organizations etc.));
- b) the problem of citizenship (issuing and exchanging of the Baltic passports, discussions regarding citizenship status etc.),
- c) the socio-legal protection (of the Baltic diplomats (extraordinary based) and the Baltic exiles (ordinary based));
- d) claims to establish the authorities for self governance of exile communities (as long run discussions and negotiation on the possible establishment of lawful governments in exile).

The formation of the exile communities is one of the key trends in the theoretical and practical (re)construction of the *Baltic question*. It also manifests the biggest and the most important socio-legal and socioeconomic line within the exploration of the *Baltic question* in postwar America. This line is sufficiently covered by the primary sources, and it reflects various aspects in the US attitude towards the Baltic émigrés coming to this country and settling there in late 1940s and early 1950s.

Firstly, under the provision of the Displaced Persons Act and special presidential directives³², numerous Baltic émigrés were able to come to the US and find there a safe and rather friendly living environment with the possibility to integrate into the local society, to work, to study and do many other things important for personal and professional comfort. Some authors suggest that the overall personal qualities of these people – like their solid working habits, helped them a lot in terms of integration and gaining the socioeconomic success in the US (Taagepera 2009, p. 453).

Secondly, the reviewed sources contain the information about ideological and political struggle over the concept of the proscribed persons. These persons – former members of so called proscribed organizations, such as military units of Nazi armed forces or paramilitary organizations of the same origin³³ – also wanted to use an opportunity and come to the US as the refugees under the provision of Displaced Persons Act. They made regular attempts to get the immigration visas. Needless to say, that the Department of State and the Department of Justice opposed this and provided the argumentation that fully justified their position.³⁴

The reviewed documents also reflect the case of the changeable and fluid nature in application of the proscribed groups' concept to members of Latvian paramilitary organization of interwar period – *Aizsargi* (*Latvian Home Guards*). The struggle for the removal of *Home Guards* from the list of proscribed organizations did not gain success until early 1950s, and even then it was decided to allow the issuing of immigration visas to former active members of this organization only after deep examination of their personal profiles.³⁵

In the case of members of the *Latvian Legion*, the considerations of their eligibility continued till mid 1950, when it was decided that these persons cannot be *ipso facto* excluded from the list of the possible immigration visa receiver^s. But, at the same time it was outlined that every such person applying for the immigration visa, should be examined with maximal attention.³⁶

Thirdly, the Baltic communities in the US were significant by their inner social and political diversity. Almost all most influential and numerous

Baltic exile social and political organizations had at least one of their central offices in America.³⁷

The problem of citizenship derives from one of the formation of the exile communities, as citizenship should represent both legal and social cornerstones to the legitimacy of these communities in the new geopolitical location. Being the citizens of non existing countries, the Baltic émigrés in the US formed quite a large social group that formally might have become a subject of various socio-legal problems if they would not have integrated into the local society as American citizens, too. In most cases integration into the local society was not very hard or socially challenging for the Baltic newcomers.

Tracing of the Baltic statehood in exile by exploration of the case changing concept of citizenship clearly leads to the conclusion that Baltic émigrés were able to get all the socio-legal protection every American permanent resident or citizen would get there. At the same time, Baltic émigrés were not forced to give up their former citizenship status, which in fact gained more symbolic than practical or functional meaning in the postwar geopolitical situation. Moreover, American politicians regarded Baltic émigrés being potentially “loyal and useful citizens of our [means – American] Republic”³⁸, who can appreciate safety, freedom and emotionally comfortable environment of their new homeland.³⁹

As for the diplomatic representatives, the citizenship issues of the Baltic émigrés were reduced almost to the monitoring functions alone. Beside it, the Baltic diplomatic missions in London and Washington D.C., as well as Estonian Consulate General in New York were entitled to exchange and issue the national passports of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, but all other diplomatic establishments were able to clarify citizenship status, issue the credentials and perform monitoring over the resettlement of the displaced persons.⁴⁰

The problems of the socio-legal protection in the context of the *Baltic question* fall into two major groups where the first group is related to the Baltic diplomatic personnel and the second one – to the “regular exiles” or the Baltic exile communities. The major difference between the two groups should be outlined, as the diplomats' socio-legal protection was performed on the extraordinary basis, but the protection of the exile communities (in fact, every single individual) had an ordinary legal background.

Two federal authorities dealing with the provision of the appropriate socio-legal protection of the Baltic diplomats in the US were Departments of State and Justice. The Department of State was the major organization providing the practical and legal assistance to the Baltic diplomats and le-

gations in any question regarding their status and rights in the US. The Department of Justice, in its turn, provided authoritative explanations in disputable cases regarding particular precedents of potential violation of the rights and in cases of general legal uncertainties.

These authorities also coordinated the legal procedure of the annual withdrawal of the money from blocked funds for the maintenance of the remaining diplomatic missions of the Baltic States.⁴¹

Baltic legations were entitled to take care about the solution of the minor legal problems themselves and were able to hire the lawyers for these purposes. For instance, the Latvian legation in 1940s and 1950s continued cooperation with its lawyer of the pre annexation period, with all the expenses regarding this cooperation being covered from the annual budget of the legation.

Only in specific circumstances, the Department of State was asked to allow to cover the fee from the blocked funds, not the legation's budget of the current fiscal year, as it is seen in the situation with required reward of \$1000 to Mr. Robert J. Law, Jr., the New York lawyer and the long time legal advisor to Latvian Legation in Washington, who discovered a rather big account of the Latvian Government in the Chase National Bank.

“The Latvian Minister [Jules Feldmans] had been invited to visit the Department for the purpose of supplying additional details in connection with his letter of April 9, 1953, copy attached, in which he requested the Department's concurrence in the payment of a fee of 1000\$ to Mr. Robert H. Law, Jr., legal advisor to the Latvian Legation. [...] Mr. Feldmans said that Mr. Law had discovered the existence of the large Latvian account in the Chase National Bank and had worked to obtain its transfer to the Government of Latvia account with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.”⁴²

For Baltic exile communities no extraordinary socio-legal protection was provided by the US authorities except the possibility to enter and settle there on the legal basis as provided in the Displaced Persons Act. According to the expanded quota regulations developed under the act, the largest and the most socially and politically diverse Baltic exile community was created in the US between 1948 and 1953.

The documental accounts of September 1950 show the amount of the Baltic émigrés settled in America between late 1947 and mid 1950 alone. The figure is quite impressive – 60 471 persons, with regard that more than 30 000 Baltic refugees remaining in the territory of Germany by that time.⁴³

The great percentage of these people was regarded as potentially interested to move to other European countries or to America in close future.

But in some exceptional situations socio-legal protection of the single members of Baltic exile communities also might have become a subject of the federal level attention. When professional abilities of the Baltic exile medical doctors and lawyers were questioned by the authorities of single states – as in the case of licensing of the Lithuanian physicians in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, the supreme assistance was provided to these people in order to obtain the confirmation of their professional qualification in the shortest possible terms.⁴⁴

Same serious attention was paid to the disputes on the inheritance of the Baltic exiles' properties after their death.⁴⁵ The essence of these disputes was as follows: the lawyers representing interests of the Soviet diplomatic missions claimed to overtake the properties, if the late persons did not leave heir, and motivated such actions by stating that these estates would be regarded as belonging to the Soviet Union. In order to prevent or stop Soviet claims, the Department of State issued its explanation of the situation, where Soviet rights to overtake any property belonging to the Baltic citizens in the US were clearly denied:

“The Department has never recognized the incorporation of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania into the Soviet Union, and consequently does not regard Soviet consular officers or their attorneys as having any rights to act on behalf of non – resident Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanian nationals with respect to distributive shares owing to them from estates of persons dying in the United States. In the case of Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanian nationals, such right has been reserved to consular officers of the respective countries by Article XXV of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights of 1928 between the United States and Latvia (45 Stat. 2641) and Article XXIV of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the United States and Estonia (44 Stat. 2379). Moreover, even in the absence of applicable treaty provisions, the Department does not consider that Soviet consular officers in the United States have any rights to represent nationals of a third country, whether residing in the United States or elsewhere, without that country's consent.”⁴⁶

However, there is documental evidence showing that in a few particular cases the representatives of the Soviet interests were able to

bring a suit in order to legitimate their right to overtake the properties.⁴⁷ Still none of these documents approve that the favorable judgments were ever made regarding these claims.

The socio-legal protection provided on the federal level included some forms of protection of the Baltic interests outside the actual legal domain of the US federal authorities, too. The Department of State in close cooperation with the US Immigration Authority of the Department of Justice took particular care to respect the rights of the Baltic émigrés to present Baltic passports as the lawful ID acceptable elsewhere within the non Communist area.⁴⁸

Claims and desires to establish the authorities for self governance of the Baltic exile communities are generally related to the discussion regarding the governments in exile where the Estonian trend in 1950s is the most visible.

At least, in early and mid 1950s this trend was represented by two émigré groups claiming to possess the authority of the legitimate Estonian exile government.

The first group led by the “possibly most respected Estonian exile politician of all”⁴⁹ – August Rei, was established in Stockholm, Sweden (technically – in Oslo, Norway), and the second – led by Alfred Maurer, in Augustdorf, Germany, since the two most powerful Estonian exile political centers were located in Sweden and the US.⁵⁰

It is rather complicated to determine, whether these groups were tended to form the alternative or some kind of opposition to the legitimate bearers of the executive state power or regarded themselves as the parallel lawful authorities with a significant social and political backing in the exile community. Unlike the Baltic diplomatic representatives, who might not feel a practical necessity to keep the close connection to different sociopolitical groups, as their positions were not up to the Baltic exiles as the source of legitimacy, the prospective exile governments actually needed to support these groups and as many Baltic émigré people as possible first hand.⁵¹

As it is stated in the general overview of the situation regarding the prospective governments in exile, written by the Estonian law professor, Vice President of the Society of the Estonian Lawyers in the US, Adolf Perandi sometime in early 1954, there were two basic demands for establishing of the lawful government in exile:

“... firstly, refugees themselves recognize the exile government. Secondly – the recognition by the other states give to the exile government its specific nature”, and accordingly,

“...without recognition by another states the exile government hangs in the air. It is like any private organization which has proclaimed its existence”⁵²

It should be added that these demands were not related exclusively to the Estonian community – at the same time they should have been applicable to the other Baltic exile groups as well. But if even there was a demand for establishing the exile government in the émigré communities, the overall legitimate basis and functional framework of such establishment was regarded as a problem – firstly, from the teleological point of view (namely, who actually needs this government, for whom it is created) and, secondly, from the point of view of the state power.

These problems are outlined by the author rather clearly and briefly:

“The first question should be the need for a government in exile. An exile government is not necessary for the people in exile. It also cannot “reign” over people that means – to be a ruling power to them. Concerning state power the people in exile are subordinated to the government of the state where they live. To be subordinated also to the exile government is not possible, because the state power cannot be divided.”⁵³

Perandi’s conception regarding exile government was based on the following duality – created and legitimated in exile, it was tended to be for the people left behind in the homeland:

“...the exile government has not means to put into operation the executive power over refugees. An exile government, concerning state power, is not meant for refugees, it is for people in the homeland. So an exile government is meant for the moment when it could be an executive power in homeland again”⁵⁴

This point marks a conceptual difference between the general teleology of the legitimate elements of the Baltic postwar statehood and the exile governmental groups.

If for the Baltic diplomatic corps’ self sustainability in the West was regarded as a primary task without a close link with exile communities as the possible source of their legitimacy/ delegitimacy, for the exile governmental groups social trend was much more significant. It is also possible that the idea of such a role was deliberately created and developed in order to

show the exile politicians' care for the faith of the fellow citizens left behind in the Baltic and to point to the indissoluble path between them and the exile political leaders – the members of exile governmental groups. If so, the social path here remains the dominant one.

For exile governments not only preservation of the formal elements of the statehood in exile was a task of outstanding importance. Functions normally non applicable to supreme executive authority like "...task of propaganda concerning fight for liberation of homeland" were also placed within their sphere of interests. Even more – this task was not regarded only as a formal obligation – it was declared more like *moral imperative* for the exile government, and also "the justification of its existence".⁵⁵

Conclusive remarks

Even though different theoretical and methodological trends in genesis of the postwar *Baltic question* have been explored for decades, there still are many subjects requiring further depth studies – possibly, more related to a multidisciplinary approach in the cognition of designated complex phenomenon.

Mostly researches dedicated to the Baltic issues in *Cold War* context deal with highlighting of the political discourse in the understanding and theorizing of the *Baltic question*, with very few paths to legal, socio-legal or anthropological topics. If even there are notable attempts to switch the research trends and priorities (Taagepera 2009), the political line still remains the leading one. It plays the role of arranging the axis for *thinking* the *Baltic question* as fully self sufficient and fully formed phenomenon, where the domination of the political contexts and readymade ideological hypertexts over the legal and anthropological trends, still prevails.

Thus, there is plenty of room for multidisciplinary issues to be brought in. There are many issues referring to the possibility of the historical and historically cognitive widening of the concept. In some way this widening might be performed on the level of the legal continuity, which had been generally reviewed and outlined in several prominent researches during the last decade (Ziemele 2005).

The dimension of the sociopolitical and socio-legal anthropology could be a field of such widening as well. But the most incontestable trend still leads to the complex exploration, critical examination and archeographical processing of the institutional sources of different groups and origins, as such deep researches would help better to understand the essence of the *Baltic question* not only as a derivate of the political and ideological his-

tory, but also as a long lasting paradox of the *Cold War* geopolitical culture, metageography, international law and socio-ethnical/ socio-legal agenda.

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(Endnotes)

- 1 Throughout this article the concept of the *Baltic question* (known also as the postwar (World War II) *Baltic question* and *Cold War Baltic question*) includes following research categories: a) the genesis of the political and legal aspects of the Baltic statehood after 1940; b) the formation and the social consolidation of the Baltic exiles; c) the socio-legal strengthening of the Baltic exile communities; d) the development of ideas regarding the possibilities to restore the Baltic sovereignty; e) the Baltic countries as the paradox of the international law; f) the Baltic trend in Cold War geopolitics, axiology, political culture and metageography.
- 2 In this case, these are documents of the Office of European Affairs, Division of Polish, Baltic and Czechoslovak Affairs [Office of the Country Director for Eastern Europe], related to the General Records of the Department of States (RG 59).
- 3 The political framework – a political system and the form of the statehood

- 4 CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945, art. 2, paragraph 7 (declaring that state autonomy must be preserved in international law).
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NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

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Monographs (books, brochures):

Turner J. H. (1974) *The Structure of Sociological Theory*. Homewood (Illinois): The Dorsey Press.

Articles in collections:

Turner R. H. (1990) A Comparative Content Analysis of Biographies. In: Øyen E., ed. *Comparative Methodology: Theory and Practice in International Social Research*. London, etc.: Sage Publications.

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Strazdiņš I. (1999) Matemātiķi pasaulē un Latvijā. *Zinātnes Vēstnesis*, 8. marts.

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Bibliography should be compiled in the alphabetic order according to the authors' names or to the titles (at the beginning – in the Latin alphabet, at the end – in the Cyrillic alphabet).

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