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Slovak national minority in the Czech Republic

The contribution addresses Slovaks in the Czech Republic, and the formation of a modern Slovak minority within the new political environment after 1989 and after the division of the joint state in 1992. It summarizes the long history of Slovaks in Czech lands when they were not a national minority, cultural contacts which led to the idea of a close Czech-Slovak mutuality and the formation of a united Czechoslovak nation upon the origination of the joint state. It characterizes the formation of Slovak diasporas in Bohemia and Moravia during 1945-1989. It presents research results which document the diversity of Slovaks in the Czech Republic based on different historical destinies and life outside of their homeland as compatriots and migrants. Due to the particularity of different Slovak settlement and migratory groups, a united Slovak minority did not originate in the Czech Republic.

Key words: Slovak national minority in the Czech Republic, nationality policy of Czechoslovakia, nationality policy of the Czech Republic, Slovak compatriots from the Transylvanian Ore Mountains in Romania, Slovaks in Hungary

Slovaks are an example of a large national minority which is scattered

From the history of Slovaks in the Czech Republic

The Slovak national minority belongs to modern minorities because it originated only after the partition of Czechoslovakia in 1993. The roots of its origination and existence in the Czech environment, however, are longer-term. They range not only to the 19th century but even to the middle ages. Slovaks already lived in Czech lands long-ago when consciousness of nationality did not exist, and when importance was placed on the country of origin. Slovaks originated from neighboring Hungary, and in period historical sources, they can be found under the Latin term Sclavi. Later, in the 19th century, Slovaks were referred to as Hungarian Slovaks. Czech and Slovak intellectuals perceived the language affinity 1 and they became the vehicle for the idea of Czech-Slovak mutuality. Prominent representatives of this idea were Bohena Němcová, Ludovít Štúr, Jozef Hurban Vajanský, Adolf Heyduk, and later on also Karel Káral, Martin Kukučín, Milan Rastislav Štefánik, and many others.

During the period of intense Magyarization of Slovakia, Slovaks were entering Czech schools and trade-schools in Moravia and Bohemia. The association Czechoslovak Unity (Českoslovanská jednota) in Prague introduced Slovak students and apprentices into the Czech environment, and it also took care of their provision – it arranged scholarships, accommodation, and alimentation for them. Later it became Czechoslovak Unity (Československá jednota).

Slovak students in Prague united in the student association Detvan. The association originated in 1882. University professor Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk enjoyed meeting with members of this association (“dětvanci”). Many of them were his students. Detvan was a discussion club as well as professional seminar.

Czechs were interested in Slovakia. A strong Slovakophile movement originated in Czech lands during the 2nd half of the 19th century. The aim of Slovakophiles was to enhance Slovakia in terms of economy and culture, stop its Magyarization, and maintain the idea of Czech-Slovak mutuality. Bearers of this idea were Czech and Slovak intellectuals. Literature addressing Slovakia, its historical facts, and Slovak art – mainly folk art – was published in Bohemia. The magazine Our Slovakia (Naše Slovensko) was also published. Mainly, it was Slovak evangelicals in Slovakia who were inclined to the Czech-Slovak mutuality. 2 One of them was Rastislav Štefánik who was responsible, together with Edvard Beneš and Tomáš G. Masaryk for the origination of Czechoslovakia.

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1 Czechs and Slovaks belong to the West Slavic branch of Slavs together with Poles, Lusatian Sorbs, Kashubians, and also Polabian Slavs who are already extinct.

2 They used biblical Czech during church services and, therefore, they perceived the affinity in a stronger way.
After the origination of Czechoslovakia in 1918, Slovaks became one of the branches of the artificially created Czechoslovak nation. The theory of Czech and partially Slovak intellectuals and politicians concerning the political Czechoslovak nation won. Therefore, Slovaks could not be a minority within the Czech lands of the new Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak language became a joint language. It had two forms. In common practice, it was Czech language in the Czech lands. In Slovakia, literary Slovak language was introduced instead of the formerly-used Hungarian language, and Czech was also commonly used as a state language because many Czech officials, industrialists, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, tradesmen, officers, gendarmery, etc. came to Slovakia.

Many Slovaks came to Bohemia and Moravia to study, as apprentices, to work, as seasonal agricultural laborers, as manual laborers, miners, politicians, and clerks in state institutions. They settled in Moravia, in Ostrava, Brno, Prostějov, Olomouc, Hradec Králové, Prague or in the surroundings of Prague, in the Mostecko region as well as other regions. Slovak intellectuals, Slovak clerks in central institutions as well as Slovak artists lived and worked in Prague. Slovak intellectuals and people with freelance occupations came to Olomouc, Hradec Králové, and Brno. Slovak agricultural laborers settled in close proximity of Prague, Mladá Boleslav, Slaný, Jihlava, and Uherský Brod, miners from Slovakia settled in Ostrava and in the Mostecko region. Slovak students had already been coming to study in Prague for a long time, and later also came to Olomouc, Jihlava, and Brno. In 1918–1938, their inflow increased and many of them stayed in Czech lands. 3

New associations called Local Branches of Matica Slovenská (Místní odbořy Matice Slovenské) originated and worked in Czech lands. They were founded by Slovakophiles. Their centre was Matica Slovenská in the Slovak city of Martin. It was a cultural association founded originally in 1868 for protection from Magyarization. Local branches introduced Slovak culture into cities in Czech lands: Prague, Hradec Králové, Prostějov, Olomouc, Ostrava, etc. They also promoted the idea of Czech-Slovak mutuality.

While the Czech-Slovak mutuality and advocacy of the united Czechoslovak nation functioned in Czech lands, in Slovakia there originated political parties which promoted the autonomy of Slovakia, and the departure of Czech intellectuals, clerical workers and gendarmery. In the years of global crisis which affected Czechoslovakia and mainly Slovakia, the pressure on the departure of Czechs increased. In the second half of the 1930’s, Adolf Hitler used this autonomist movement to destabilize Czechoslovakia.

After the split of Czechoslovakia and the origination of the clerical-fascist Slovak Republic under the protection of A. Hitler, Czechs had to leave Slovakia. In 1939 – 1945, therefore, Slovaks became a national minority in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia for the first time. Many Slovaks also came to work in industry in separated borderland territories connected to Germany.

**Slovaks in Czechoslovakia in 1945-1992**

The status of Slovaks in post-war Czechoslovakia in the Czech part of the republic was not defined until the Ninth-of-May Constitution in 1948. According to this constitution, Czechoslovakia was a united state of two nations – Czech and Slovaks. The pre-war Czechoslovak nation ceased to exist. Due to the constitutional arrangement, Slovaks in Czech lands were once again not considered to be a minority. In the Czech part of the republic, however, they had already functioned unofficially as a minority since 1946. They had certain rights concerning education in their mother language and their own culture in the Slovak language, which was supposed to be imported from Slovakia.

In 1947–1951, Local Branches of Matica Slovenská worked here again. They were organized by Matica Slovenská from Slovakia which sent its cultural workers to the Czech part of the republic. Their task was to secure cultural needs and education in the Slovak language for Slovaks in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. Slovaks had the same rights here as Czechs. They could require lessons of the Slovak language for their children – not only in elementary schools and secondary schools, but also in kindergartens. The necessary condition was, however, a certain number of Slovak children in the classroom, the interest of parents and children in lessons in the Slovak language, etc. They could use the spoken as well as written Slovak language, and require the arrangement of their own cultural needs in their mother language. Practically, however, they did not use these possibilities. In 1951, the branches of Matica Slovenská were incorporated into Národní fronta (National Front) under the supervision of KSČ (Czechoslovak Communist Party), and by 1953 they ceased to exist in the Czech lands.

The most considerable inflow of Slovaks into Czech lands took place during 1945–1950, 1953–1964, and 1969–1972. It was mostly connected with the settlement of the borderland after displaced Germans and the migration for work. Slovak compatriots returned from Romania, Hungary,
Carpathian Ruthenia, Croatia, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Belgium, as well as from overseas. Slovaks from Slovakia, Romania and Hungary left their mark in the Czech environment, especially in the borderland. The inflow of Slovaks in 1969-1972 was due to the federalization of Czechoslovakia. Slovaks entered governmental structures and many other institutions in Prague. 596,134 Slovaks lived in the Czechoslovak Federative Republic at that time. After the division of Czechoslovakia, 200,000 Slovaks went back to Slovakia. During 1993-2001, Slovaks who did not agree with the political views of Vladimir Mečiar, the prime minister at that time, and with his political party “Movement for Democratic Slovakia” („Hnutí za demokratické Slovensko”) moved to the Czech Republic. They came to the Czech Republic to seek a real democracy.

A numerous Slovak minority – 314,296 people – originated in the Czech Republic. This minority was internally structured and did not bear itself as a united body. Some Slovaks were part of the former governmental, political, and apparatchik structures before 1989. In the formation of new structures concerning the Slovak minority in the Czech Republic, they saw the conservation of their power with the creation of new jobs as well as the enforcement of a new influence in the sphere of policy concerning minorities. In spite of their small number, they bore themselves fiercely, and they were supported from the Slovak Republic by Mečiar’s government.

Most Slovaks in the Czech Republic did not join the nationality politics of the newly founded civil association Community of Slovaks in the Czech Republic (Obec Slováků v ČR) and they stayed outside of minority politics. Several Slovak associations originated in Prague, and they were involved in the presentation of Slovak culture and the strengthening of the Czech-Slovak mutuality. They were founded as an opposition to the Community of Slovaks and its minority policy. These included the Slovak Culture Club (Klub slovenské kultury), the Limbora Slovak Folk Association (Slovenské folklorní sdružení Limbora), the Documentation and Museum Centre for the Slovak Minority in the Czech Republic (Dokumentační a muzejní středisko slovenské menšiny v ČR), the Slovak-Czech Society (Slovensko-česká společnost), Detvan, etc.

The administration of the Community of Slovaks in the Czech Republic gave publicity to the problem of the Slovak minority in the Czech Republic, including its “forced” assimilation, based on unfounded information, and it gained considerable acceptance among former as well as contemporary communist politicians in Slovakia as well as in the Czech Republic. A “forced assimilation of one million Slovaks” was discussed. This assimilation was allegedly caused by the circumstances in the Czech lands because the education of Slovak children in Slovak schools was not possible, and no Slovak culture came to the Czech Republic, etc.

It was necessary to respond to these serious reservations. Since 2003, therefore, we have researched Slovaks in the Czech Republic. The research focused on localities with a higher percentage of Slovaks (15% – 30%). It was oriented towards their original home areas in Slovakia and abroad, their history of coming to the Czech Republic, their cultural capital consisting of material and spiritual culture which they brought to the Czech Republic, their life stories, professional career, and social capital. The research took place in western Bohemia (Chebsko, Tachovsko, Karlovarsko, and Sokolovsko regions), in northern Moravia (Králicko region), and in Silesia (regions of Jesenicko, Bruntálsko, and Krnov). The first part of the results, which document the diversification of the Slovak minority, variety of its origin, social stratification as well as cultural capital, is presented here.

Slovak settlers from Slovakia

In the borderland of Bohemia and Moravia were bearers of their own cultural awareness, which stemmed from their traditional material and spiritual culture. Their cultural awareness was contributed to by their own legal rules which originated in the Hungarian customary law known as Werboczy’s Tripartitum. This customary law of Štefan from Vrbóvë from the 17th century was never codified and it never attained a form of an actual legal rule. Yet, it stayed unofficially preserved in Slovakia during 1918-1948. It did not succumb to the unification of laws within Czechoslovakia in 1918-1938 and it helped to preserve Slovak solidarity. It concerned the system of property inheritance, property distribution, legal status of women, custody, etc. Slovak families abided by wedding customs, baptism, as well as funeral ceremonies. They were a part of traditional norms for coexistence. The customary law had its place in calendar ceremoniousness and social life in villages and cities. Slovak three-day weddings that the entire village participated in were not only a merriment which was, according to folklore, supposed to secure a prosperous and plentiful future to the young couple through a large amount of food and drinks. They were also a legal act of customary law. Wedding guests became witnesses of the dowry and trousseau which the bride brought into the groom’s house; they

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4 A customary law, the so-called Werboczy’s Tripartitum, was in force in Slovakia and in the Kingdom of Hungary. The Czech lands followed the Austrian law and the Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (ABGB) from 1811 which was, with some modifications, used until 1949-1950 when the legal two-year-plan from USSR was assumed and led to the socialistic re-codification of law.
became participants of a new contract that originated between the groom’s and bride’s family. In case of a breakup or becoming a widow, the bride got her property back unless she decided to stay in the groom's house where she left her own property – real estate and trousseau. Wedding guests also committed to help the young couple in their beginnings. Therefore, bonds with wider families, which were no longer common in Czech lands, can be found also in calendar customs and traditions which Slovaks brought to borderland regions. However, unlike the Slovak re-emigrants from Romania, they soon ceased to follow them. Czech legal rules were different and, therefore, they considered the Slovak ceremoniousness to be useless. The customary law and Werboczy’s Tripartitum was mandatory also for Slovaks living in Romania, Hungary, and in Carpathian Ruthenia.

Slovaks from inland Slovakia brought the Slovak language and a part of their own material and spiritual culture into the Czech borderland. They brought their own traditional rules concerning the family and social life which were their cultural heritage. These rules were already uncommon in newly settled areas. Slovaks enforced their cultural capital in several borderland regions (Chomutovsko, Sokolovsko, Chebsko, Karlovarsko, Jesenicko, Šumiperecko, Kaplicko), but not in the region of Králicko. In Králicko, as in many other regions, Slovak settlers alternated according to migration waves, and only some of them settled there permanently. This minority was mobile, and it was not bound to a concrete original Slovak region and its cultural capital.

Young Slovaks from Slovakia came to the Králicko region after a several years-long stay in a different part of the Czech borderland – Cheb, Náchod, Chomutov, where they worked in the textile industry, at State Estates or in Agricultural Production Community (JZD). For several years, they settled down also in the Králicko region where they were later replaced by other Slovak migrants. Young Slovak families were attracted by work opportunities. In the Tamberecko and Králicko regions, most women were involved in poorly paid home-based work for the textile industry and seasonal work in agriculture. In that time, the district belonged to prominent growers of flax, the processing of which provided enough seasonal work for women. They were tied to the household due to their raising of small children for whom there were not enough pre-school facilities. At first, working from home satisfied Slovak women as well, but soon they were discouraged by low monthly income, and they searched for jobs in local newly built factories in the town Králík and its surroundings where Slovak men worked. New factories were supposed to function in retaining at least some settlers in the Králicko region. (Tošovská 2009) Other settlers worked in agricul-

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ture. Young Slovak families, removed from their original bonds with relatives and neighbors, left their social contacts in their original home. It was difficult for them to build their new status, and they lacked a background in terms of family and neighbors. They could not apply their cultural values connected to family and social life in their new home. Due to all-pervading changes in society, these values became redundant and disappeared. This concerned not only the Czech Republic, but also Slovakia, due to all-pervading changes in society with the fading of private ownership, traditions, etc. The use of the Slovak language faded gradually. It became the language of households.

Slovak re-emigrants from Romania

Slovaks from the Transylvanian Ore Mountains in Romania, so-called “Rumuni”, were included among settlers. After 1945, they returned to their homeland and settled many borderland villages, mainly in the western and southern Bohemia borderland, as well as in the northern Moravia borderland and foothills regions. Their requirement for re-emigration from Romania was an allowance for a group settlement in neighboring municipalities. During 1946-1948, there were several cases where these immigrants to the western and southern Bohemia borderland formed a coherent chain of villages, into which they settled, comprising up to 50% of the population. In other regions they came as individual families after 1948. According to memories of eyewitnesses, they searched for the certainty of private farming. Some of them refused to work in factories and mines and they were inclined to work in forests and agriculture.

Romanian Slovaks brought their own cultural capital to the borderland which had its roots in their original Slovak home regions – Kysyce, Orava, Gomer and Hont, from where they left to go to Romania in the 18th century. (Nosková, Váčová 2000) Their customary law stemmed from Werboczy’s Tripartitum. Their cultural capital was influenced by their affiliation to the Catholic Church thanks to which a part of the liturgy was carried over into folk traditions. It became a regional cultural consciousness and an older variant of Slovak customary law in families and society.

Slovaks in Transylvania preserved their cultural capital through folk customs and traditions from generation to generation in unwritten form for two hundred years, only through their memory and traditions passed down orally. Czechs and Slovaks considered their way of life, living, clothing, diet, and farming to be old-fashioned and evidence of a lower social class. Slovak compatriots preserved their cultural capital until 1970’s – until later generations took over.
In Tachovsko, Sokolovsko, Chebsko, Kaplicko, Jesenicko and other regions, folk traditions forming a specific cultural capital of Slovaks from Romania lasted until the 1990’s. (Nosková 2010 (1), p. 74-108) In other regions, e.g. in the Králicko region, it lasted only in a latent form – in the memory of local Slovak re-emigrants and their descendants. The low number of re-emigrants and low education acquired in denominational schools and minority schools in Transylvania did not enable its transfer, presentation, and preservation in the local conditions. Also the internment of clergymen and nuns in the cloister in Horný Hedeč played its role, because after 1948 Slovak re-emigrants were afraid of various recourses which they could face for practicing their faith. Then, they were rather inclined to the social policy of the communistic party, and with the help of the party apparatus they also strengthened their status and influence in the region.

**Slovaks from Hungary**

Were also borderland settlers who had to settle in borderland regions of the Czech lands after the displacement of the German population, instead of returning to Slovakia as promised. In Czech and Moravian regions, they often lived once again in close vicinity to Hungarians from southern Slovakia who were brought for work to the Czech Republic and dispersed in different localities as individual families. Their history had a lot in common with the Hungarians, but their material and spiritual culture was different. It preserved original Slovak traditions, even though Hungarian Slovaks lived in Hungary for two centuries. They were not wedded to Catholic liturgy because most Slovak incomers from Hungary were evangelicals. Slovaks moved from regions in Upper Hungary to Lower Hungary at the end of 17th century. According to technical literature, this part of Slovak serfs moved within the Kingdom of Hungary to other Hungarian manors mainly for religious reasons, and also because Upper Hungary was overpopulated after the Turkish invasions. In the 18th century, these were followed by stronger migration flows of Slovak serfs who also left for religious reasons, to various manors of the Podmaniczky, Prynay, Grassalkovitch, Záborský, Balassa and other families. (Sirácky 1971, p.106) Economic conditions associated with the overpopulation of Upper Hungary regions and the absolute shortage of cultivable agricultural land also played a role. According to statistical data, up to two thirds of Slovak inhabitants in the language islands in Hungary professed 

5 An outline of the exchange of population between Czechoslovakia and Hungary was described based on references from NA and AMZ collections by J. Vaculik (Vaculik 1993, p. 36-52)

6 AMZV, f. TO – Madarsko 1945-1959, file 3, contracts.
the question of why the majority of Slovaks in the borderland do not retain a pronounced minority consciousness and choose a natural integration into society. Slovaks in the borderland regions did not search for association activity. Slovak compatriots from Romania substituted this with the church, abidance by the liturgical year, and meetings within folk customs concerning calendar ceremoniousness. Another opportunity to meet was provided by family customs accompanying baptism, weddings, and funerals. Slovaks from Hungary, mostly evangelicals, became members of amateur theatrics, music bands, and choirs in abroad. In several cases, they founded a local association “Czemadok” in which they pursued the Hungarian folklore that reminded them of their original home.

The Slovaks from Slovakia did not establish associations either. In the post-war period during 1947-1951, they became members of Local Branches of Matica Slovenská, founded by workers of Matica Slovenská in Cheb, Aš, Luby, Františkovy Lázně, Sokolov, Chomutov, Ostrava, and other cities. After the extinction of these branches, they were no longer involved in the association activity within the National Front. They did not reestablish association activity after 1989 either. They chose a natural integration into Czech society. This has been due to the diversity of the initial cultural capital, and the absence of social capital in some regions (Králicko, Jesenicko). The only city where association activity started to develop after 1989 was Prague.

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After the Czechoslovak Republic was established, there was a change in that, besides viewing Jews according to their affiliation to their religion, the legal order instituted the option to profess the Jewish nationality. Jews had equal rights with other inhabitants in Czechoslovakia and were able to be active in all spheres of society. Assimilated Czech Jews developed their identity within the Czech nation – based on language, culture and history. Thus, their perception of Jewishness significantly differed from Zionists.

The beginning of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia put assimilates and Zionists into the same position of persecuted inhabitants. Jews tried to emigrate but they had problems with obtaining visas. Most Jews did not manage to leave and they got caught in the Nazi exterminatory system. After the end of WWII, there were Jews returning to Czechoslovakia from concentration camps, and also some who had managed to emigrate before the establishment of the protectorate or in the first months of its existence. Nevertheless, Jews learned quickly that the practice from the first republic of Jewish nationality as a nationality with equal rights was not officially recognized because the Jewish nationality did not fit in the concept of Czechoslovakia as a state of two Slavic nations. In 1948 Czechoslovakia strongly supported the new State of Israel, through the sale of weapons and training of soldiers. The situation of Jews in Czechoslovakia got even worse in the 1950's when the activity of communities was under the state control. The CCP campaigned against Zionism, which was referred to as a harmful capitalistic cosmopolitan ideology which needed to be subdued. A period of relaxation came in the 60's when the topic of the holocaust became notable in Czechoslovak culture. It was possible to talk more openly about the hardships faced by Jews during the era of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The era of normalization in 1969-1989 was again connected with campaigns against Zionism and with strained relations between the communist bloc countries and Israel. Tragically, the communist regime tried to erase the holocaust from peoples' memory. Not even history textbooks stated that the largest part of WWII victims in Czech lands as well as in Slovakia were Jews. After 1989, Jewish communities expanded their activity. Presently, there are 10 active Jewish communities in the Czech Republic – the biggest community in Prague has c. 1,600 members at the present. Other communities are considerably smaller. The number of members in other communities ranges from 50 to 150 people. With such a small number of members, it is often admirable how much activity the communities are able to generate in the religious, social as well as cultural sphere.

Key words: Jewishness, Jewish communities, Czechoslovak nationality, antisemitism, Zionists, national minorities

The interwar period in Czechoslovakia

The legal order of the Czechoslovak Republic instituted the option to profess the Jewish nationality. This was extraordinary even within the European context. The fact that since the end of the 19th century President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk had been known internationally as a man who opposed antisemitism was crucial for the situation of the Jews in the new state. Masaryk also sympathized with the Zionist idea of creating an independent Jewish state in Palestine. He considered Zionism to be a good perspective for the Jewish nation (Soukupová and Zahradníková, 2003). Nevertheless, the period of Masaryk's presidency (1918-1935) cannot be considered as absolutely idyllic and without the manifestation of antisemitism. Already in 1919 – 1920 there were antisemitic disturbances – Jewish stores were plundered in connection with the economic depression. Jews also often spoke German as their main language, especially in large towns, which led to a nationalistic battle against Jews as representatives of Germany. Similar high tensions with antisemitic manifestations taking place can be observed in the first half of 1930's. Jews were labeled as exponents of the German element in large Czech cities (Prague, Brno, Ostrava). During
the 1920’s and 1930’s, there were various fascist parties and groups in Czech lands, however, they did not significantly appeal to Czech society with their intensive Czech nationalism. Therefore, they never achieved significant success in elections at any level (Pojar, Soukupová, Zahradníková, 2004).

The Jews in Czech lands were divided into assimilates and Zionists. Assimilates perceived their Jewishness in terms of claiming their Jewish religion but they did not perceive themselves as Jews in terms of nationality. Czech Jew-assimilates developed their identity within the Czech nation. They perceived their Jewishness as religious, but in terms of nationality they felt they were members of the Czech nation – based on language, culture, and history. By contrast, Zionists claimed the Jewish nationality and the idea of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. The Central Zionist Association, which organized international Zionist congresses in Czechoslovakia in 1921, 1923 and 1933, was a crucial institution for Zionists. The association had subdivisions all over the republic. Both assimilates and Zionists had a rich club activity. It was very important for Zionists that they were able to profess the Jewish nationality regardless of their language.

In the census of 1921, people with Jewish religion claimed the following nationalities: 38 % Czechoslovak (43,350 people), 35 % German (39,629 people) and 26 % Jewish (29,613 people). Considerably more inhabitants claimed the Jewish nationality in Slovakia (70,500) and in Carpathian Ruthenia (80,000). Out of a total of 354,000 people with Jewish religion, 180,700 people claimed the Jewish nationality.

In the census of 1930, out of a total of 356,700 inhabitants with Jewish religion, 187,000 people claimed the Jewish nationality – 30,000 in the Czech lands, 65,000 in Slovakia, and 91,000 in Carpathian Ruthenia (Pěkný, 2001).

During the entire period of the first Czechoslovak Republic, there was considerable tension between Czech Jews and Zionists, which was associated with a different view on how Jews should perceive their Jewishness. Zionists were very active in enforcing their interests in the political scene as well. From the end of the 1920’s, they even had a deputy representing the Jewish Party in parliament. With the increasing feeling of threat from Nazi Germany, Zionism was winning more and more support from young people who were interested in leaving to go to Palestine.

The period of October 1938 to May 1945

After the acceptance of the Munich Dictate, Czechoslovakia searched for a party to blame for the difficult situation of the republic. Already by October 1938, the Czech press published a critique concerning the twenty years of the republic, the existing parliamentary arrangement, Czechoslovak foreign policy, liberalism, and president Edvard Beneš. Immediately in the first days of October, there were texts in the Czech press that attacked Jews. Considerable manifestations of antisemitism suddenly arose in Czechoslovakia. Right-wing parliamentary parties also joined the attacks against Jews. The activity of Czech fascists increased significantly. Jews were reproved for having too strong positions in the economy. Organizations of Czech doctors and lawyers started to exclude their Jewish members so that Czech members were able to take over their clients. Jews (irrespective of whether they were assimilates or Zionists) were labeled as people who should not have any influence on the form of Czech culture. The situation was very difficult for Jewish emigrants who found asylum in Czechoslovakia during the 1930’s after their departure from Germany and Austria (Čapková, Frankl, 2008). There were very strong opinions in the political scene as well as in the press that emigrants should leave in the near future. This requirement was justified by the fact that the decreased republic faced many economic problems and no longer had the capacity to look after emigrants. Germany applied strong pressure on the Czechoslovak government to take anti-Jewish measures, which were implemented by the end of January 1939. The government established a measure that emigrants should leave Czechoslovakia within six months. Domestic Jews also started to be dismissed from state services (Gebhart, Kuklík, 2004).

It might be assumed that in such a difficult situation assimilates and Zionists would unite in the struggle against antisemitism. Unfortunately, age-old disputes sharpened. The Association of Czech Jews (organization of assimilates) supported the idea that from the territory that the republic had to cede based on the Munich Pact, only people with Czechoslovak nationality should be allowed to settle permanently in Czechoslovakia. They agreed with the opinion that the diminished state should still be a purely national state with as few members of minorities as possible. According to Zionists, however, the state was supposed to take care of all its citizens regardless of their nationality. They considered the idea of fugitive Jews from the Sudetenland being divided according to their nationality to be discriminatory. Zionists emphasized that the state should also look after Jews from the Sudetenland who claimed German or Jewish nationality. Assimilates also argued that the Zionist emphasis on Jewishness led to an increase in antisemitic attitude in Czech society, which in the critical situation of the republic was not in favor of minorities’ requirements. Both groups differed in their view on the departure of Jews from Czechoslovakia. The Association of Czech Jews, as the most significant organization of assimilates,
considered the people who left the republic during this difficult time to be cowardly deserters. Zionists, on the contrary, emphasized that the development in Europe highlighted the necessity to increase the effort to create an independent Jewish state, and that young people should try to leave for Palestine in large numbers. The beginning of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia put assimilates and Zionists into the same position of persecuted inhabitants. Jews attempted to emigrate, however, they had problems with obtaining visas. Most Jews did not manage to leave and were caught in the Nazi exterminatory system. Already from March 1939, the rights of Jews had begun to be limited. From fall 1941, they began receiving citations to enter transports. A large Jewish ghetto was built in the town Terezín; from there, Jews were deported to exterminatory camps in Poland.

**The period of 1945 to 1948**

After the end of WWII, Jews who lived to see the end of the war in the ghetto in Terezín or in concentration camps started to return to their homes. Those Jews who managed to emigrate in the 1930’s also returned. Many of these repatriates discovered that the Nazis liquidated their entire families. Jews strived to restore Jewish communities, but within the first few weeks after the liberation it was clear that it would be very difficult to restore these communities due to the huge human losses. Out of the original 208 Jewish communities in the Czech lands in 1938 (80 of which were situated in the territory ceded after the Munich Pact), only 53 (34 in Bohemia and 19 in Moravia) communities were restored after WWII. It was often impossible to even meet the earlier rule that every community must have at least 100 members (Wehle, 1984). The decrease in the Jewish population can be demonstrated with concrete numbers. In the beginning of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, there were 118,310 Jews living in its territory, out of which 103,960 had Jewish religion. The others belonged to the definition of Jew according to the Nuremberg Laws. One year after the liberation in May 1946, the registry department of the Council of Jewish Communities issued information that in the register of the Jewish Community of Prague there were 9,156 people who suffered racial persecution during the protectorate. Two thirds of these had the Mosaic religion and the remaining third consisted of Catholics, Evangelicals and people without religion. 6,700 Jews were registered in out-of-Prague communities. In Slovakia, there were 30,000 people who had suffered racial persecution, of which five sixths had the Mosaic religion (Krejčová, 1993).

Each repatriate received several pieces of clothing and one pair of shoes from state authorities. Otherwise they had to take care of everything them- selves. Therefore, Jews addressed the Jewish Community of Prague as a central community to ask for help, and the community tried to arrange food, medicines, clothing, footwear, and accommodation for them. It looked after children who had lost all their relatives during the war. Of great importance was the foreign financial and material help which was provided to Jews in Czechoslovakia by the organization American Joint Distribution Committee. There were not enough financial resources, however, to repair synagogues and cemeteries.

The Jewish people asked for restitution of property which they had lost in consequence of racial persecution. They expected that their businesses and trades would be returned to them. But there was no effort to facilitate this process on the part of state authorities. During the occupation, Jewish property was passed mostly to Germans through Aryanization. After the end of the war, it was confiscated as German property and state authorities appointed national trustees who managed the operation of individual businesses. When a Jew requested the restitution of their property, national trustees often were not in favor of it.

At the same time, in postwar Czechoslovakia there was a socialization tendency which was also not in favor of returning property to private owners. In fall 1945, the first wave of nationalizing took place in the Czech Republic. On the 24th of October 1945, President Edvard Beneš signed decrees based on which mines, key industries, joint-stock banks, private insurance companies, and the food industry were nationalized. Political parties in post-war Czechoslovakia intended to continue along this socialization trend. The era was more inclined towards a transfer of property from private persons to state ownership. After its electoral victory in 1946, the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CCP) did not have many reasons to enforce the termination of national controls and the transfer of businesses to their pre-war owners. It cannot be omitted that it was often the case that members of the Czechoslovak Communist Party became national trustees.

In 1945, Czechoslovak politicians declared that the liberated republic would be a state of two equal nations – Czechs and Slovaks. Members of minorities were supposed to blend in with Czechs and Slovaks if they were not displaced. The liberated republic started to put a strong emphasis on the importance of Slavic patriotism and on the alliance with the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia was supposed to be a republic of Czechs and Slovaks who would have their closest relations with other Slavic nations in liberated Europe (Kaplan, 1990). With this new concept of the state it was clear that the pre-war option to claim the Jewish nationality as an equal nationality was no longer acceptable. State authorities required Jews to become assimilated
and claim either the Czech or Slovak nationality. The post-war legislation
no longer allowed for Jewish nationality. In this situation, Zionists saw that
they could not expect support for their movement from the state. The ef-
fort of Great Britain to not allow the arrival of Jews from Central Europe to
Palestine did not allow them to leave.

The situation after WWII was most difficult for Jews with German na-
tionality. Authorities approached this group of Jews in the same way as the
rest of the German population, which meant that the same measures also
applied to them. Only those Jews who were officially validated as antifas-
cists avoided this treatment. That allowed the absurd situation that Jews
who had survived Nazi concentration camps were assessed by authorities
as any other German. They had to wear white bands and some of them
ended up in receiving camps where they were assigned for transport. Some
of them were indeed transported to Germany and Austria in this way. Jews
with German nationality had their salary cut by 20 %, pensioners were not
granted their pension, and all such Jews received German ration books
which allowed lower rations compared to Czechs (Staněk, 1991; Wehle,
1984). The Council of Jewish Communities asked the Ministry of the In-
terior to issue a regulation that would absolutely prevent the recording of any
Jew with German nationality on the list for displacement. It was not until
the 10th of September 1946, that the Ministry of Interior issued a regu-
lation that clearly stated that it was not permissible to include for displace-
ment those Jews who claimed German nationality in 1930. On the 13th of
September 1946, the Minister of Interior Václav Nosek issued a regulation
that contained instructions regarding how authorities should proceed in
maintaining the citizenship of persons with Jewish origin and German or
Hungarian nationality. According to this regulation, the Czech and Slovak
nations refused any racial differentiation between victims of Nazi persecu-
tion and other members of the nation that survived the Nazi hardship. It
deprecated all their discrimination in terms of ancestry, religion, and native
language. Through this regulation, it acknowledged that all Jews and people
of partial Jewish descent living on the occupied territory were victims of
Nazi or fascist terror. Therefore, the condition for keeping Czechoslovak
citizenship was fulfilled in the case of Jews with German or Hungarian na-
tionality. If another condition was fulfilled, that such a person had never
wronged the Czech and Slovak nation, there was no reason according to the
regulation to deny them Czechoslovak citizenship. The mere affiliation with
a nationality or use of language was not supposed to be considered as Ger-
manization or Hungarization. Jews counted upon this regulation to solve
all discrimination which was, however, not the case. In the following year,
several restitution cases took place that showed, on the contrary, that the
regulation sections, which defined Germanization, were disputable. People
who tried to stop Jews from property restitution tried to prove that the Jew
should not get the property back because they committed actions which
could be called Germanization. For example, the person in question was
blamed for being an entrepreneur that employed Germans in the 1930’s
or that he or she was a member of German clubs. There were also various
ways to interpret how a Jew that had lived abroad during the war should
prove that they had stayed loyal to the republic. On the 30th of December
1946, there were 1,876 Jews with German nationality in Czech lands (1,536
in Bohemia and 340 in Moravia and Silesia). Most of these people fell with-
in the authority of Prague (621), Litoměřice (435), Liberec (227), Karlovy
Vary (117), Brno (115), and Opava (97). When the state showed indiffer-
tence towards Jews with German nationality in 1947, many of them used the
opportunity for voluntarily moving abroad. This was certainly contributed
to by the bad experience these people had when they waited 16 months
for a regulation to be issued by the Minister of Interior that would protect
them from the danger of being included in the transport and displacement
to Germany (Staněk, 1991).

After the end of WWII, approximately 12,000 Jews from Carpathian
 Ruthenia came to Czech lands and they settled mainly in North Bohemia
where they found accommodation and jobs following the displacement of
Germans. In most cases, however, they could not get Czechoslovak citizen-
ship. According to the contract from the 29th of June 1945, Czechoslovakia
ceded the territory of Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviet Union. Until the 1st
of January 1946, local inhabitants had the right to submit an option state-
tment to obtain Czechoslovakian citizenship. However, this right for option
concerned only people with Czech or Slovak nationality, or possibly Rus-
ian and Ukrainian nationality if they fought in the Czechoslovak army.
Jews in Carpathian Ruthenia had mostly Jewish nationality. For this reason,
even those who lived in Czech lands since 1945 could not opt for Czecho-
slowakian citizenship. Based on this contract, they automatically became
citizens of the Soviet Union. These Jews, however, were not interested in
returning to the territory of Carpathian Ruthenia. They left to North Bo-
hemia which enabled the restoration of local Jewish communities (Liberec,
Ústí nad Labem, Děčín – Podmoky, Teplice – Šanov) that had perished
during the occupation of Sudetenland in 1938. The position of the Jews
from Carpathian Ruthenia was very uncertain because Soviet authorities
could have taken them to the Soviet Union at anytime. Czech authorities
were not particularly interested in Jews. Jews from Carpathian Ruthenia

were mostly Zionists, and it could not be assumed that they would assimilate. With regard to this tense situation, 6,000 Jews from Carpathian Ruthenia went over to the American zone in Germany. Another 6,000 Jews, however, stayed within Czech lands. Thanks to their large number, they became an important part of the Jewish community and strengthened the Zionists representation. (Jelinek, 1984, Jelinek, 1995).

The period of 1948 to 1968

In 1948, communists had already taken control over the management of Jewish communities. In the first weeks after the Czechoslovak coup d’état of February 1948, members of Jewish communities were being persuaded by their new top representatives that they should support the policy of CCP. It should be said that many young Jews had already become members of CCP during 1945-1948 based on their strong sympathy for the Soviet Union. For many of them, the Red Army was the army that liberated them from concentration camps in 1945. These young people believed that the Soviet Union was a country which eliminated manifestations of antisemitism. They thought that communists in Czechoslovakia would also prevent manifestations of antisemitism from ever occurring again (Kaplan, 1993).

After its origination in May 1948, the independent state Israel faced attacks by Arabs. In the summer of 1948, Israel was provided with significant help from the Czechoslovak government, which arranged the training of Israeli soldiers in Czechoslovakia. The Czech government also sold weapons made in Czechoslovakia to the Israeli army, in spite of an embargo by the United Nations. To this day, this help is considered to have been a very important element in the effort of Israelis to protect their new state (Kaplan, Dufek, Šlosar, 1993). On the 15th of November 1948, the Israeli delegate in Czechoslovakia Jehuda Überall-Avriel asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs Clementis to allow the departure of Jews from Czechoslovakia to Israel, which wanted to accept Jews who would settle the free land. The government supported this emigration because it was a way for many Zionists as well as Jew-assimilates who did not sympathize with the new regime to leave. During 1948 and 1949, there was a significant decrease in the number of members of Jewish communities in Czech lands as well as in Slovakia because c. 19,000 Jews moved from Czechoslovakia to Israel (Kaplan, 1993).

The register of the Council of Jewish Communities from 1950 stated a total of 10,486 people with Jewish religion associated in 49 communities in the Czech lands. In the following years, however, there were considerable organizational changes. Only 9 communities (Praha, Ostrava, Olo-
However, there was no major change in the attitude of the CCP. The CCP decreased the number of Jewish communities in Czech lands from 9 to 7, and the State Security still monitored the activity of communities. In 1967, Czechoslovakia conformed to the dictate from Moscow, and after the Israeli–Arab six-day war, the country severed diplomatic relations with Israel and became involved in the anti-Zionism propaganda of the Eastern bloc. The expectation of possible positive changes was terminated by August of 1968, when the number of Jews subsequently decreased due to a considerable wave of emigration. Approximately one third of the total number of c. 18,000 members of Jewish communities left Czechoslovakia (Brod, 1997).

The period of 1969 to 1989

The era of normalization in 1969-1989 was again connected with campaigns against Zionism and with strained relations between the communist bloc countries and Israel. Tragically, the communist regime tried to erase the holocaust from the memory of people. Not even history textbooks stated that the largest part of WWII victims within Czech lands and Slovakia were Jews. When quantifying the victims, the proportion of Jews was not stated. The same treatment applied to the numbering of total WWII victims. Despite this difficult situation, Jewish communities maintained their religious as well as social activities, although a shortage of clergymen was a major problem. In 1971-1983, communities in Czech lands did not have a rabbi. Jewish communities were still intensively monitored by the State Security. Jewish origin was stated in personal background information, and it could be a reason for complications at school or work (Heitlingerová, 2007).

The battle against Zionism also projected itself in attacks against political opposition groups. When, in January 1977, the first signatories signed the Charter 77 declaration that protested against a violation of human rights in Czechoslovakia, the CCP stated in its propagandistic attacks that the document originated from anti-communist and Zionist headquarters. Signatories with Jewish origin were labeled as Zionists. The totalitarian regime worked with an antisemitic concept of world Jewish conspiracy.

The devastation of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries continued throughout the 1970's and 1980's. In 1989, the Charter 77 signatories prepared a document that criticized how the totalitarian regime did not take care of Jewish monuments, and did not protect them from devastation. It also called attention to the closure of synagogues in Prague. Charter 77 also criticized the fact that people were not sufficiently informed, beginning with elementary school, about the number of Jewish victims during WWII and about the holocaust in general (Svobodová, 1994).

The period from 1990 to the present

In a free society Jewish communities were able to develop their activity again. A lot of attention was paid to the issue concerning the restitution of Jewish property. In many aspects, this issue remains difficult to the present. Although communities had some of their property restituted, it was often in very bad condition and required major financial investments (synagogues, cemeteries). Today, the Federation of Jewish Communities in the Czech Republic, as an umbrella authority of Jewish communities, administers 92 Jewish cemeteries that are being gradually reconstructed, but every year there are new vandalism acts when some Jewish cemeteries are damaged without the offenders being caught.

Presently, there are 10 active Jewish communities in the Czech Republic – Praha, Brno, Karlovy Vary, Liberec, Olomouc, Ostrava, Plzeň, Teplice, Ústí nad Labem, and Děčín. Geographically, most communities are in North Bohemia. The biggest community in Prague has c. 1,600 members at the present. Compared to 1989, the community went through a considerable revival – the number of members increased by 900 and the average age declined from 80 to 57. The Prague community acquired young members, and at the same time, it profited from the fact that it gained new members in foreigners who moved to Prague. Other communities are considerably smaller. The one in Brno has less than 300 members, for example. The number of members in other communities ranges from 50 to 150 people. With such a small number of members, it is often admirable how much activity the communities are able to generate in the religious, social as well as cultural sphere.

There are various surveys that record the relation towards Jews. In 1993, for example, results of the Institute for Research of Public Opinion showed that 29 % of respondents defined their relation to Jews as good, 35 % as neutral, 5 % as bad, and 73 % of respondents answered that they do not have any relation to Jews (Svobodová, 1994).

The problem with these surveys is that they ask about Jews in terms of nationality. Therefore, the relation to Jews is then concurrently compared with the relations to Slovaks, Poles, Russians, etc. The Czech language itself is problematic in this matter because the word Jew can be written in two ways. When the first letter is capitalized, the word denotes nationality. When spelled with a lower-case first letter, the word “Jew” means an affiliation with the religion. Such determination can be done in the case of an individual, but it is problematic to write about Jews as an aggregate because such writing can never be precise. When we write about people with Jew-
ish religion, some of them will also perceive their Jewishness in terms of nationality, although they will be a minority in the Czech environment. Thus, the Czech language is interesting in that it forces its users to choose whether they want to put emphasis on religion or nationality when they write the word Jew.

However, there is also the question of how Jews perceive themselves. Ten years ago, the sociologist Alena Heitlingerová performed a survey among Jews who were born after WWII. She asked them how they perceived Jewishness. 40 % of respondents answered that a Jew is anybody who feels like a Jew. 38 % stated that a Jew is a person with one Jewish parent or somebody who had converted. Thus, Jews themselves applied a very liberal approach. It was also shown that for these Jews the affiliation with Jewish culture and the awareness of relation to ancestors were crucial, but for only one quarter of them religious life was important as well. However, this raises the problem that they do not see the necessity of linking their Jewishness with an active involvement in the Jewish community (Heitlingerová, 2007).

In 2010, the agency Factum performed a survey for the Israeli embassy in Prague. One of the questions was who would people not want as a neighbor: 76 % of respondents refused Roma, 60 % Arab, 40 % an Israeli, and 18 % a Jew. Another question was who they would not want as a new family member: 84 % answered Roma, 77% Arab, 60 % an Israeli, and 30 % a Jew. The survey showed that people make a significant difference between Jews and Israelis, the latter being perceived noticeably worse.

**Conclusion**

If we look at the number of people who do not want a Jew for a neighbor or in their family, we see that it is not a small percentage. At the same time, political parties with xenophobic and racist opinions have very bad results in all elections, showing that people do not want to openly support these political groups. But there is a hidden xenophobia in society. That raises the question of whether in an era of substantial economic crisis this hidden form of xenophobia might change into an open one, where racist opinions could achieve a more significant response from society. There is the historic experience of the year 1938 when it also seemed that antisemitism in Czechoslovakia would not be a significant problem. After the Munich Pact, however, the republic entered a deep political, economic and moral crisis and antisemitism markedly surfaced.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Vladislav Volkov

LINGUISTIC IDENTITIES IN MODERN DAUGAVPILS

Identities of the inhabitants of modern Daugavpils are diverse: they include national, state, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious, regional and other social features of identity. The above mentioned identities are structured and they themselves form hierarchies. It is the language which forms the core of the cultural and ethnic identity. In order to reveal the hierarchy of national civil and linguistic identities of the inhabitants of Daugavpils, the author has carried out a sociological research entitled “Interaction of Collective and Individual Identities of the representatives of the Ethnic Groups in Daugavpils as a Factor for Development of a Civil Society”. At the same time the author has used the data obtained within the international research project “Antagonisms and Conciliation in Multi-cultural Milieu”. The outcomes of the research proved that the identity of the Daugavpils’ inhabitants is formed as a linguistic one which enhances solidarity within the certain ethnic group and is not directed against other ethnic groups.

Key words: linguistic identities, polyethnic society, identity hierarchy

Social identity hierarchy

Identities of the modern Daugavpils residents are varied and diverse: they involve national, state, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious and other...
features of the social identity. Moreover, it is the language which forms the core of the cultural and ethnic identities. (Garcia 2010, p. 519; Fishman 2010, p. xxiv) It should be noted that these identities have structures of their own and even form their own hierarchies. This issue is being seriously considered in the symbolic interactionism and the sociology of P. Bourdieu. According to the opinions of the distinguished researchers of the identity within the frameworks of social paradigms, Professors of Californian University Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, this is the approach which enables examining the social identity of a person in its connection with a social structure of the society. Thus, it is possible to avoid the identification of a person's social identity with the groups' social features exclusively, to demonstrate a variability of human behavior and its contribution to the formation of social structures. (Stets, Burke 2005, p.128-134) This observation is significant for the information presented in the given article: social identities of the people who belong to different ethnic groups characterize not only the ethnic and cultural variety of the social environment but also influence the formation of the socio-ethnic stratification.

The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu emphasizes the understanding of the social (as well as national civil and ethnic) identity as a hierarchical phenomenon. In the opinion of the French sociologist, the identity can be interpreted as an interiorized hierarchy of value priorities, a kind of habitus (Bourdieu). This approach as well as the symbolic interactionism, can demonstrate to what extent social actors are orientated to certain values, for example, national civil values or ethnic and linguistic ones, and the way the actors structure their priorities. The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu is a vivid manifestation of the trend to relate the understanding of a social identity to a dynamic variety of forces in the social environment, but not to the established standard order within the society or the total of inherited (primordial) social qualities. Pierre Bourdieu reckons that the social identity cannot be deduced from a social group on the basis of its “observed borders”. In reality a social group is various structures which are formed by the group's functions in social practices. In this respect, Bourdieu has expressed the statements which can be interpreted as the identification of the agents' social identity with the adopted habitus. Bourdieu emphasizes the idea that social agents do not possess any other forms of social identity apart from the one which is connected to their positions within social fields, a type and amount of social capital and power at their disposal. Furthermore, various types of identities themselves presuppose a hierarchical structure which is also related to the agents' dispositions within the social environment. (Burdjė 2004, p. 225)

In the science literature the concept “identity hierarchy” is examined in order to explain the relationship between a human's social identity and a social context and system of social interactions. At the same time, the evidence of belonging to various social groups (artifacts) turns out to be in a certain hierarchy in accordance with the degree of its significance within the human's social identity. (Grayson 2002, p.9; Sekhon 2008, p.349) The social identity is being formed and revealed as a whole of a human's social roles. Moreover, a person's preferences of some social roles to others are also subject to a certain hierarchy. The preference of social roles is especially significant for forming an “ideal I” image. The preference of one or another social identity depends on the degree of profit gained in the case of realization of a certain social role, and its approval by others. (McCall, Simmons 1978, p.74) The social identity can be ranked in accordance with the person's value and ideological preferences as well as under the pressure of a specific situation. In this case it acquires the character of a “salience hierarchy”. (Stryker, Serpe 1994, p.16-35) This approach towards identity allows to characterize it as a particular phenomenon related to its particular bearer's essence and prevents the social subject's dissolution in a diverse social environment.

The significance of the study of a linguistic identity of the Latgale people alongside their ethnic and national identities has been recognized among the Latgalian scientists. This was reflected, for example, in the bulk research “Study of Ethnolinguistic Situation of Latgale” carried out in the period 2006-2009. Furthermore, the authors of the research assume that the adequate study of the ethnic diversity of Latgale and Latvia on the whole is possible only if the people's national identity is studied as including the identities of ethnic groups: "Peculiarity of Latvia as well as Latgale is that alongside the Latvian ethnicity there is the national identity. At the same time the national identity here is formed by two separate parts – a connection of the Latvian identity with the state and presence of other nationalities. Each ethnus living in Latgale is special and unique". (Šuplinska, Lazdiņa 2009, p. 57, 116) It is also important that the research methodology was not based on the assumption about the normative subordination of languages and linguistic identities in Latgale.

The different models for understanding the hierarchy of national and ethnic identities have been accepted in the Latvian ethno-sociology for the last 20 years. The most popular approach within which the ethnic and linguistic identity is seen as an integral characteristic of ethnic groups, but its place within these ethnic groups’ identity hierarchy is not shown. For the authors of the sociological research in this case it is very important to dem-
Linguistic identities in modern Daugavpils

The immense interest towards analysis of the hierarchies of the linguistic and civil identity is demonstrated in the works of socio-linguists and sociologists. This does not happen by accident, since in the Latvian society with its only state language and significant role of the Russian language in the lives of Russian and other ethnic minorities as well as with the further development of the spheres of application of the languages of other ethnic minorities, the issue of preserving the hierarchy of languages and linguistic identities has acquired a vital significance.

Hierarchy of the national-state and linguistic identities of the Daugavpils residents.

In order to study the established hierarchy of national-state and linguistic identities of the Daugavpils residents the author has carried out the sociological research “Interaction of collective and personal identities of ethnic groups in Daugavpils as a factor for development a civil society”. The author also used some of the data of the international research project “Antagonisms and Conciliation in Multi-Cultural Milieu” within which the author carried out the research in Daugavpils.
and Conciliation in Multi-cultural Milieu (No. N N116 230436”). The head of the project – Professor Jaceks Kurčevskis, Warsaw University (Jacek Kurczewski). The period of the research – spring-autumn, 2010. Selection – 578 people – is representative and stratified (in accordance with the city regions, respondents’ age, sex and ethnic origin). The peculiarities of the hierarchy of the national-state and linguistic identities are demonstrated on the example of the Latvians and two largest ethnic minorities in the city – The Russian and Poles. A share of the representatives of ethnic groups within the Daugavpils population at the moment of the research in 2010 (Daugavpils 2010) and selection of the respondents according to their ethnic origin are presented in Table No 1.

### Table 1. The Daugavpils residents’ ethnic structure and respondents’ ethnic structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daugavpils residents’ ethnic structure in 2010 (thousand)</th>
<th>Respondents’ ethnic structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>103.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A linguistic identity of the Latvian, Russian and Polish respondents, i.e. their belonging to a language to a great extent coincides with their ethnic identity. The Russians (96.3%) and Latvians (69.9%) have the highest number of coincidences, the Poles have fewer number (57.2%) (Table 2). Such a high share of coincidences of linguistic and ethnic identities is peculiar only to the respondents-Lithuanians and is not peculiar at all to the Belarusians and Ukrainians. Moreover, it is peculiar only to one ethnic group (Russian) that their mother tongue serves as a mother tongue for the significantly larger group of respondents than the share of Russians in the population of Daugavpils. (75.2 and 56.0% respectively). (Table 3.)

### Table 2. Respondents’ mother tongue. (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Latvian language</th>
<th>The Russian language</th>
<th>The Polish language</th>
<th>Other language</th>
<th>Other answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>69.9 (incl. 8.4% the Latgalian Language)</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents have wide possibilities to realize their linguistic identity within the private and public environment in Daugavpils. As can be seen in Table 4, the respondents’ mother tongue performs important functions of communication in various spheres of public life in Daugavpils. It is evident that the most widely the mother tongue as a means of communication is used by the respondents in communication with their family and friends (permanently or sometimes – 94.3%). The use of the mother tongue is also widespread in communication in shops and markets (in a varying degree – 83%), as well as at work (73.4%), at state institutions (70.5%), at educational institutions (67.3%), at municipal institutions (66.0%), in communication with police officers (63.4%). But in general, in not less than two thirds of the cases respondents permanently or sometimes realize socio-communicative functions of their linguistic identity. And this is peculiar not only to private
life but also to communication in public environment. Linguistic identity turns out to be stable because it is reproduced by its practical realization. According to P. Bourdieu, habitus as an implementation of social identity is stable also due to the power of public structure in which it is realized.

Table 4. Frequency of respondents’ communication in their mother tongue in various spheres of life. %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>permanently</th>
<th>sometimes</th>
<th>Almost never</th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With friends, acquaintances</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In shops and markets</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At work with colleagues</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At state institutions</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At local municipality</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In communication with police officers</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At educational institutions</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The preservation of the mother tongue as a basis for the linguistic identity is recognized by all respondents as a task which requires the activation of a variety of factors. These are mass media and educational establishments in the languages of ethnic groups, their non-governmental organizations, as well as business activity, work of political parties, religious and ethnic communities, and active position of a person and involvement of the state. As can be seen from Table 5, the vast majority of Latvians, Russians and Poles look at these factors as the most significant ones for the support and preservation of the ethnic groups' language and culture. Furthermore, the respondents find the factors of mass media and educational establishments in the ethnic groups' language and culture (84.8% and 86.5% of all respondents) as well as active position of a person (84.4%) the most reliable. The least significant role in this process is attributed to business activity and the work of political parties (56.9% and 56.7%). However, such institutions of civil society and market economy as political parties and business, meanwhile do not acquire a due influence in the public consciousness as the forces which are able to effectively solve important social and cultural tasks of Latvian people.

Table 5. What does the preservation of the ethnic groups’ language and culture in Latgale depend on? (answer: “depends in a varying degree”, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
<th>Latvians</th>
<th>Poles</th>
<th>Russians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educational establishments in the ethnic groups’ languages</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass media in the ethnic groups’ languages</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>87.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person's active position</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic communities’ active position</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups’ non-governmental organizations</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of the state</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious communities’ active position</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business activity</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties’ activity</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The linguistic identity does not coincide with the linguistic environments where the Daugavpils residents tend to receive information. The data on reading newspapers, listening to the radio, watching television programmes in the Latvian, Russian and Polish languages as well as the data on books in these languages in the respondents’ home libraries are presented in Table 6. Comparing these data with the respondents’ ethnic structure, it is clear that the share of the respondents who receive the information in two languages – Latvian and Russian – is bigger than the share of the ethnic Latvians and Russians among the respondents. The books in Polish in the home libraries is a kind of exception: their share turns out a little bigger than that of the ethnic Poles among the respondents (15.1 and 13.2% respectively). These data signify the existence of two clearly identified streams of information in Daugavpils – in the Latvian and Russian languages. But at the same time the share of respondents who receive the information in the Latvian language in Daugavpils is really small.
Linguistic identities in modern Daugavpils

A priority significance of the linguistic identity within a person's identity hierarchy should be interpreted as a multi-faceted and multi-functional phenomenon.

Firstly, the respondents' linguistic identity is reproduced in ethnically homogeneous families. Two thirds of Latvian respondents, 60% of Polish respondents and three quarters of Russian respondents were born in the families where the parents are respectively the Latvians, Poles and Russians. (Table 8)

### Table 8. Parents' ethnic origin (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Latvians N=95</th>
<th>Russians N=324</th>
<th>Poles N=77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mother</td>
<td>farther</td>
<td>mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pole</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusian</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic origin</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even if the respondents who are the Latvians, Russians and Poles of Daugavpils create ethnically heterogeneous families, the ethnic origin of 89.6% of children born in Latvian- other ethnicity families are Latvians, 84.7% of children born in Russian-other ethnicity families are Russian, and 83.3% of children born in Polish- other ethnicity families are Polish in the vast majority of cases. At the same time the Latvians and Poles in Daugavpils possess a more explicitly expressed need in their ethnic reproduction than the Russians. It turns out that the share of children of Russian ethnic origin slightly exceeds the share of ethnically homogeneous Russian families – 84.7% and 70.8% respectively. The share of children of Latvian origin significantly exceeds the share of ethnically homogeneous Latvian families (89.6% and 36.0% respectively). The Poles have the same proportion (83.3% and 40.8% respectively). (Table 9)
Table 9. Spouse and children's ethnic origin (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Latvians N=95</th>
<th>Russians N=324</th>
<th>Poles N=77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>spouse</td>
<td>children</td>
<td>spouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>89.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic origin</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Actualization of the linguistic identity strongly influences the hierarchy of national-civil and ethnic-group values in the consciousness of the Daugavpils residents. In the modern society the ethnic identity of various groups (representatives of the main nation or ethnic minorities) is always related to the universal civil values. The practice of European national states with their multi-ethnic population abounds a lot of examples where the ethnic values either coexisted in harmony with the universal civil values and human rights, or they were recognized more than the universal civil values and human rights, or they were sacrificed to the latter. The present research also attempted to address the issue about the most acceptable model of interrelation between the ethnic identity, human rights and civil values in the consciousness of the Daugavpils respondents.

Within the framework of the present research the respondents were asked to construct the most acceptable model of a civil society applicable to Latgale on the basis of the following models of the value hierarchy:

1. Civil values are higher than ethnic groups’ values;
2. Civil values are formed by ethnic groups’ values;
3. Latvian values should dominate in Latgale;
4. Latvian and Latgalian values should dominate in Latgale;
5. Latgalian values should dominate in Latgale;
6. A person’s values but not ethnic groups’ values should dominate in a civil society.

The results of the research demonstrated that the ethnic groups’ values, civil values and human rights are not opposed as the basic principles of constructing the identity hierarchy in the respondents’ consciousness. More than a half of the respondents supported the dominance of the human rights in a civil society (67.4%), as well as the idea of a civil society as a manifestation of the values of the ethnic groups (58.6%) which comprise this society, and the idea that the civil values should be more significant than the ethnic groups’ values (51.4%). (Table 10) The data obtained in the run of the research to a certain extent put in question the established stereotypes created by the apriorism of liberalism and multiculturalism. The respondents find the combination of various models of identity hierarchy relatively acceptable where the leading role is attributed to individual as well as ethnic-group and national-civil values. In fact, in the modern multi-ethnic society civil values, ethnic groups’ values and human rights should not oppose each other: the Daugavpils residents look at these values as significant resources for constructing the people's identity in a multi-ethnic environment.

Table 10. Model of inter-ethnic relationships the most acceptable for Latgale in the opinion of all respondents and those who indicated Latvian citizenship as the most important factor of their identity, Latvians, Russians and Poles.

(Answer: “acceptable to a variable degree”, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of relationships</th>
<th>AR N=578</th>
<th>LC N=169</th>
<th>LN-93 N=241</th>
<th>R N=324</th>
<th>PN-77 N=132</th>
<th>MW-LR</th>
<th>MW-LP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human values but not ethnic groups’ values should dominate in a civil society</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>0.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil values are formed by ethnic groups’ values</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil values are higher than ethnic groups’ values</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian and Latgalian values should dominate in Latgale</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latgalian values should dominate in Latgale</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian values should dominate in Latgale</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Keys: AR – all respondents, LC – respondents who indicated Latvian citizenship as the most important factor of their identity респонденты, L – Latvians, R – Russians, P – Poles, MW-LR – coefficient Mann-Whitney U Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) comparison of positions of Latvians and Russians, MW-LP – coefficient Mann-Whitney U Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) comparison of positions of Latvians and Poles.
Identity acts as a set of social features adopted by a person. The respondents were requested to choose those features which characterize their identity in varying degrees. The following social values were offered as markers of identity – Latvian citizenship, Latvia as a place of residence, EU citizenship, ethnic origin, religion, native culture, Latvian language, mother tongue, language of communication in the family. As you can see, among the identity markers offered there are those with whose help the civil and national identity is formed and strengthened as well as well those which are peculiar to the ethnic, traditional identity. The outcomes of the research have not come as a surprise, quite the opposite, they have confirmed the long-term observations. Civil values in the set of identity markers are expressed less vividly than the values of traditional ethnic identity for the residents of multi-ethnic Daugavpils. Thus, for example, the language has become the most significant marker of the identity for the Daugavpils residents. 89.5% of the respondents in Daugavpils consider this marker significant for characterizing their identity. The next significant marker is the language of communication in the family (85.2%). But such a crucial marker of national identity as Latvian citizenship turned out to be an important marker of identity for 49.2% of the respondents in Daugavpils. Ethnic communities tend to preserve their group identity in the inter-ethnic communication via actualization of their own identity as a linguistic one specifically. As compared to other manifestations of the ethnic identity – ethnic origin, religion, inherited cultural tradition, etc. – the linguistic identity specifically is able to provide a person with the entry into the widest range of possibilities in the modern and postmodern society: the system of education, socializing, bureaucratic rationalization, control and management, etc.

At the same time it would be a mistake to think that the majority of the Daugavpils residents adhere to the traditionalist orientation of as opposed to national and civil. The data obtained in the run of the research prove that the total of markers which characterize both civil and ethnic identities are approximately similarly popular with about two thirds of the respondents. These markers characterize belonging of a person to intimate ethnic values as well as to Latvia as a country of residence. These markers are – “native culture” (74.4% of the respondents find it significant for characterizing their identity), “Latvia as a country of residence” (71.0%), “ethnic origin” (65.3%), “religion” (63.4%).

These data allow to correlate the existing, even in the scientific research, ideas that the key divide of values in the identity of a modern person lies between the primordial (ethnically inherited) values and the values constructed by a modern society (national). Such opposition of primordial

and constructed values are peculiar to the human identity in the societies which are undergoing the transition from a traditional, feudal society to the society of a modern type, capitalism. For modern Latvia this transition is obviously in a relatively far past. But the existence of large ethnic communities which are undergoing the transition from a traditional, feudal society to the society of a modern type, capitalism. For modern Latvia this transition is obviously in a relatively far past. But the existence of large ethnic communities which are in some kind of competition with each other is really significant for the Latvian society. For such a multicultural society a lot of values, first of all the mother tongue of their bearers, is not exclusively the element of the ethnicity inherited from their ancestors. In the world of intercultural communications which are characterized by intense exchange of information in both private and public lives, the language for their bearers is an important means of socialization, fully-fledged inclusion into public structures. Thus, it is not surprising that in a multi-ethnic and multicultural society the language is filled with such value content, so that the use of it (or refusal to use it) becomes a visionary and ideological choice. An extremely high importance attached by the respondents to their mother tongue as a marker of their own identity does not at all signify their commitment to a traditional way of life. The vividly expressed linguistic identity acts as a particular form of expressing and affirmation of a civil identity which determines the way of behavior of its bearers in a modern multicultural society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Dangers of ethnic and other social conflicts in the minds of residents...

Olga Popova

DANGERS OF ETHNIC AND OTHER SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN THE MINDS OF RESIDENTS OF ST. PETERSBURG (2008-2012)

Data of empirical researches of settings in Petersburgers' consciousness of the ratio of "others" – immigrants, representatives of other nations, religions, people of other regions of Russia and neighboring countries, etc have been analyzed in the article. The author shows the development and interconnection of these systems, focusing on distribution of stereotypes of anxiety in respect of various social conflicts over new socio-demographic groups. Studies show that the level of tolerance of St. Petersburg residents to “others” (ethnic groups, particularly in the case of the inhabitants of other regions of Russia, or migrant workers, natives of South Asian countries) is extremely low.

Key words: Russia, St. Petersburg, metropolis, social conflicts, ethnic groups, migrants, mass consciousness, settings.

The proposed paper continues a series of articles on the peculiarities of perception of different types of social, in particular interethnic and religious, conflicts, by Petersburgers, – residents of multiethnic metropolis (Popova 2009, 3–21; Popova 2012a, 279–282; Popova 2012b, 78–89). Thus, apparently, a private research empirical task is extremely important in terms of tracking the effects of the policy of social partnership, ethnic and religious tolerance, and so on, which are inevitably manifested primarily in the minds of ordinary residents of large cities always more responsive to economic, social and political changes. In addition to the problems caused by the first and the second waves of the global economic crisis which hit our country in 2008, interethnic issues, primarily related to the labor migrants from neighboring countries, are actualized in the minds of citizens.

Traditionally, problems of megacities are the theme of economists, sociologists, statisticians and psychologists. But in recent years the situation begins to change. Thus, analysts are beginning to research megacities as objects of targeted state politics (Fedyaakin 2012; Yakovlev 2009), the cultural life of population of these conglomerates (Esakov 2008), and the political consequences for megacities of ethnic and migration policies in modern Russia. There are dissertations about the effects of the migration of ethnic policies in the Russian megacities,¹ interesting monographs and articles are published (Filippov 2009; Tolerant metropolis... 2003, 2004: Nazarov 2005; Astafeieva 2010, 95–100; Kireev, 2010, 182–191).

Analysis of the situation with migration policy in Russia shows a gradual shift from the model of temporary labor on favorable conditions for business owners to the model of the state population growth due to migrants as a factor of national security. With all the controversy and ambiguity of effects and consequences of both the first and the second models, there is the logical question not only on the nature of integration of immigrants into the new environment, but also on the response by the resident population of cities, as these cities are the most attractive for both internal and external migrants.

There is a series of difficult questions of migrants’ readiness to share the values and norms of the host society, conditions of growth in the Russian cities of traditional enclaves of traditional for immigrants socio-cultural environment, and consequences of these processes for the Russian cities, etc. In fact the modern migration to Russia from some republics of the former USSR, now independent states, – is an effective survival strategy in countries with relatively undeveloped economy, when rationally thinking productive people even without any qualifications and knowledge solve their problems by means of temporarily relocation outside their country.

¹ Mostly these are works in the field of sociology and philosophy, i.e., PhD thesis of: I. M. Kuznetsov “Adaptive Strategies of Migrants in Metropolis (on example of Moscow)” (2006, Moscow, Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Science ); N. G. Mazurina “Interethnic Relations in multiethnic metropolis (on materials of Moscow)” (2008, Moscow, Russian Academy of State Service), E. I. Perina “Sociological Analysis of Characteristics of Political Culture of Metropolis Population in Modern Conditions” (2009, Ekaterinburg, The Ural Federal University (UrFU)); E. V. Revina “Multicultural City as a Space of National Identity” (2009, Stavropol).

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Even if they “settle” in Russia, they do not want to integrate into this society. Their chances of stable, well-paying jobs are very small, so migrants are employed in sectors with small upward mobility or in the zone of enclave migrant labor market to serve their countrymen.

Quite often analysts construct simplified schemes of connection of migrants’ adaptation strategies with their personal life plans. It is believed that if migrants regard their stay in another cultural environment as a temporary one, they do not make any efforts to adapt to the new conditions (enclave strategy), trying to communicate primarily with “their own people”, i.e., creating a kind of buffer zone which does not allow not only to accept, but also to realize the importance of the values of the host-society. If migrants are to “settle” in the metropolis, they will undertake great efforts at least to copy external behaviors (integration strategy). The adaptation situation is simplified considerably in the cities due to the blur and mosaic of cultural standards of everyday practices.

This scheme may be accepted as a whole, but does it work linearly at the accumulation of “critical mass” of other culture migrants in the metropolis? Arguments of some Russian scientists on the readiness of many migrants to accept social and cultural values of the receiving environment, in comparison with their environment, look too optimistic in these conditions. Daily observation shows that migrants assimilate negative and destructive behaviors of local lumpenized and marginalized groups, which negatively affects the attitudes of residents of the metropolis. Most of the migrants consider their new habitat as exclusively economic and technological resources for their own material needs and more comfortable existence at the absolute priority of their original socio-cultural norms. Moreover, the conditions of life for migrants in the metropolis do not create their perception of the receiving environment as a historical cultural integrity, formed on the basis of Russian culture because of urbanization to blur this basis. An acute social and political problem for the host metropolis is the formation of stable self-replicating and developing ethnic enclaves, connected (including corrupt) with officials of different level. “Their own” groups are especially important for immigrants (countrymen, people of the same nationality, fellow believers, people with the same level of income, comers from a particular country/region), generated by circles of everyday communication in the host environment specific for visitors.

So, what is the reaction of residents of the metropolis to the new challenges of the era of globalization, superimposed on traditional problems associated with socio-economic conditions? We insist that quality conceptualization of social and political processes are possible only if the analyst has scientific, certain facts, which are provided by empirical political and sociological science. Any external scientific reasoning without confirmation by specific political and sociological research is a form of ideology, reflecting political preferences of the authors. When making administrative and political decisions, public opinions and feelings should be taken into account. Of course, we do not believe that the government should always follow moods and expectations of the masses, but it is necessary to know the real situation to avoid catastrophic mistakes in making their decisions and minimize their negative effects.

“Political Petersburg” annual project ongoing for over 10 years by The Center for Empirical Political Studies (CEPS) of The Faculty of Political Science, St. Petersburg State University examines changes in values, attitudes and preferences of the political consciousness of Petersburgers. In a sense, St. Petersburg is a “city of contrasts”. The fairly stable economic situation in the city, the work of a large number of companies, research institutions, universities, cultural sites, the relatively high level of the average wage (according to statistics, more than 27000 rubles in autumn 2012 (= 1000 USD)), efforts of the regional authorities to promote tolerance of the population (in recent years, as experts estimate the share of migrants in the population of St. Petersburg above 10%, the ethnic aspect of the problem is particularly important), the very history of St. Petersburg as a multiethnic city which grandeur had been created by the labor of dozens of representatives of various nationalities, and so on, should apparently give good results in terms of overcoming the distrust between the different social groups, but research materials witness, that it is not so simple. Particularly interesting in this regard are views of Petersburgers about the level of danger of different types of social conflicts. Empirical indicator “risk of conflict” fixes both risks

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2 Annual telephone survey, the sampling is not less than 1111 people, randomly noniterative with controlled distribution of calls over administrative districts of St. Petersburg and quoting of such socio-demographic parameters of the respondents such as gender, age, education. Field stage – March–April

3 Sample size is 1167 persons, randomly noniterative with controlled distribution of calls over administrative districts of St. Petersburg and quoting of such socio-demographic parameters of the respondents such as gender, age, education. Research is made by The Center for Empirical Political Studies (CEPS) of The Faculty of Political Science, St. Petersburg State University. The research team: O. V. Popova – Doctor of Political Science, Professor; O. V. Lagutin – Associate Professor, PhD; E. O. Negrov – Associate Professor, PhD; A. V. Shentyakova – Assistant. Information was collected by workers of The Resource Center “Sociological and Internet Technologies”, St. Petersburg State University (headed by S. M. Snopova, PhD).
of deployment and consequences of the events, and high probability of their development.

At first glance it seems that the visual perception of danger of conflict between the rich and poor in the last 5 years is reduced (Table 1). Indeed, in contrast to 2008, when the population was living in anticipation of a strong economic crisis, a third of the citizens – 32.7% – considered this type of conflict to be very dangerous, in late 2012 a quarter of the citizens expected such a danger. However, with those who consider them dangerous (25.2% in 2008 and 32.9% in October 2012), the total level of anxiety has not decreased. There are especially representative data of April 2012, when conflicts between rich and poor were considered as very dangerous 27.6% of respondents, and 28.7% – rather dangerous (combined ratio – 56.3%) at the background of pre-election promises to the Duma and presidential campaigns. Noteworthy that in autumn, despite the increase of the cost of utilities in September and rising prices for basic foods (milk, bread, cereals) by the end of the summer 2012, the rate of anxiety due to material stratification in society has not changed.

Table 1. Dynamics of views of Petersburghers on the degree of risk of conflicts between rich and poor (2008–2012, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>very dangerous</th>
<th>rather dangerous</th>
<th>rather not dangerous</th>
<th>not dangerous</th>
<th>difficult to answer, refuse to answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008, April</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011, April</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012, April</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012, Oct.</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To a greater extent than other social groups such conflicts are very dangerous for citizens with the lowest incomes; rather dangerous for salespeople; rather not dangerous for the administrative staff. Citizens with incomplete higher education, as well as working and non-working pensioners (standardized residuals for these groups are, respectively, +2.1, +1.7, +1.9, +1.7, +2.1, +3.6) ignore these conflicts, considering not dangerous at all. For all other groups statistically significant standardized residuals were not recorded. Assessment of the dynamics of views of Petersburghers on the danger of conflicts between owners and employees show a slight increase in the spring 2010, which can be considered rather as a delayed reaction to the first wave of the economic crisis, which has covered Russia in autumn 2008. However, in general there is a split in the estimates of citizens: a roughly equal number fears and ignores such conflicts (Table 2).

Table 2. Dynamics of views of Petersburghers on the degree of risk of conflicts between owners and employees of enterprises (2008–2012, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>very dangerous</th>
<th>rather dangerous</th>
<th>rather not dangerous</th>
<th>not dangerous</th>
<th>difficult to answer, refuse to answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008, April</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010, April</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011, April</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012, April</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From April 2008 to April 2011, the share of citizens who are afraid of conflicts between officials and ordinary citizens, grew from 45.9% to 55.2% (Table 3). Almost similar results were obtained in a study in April 2012 (55.4%), but by October 2012 the index slightly fell – to 49.2%. The survey was conducted before the scandal between the Governor of St. Petersburg G. Poltavchenko and residents. It was caused by the opinion of the head of the region about the relationship of citizens to the second face of the state D. A. Medvedev during the motorcade vehicles on the streets of St. Petersburg in early October 2012 (according to the Governor, after closing the route to allow free way for officials, drivers pressed the horns, and pedestrians, “showed different fingers”), his statements on the need to collect donations for the construction of the stadium after having spent and stolen huge funds from the city budget, and chanting “fans” of “Zenith” at the “Petrovsky” stadium “mirror” characteristics of the Governor and the proposal to sell his cottage and finish construction of the stadium (“Governor – redneck”, “Sell your cottage – construct stadium!”).
Table 3. Dynamics of views of Petersburgers on the degree of risk of conflicts between officials and ordinary citizens (2008–2012, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>very dangerous</th>
<th>rather dangerous</th>
<th>rather not dangerous</th>
<th>not dangerous</th>
<th>difficult to answer, refuse to answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008, April</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011, April</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012, April</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012, Oct.</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from Table 4, up to 80% of the interviewed citizens believe interethnic conflicts dangerous. And although this indication of anxiety in October 2012 3% is higher than in spring 2012, during the previous three years it practically did not change. Apparently, anxiety in the relationship between the Russians and Non-Russians increased sharply in 2009, when larger numbers of legal and illegal migrants were in St. Petersburg. Noteworthy that in the context of even these high rates people with incomplete higher education, students (standardized residuals are + 2.0, +1.7) tend to worry about the dangers of inter-ethnic conflicts more than other social groups.

Table 4. Dynamics of views of Petersburgers on the degree of risk of conflicts between the Russian and Non-Russian (2008–2012, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>very dangerous</th>
<th>rather dangerous</th>
<th>rather not dangerous</th>
<th>not dangerous</th>
<th>difficult to answer, refuse to answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008, April</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010, April</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011, April</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012, April</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012, Oct.</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Much lower – 56.2% is the indicator of anxiety of Petersburgers on religious conflicts (Table 5). It declined slightly (4–6%) compared to the data of spring surveys 2011 and 2012. Note that if in 2008, there was apparent correlation between ethnic and religious conflicts (correlation coefficient of Pearson was +0.539 at a significance level of 0.000), then in 2012, it is somewhat reduced (Pearson's correlation coefficient was +0.433 at a significance level of 0.000).

Table 5. Dynamics of views of Petersburgers on the degree of risk of conflicts between The Orthodox and The Muslims (2008–2012, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>very dangerous</th>
<th>rather dangerous</th>
<th>rather not dangerous</th>
<th>not dangerous</th>
<th>difficult to answer, refuse to answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008, April</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010, April</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011, April</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012, April</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012, Oct.</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Men and employers with a monthly income of 20 to 25 000 rubles per family member perceive the risks of inter-religious conflicts easier than women. These conflicts are taken by the wealthiest citizens more anxious than by the others. And pensioners are more naïve than others to consider such conflicts as not dangerous (standardized residuals for these groups are, respectively, +1.7, +2.8, +1.8, +2.3).

In October 2012 in the course of the survey (CEPS) the question about the degree of danger of conflicts between locals and newcomers was first asked. 29.6% of respondents found such conflicts very dangerous, 31.8% – rather dangerous, 21.3% – rather not dangerous, 8.2% – not dangerous, every eleven (9.1%) respondent declined to answer or could not say anything.
Conflicts between locals and newcomers are the most concern of humanitarian intelligentsia. Students, many of whom come from different parts of Russia probably tend to believe these conflicts as rather not dangerous. It is difficult to give any estimates for mostly non-working pensioners (standardized residuals for these groups are, respectively, +1.7, +2.2, +2.2).

The data in Table 6 show that in October 2012 the presence of people of another nationality disturbs at least one third of Petersburgers, and the presence of people from other states – every fifth citizen (in this case it is about newcomers from former South Asian Soviet republics because the residents of St. Petersburg meet them all the time, every day in their daily life: in the underground, ground public transport, in shops and on the streets, and foreign tourists are met relatively rare). At the same time, the presence of people with other religions bothers only one out of six, and people from other regions of Russia or people with other political views – one out of seven. In this case we are talking about the perception of people in the “their own – alien” system of relations. Anxiety is caused by not just “others”, but those who differ significantly, if not radically. For Petersburgers the “others” are first of all representatives of other nationalities mostly from other states. The answers of respondents to the open question about resolution of ethnic conflicts clarify, that it is about people from the former South Asian Soviet republics. In addition, in the minds of many of Petersburgers, the Russian republics of the North Caucasus are not Russia.

In terms of evaluation of the dynamics of anxiety in relation to “others” comparison of the number of people who chose the answer “do not disturb” is of interest in relation to the various social groups in April and October 2012 (Table 7).

Table 6. Indicators of anxiety feelings of Petersburgers in the presence of other social groups (2012, October, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objects of evaluation</th>
<th>Disturbs</th>
<th>Do not disturb</th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of other nationalities</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from other regions of Russia</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens of other states</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with other political opinions</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of other religions</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Indicators of anxiety feelings of Petersburgers in the presence of other social groups (2012, April, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objects of evaluation</th>
<th>Disturbs strongly</th>
<th>Disturbs to same extent</th>
<th>Do not disturb</th>
<th>Difficult to answer</th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of other nationalities</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from other regions of Russia</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens of other states</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with other political opinions</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of other religions</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If in April 2012 49.5% of the respondents were not worried about the presence of people of other nationalities, in October 2012 – 62.4%. Similar answers in comparison of relation to the presence of people of other political views were respectively 79, 6% and 82.0%, of other religions – 80.8% and 82.1%, from other regions of Russia – 82.6 % and 83.5%, from other
countries – 75.7% and 74.3%. All changes, except one – the anxiety in the presence of representatives of other nationalities (12.9%) were within the statistical error. Petersburgers are more concerned about the presence of people of other nationalities and from other states, than different from them on the grounds of religion, political views or residence in another region of Russia.

For the data of October 2012 a persistent correlation between anxiety of Petersburgers’ perception of people has been revealed: a) people of other religions and other political views (Pearson’s correlation coefficient is +0.443), b) from other regions of Russia and other countries (Pearson’s correlation coefficient is +0.461); c) other nationality and other region of Russia (Pearson correlation coefficient is +0.444).

According to a telephone polls conducted in October 2012, 45.7% of the residents of St. Petersburg worry about ethnic relations in Russia in general, but a greater number of citizens – 57% – worry about them in St. Petersburg (see Table 8).

Table 8. Level of anxiety about the state of inter-ethnic relations in the country and St. Petersburg (St. Petersburg, October 2012, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible answers</th>
<th>Situation in the country as a whole</th>
<th>Situation in St. Petersburg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Care to a large extent</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care to some extent</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care to a small degree</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not care</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to answer</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since in both cases less than 3% of respondents were undecided, we can assume that this question does not cause any inner anxiety and is not related to the category of taboo. Both men and women are concerned about ethnic issues to the same extent (no deviations from standardized residues). There are no socio-demographic groups, for which the problem of ethnic relations would not represent any problem. However, less of all care about inter-ethnic relations citizens aged 40 to 49 (for the answer “care to a small degree” standardized residual for the group was +2.8), the middle-income citizens (15–20 000 rubles per family member per month; for these people the standardized residual for the answer variant “Care to a small degree” was +2.2) and students of higher educational institutions (for which the standardized residuals for the answer “care to some extent” and “Care to a small degree” were, respectively, +2.5 and +2.7).

In the minds of more than 40% of the residents of St. Petersburg the problem of interethnic relations is actualized, as 15.7% of respondents always discuss these issues with their friends and colleagues, and 24.6% do it frequently. Almost a third of citizens (37.5% of respondents) address the topic of inter-ethnic relations rarely. However, one in five (21.1% of respondents) does not discuss this problem with close people. Only 1.1% of respondents found it difficult to answer this question.

To a greater extent than other groups, non-working pensioners over 60 years tend to ignore the subject in their conversations (standardized residuals for the answer “never discussed” are, respectively, for the parameters of age and social status of this group of +2.5 and +3.9; however this does not mean that the topic is not relevant to them). This subject is also ignored by the poorest residents with income up to 5,000 rubles per family member (standardized residual for the group in terms of “never discussed” is +1.9).

It should be noted that these empirical data just debunk the myth settled in the minds of many scientists that it is the poorest who take for the most convenient object of accusations in their life problems, wealthier people of other ethnic groups, and this setting is applied further through interpersonal communication. Students of higher education discuss the issue of inter-ethnic relations rarely (according to interviews 51.2% of students talk about it with friends and family rarely; standardized residual for this option was +2.1.) In all other socio-demographic groups the intense discussion is almost the same.

In this situation, the attitude of citizens to interethnic-regional problems is expected to be caused by information obtained from the media. However, only a third of respondents (34.6%) are aware of this influence, 61.1% strongly deny it, 4.3% of respondents can not say anything definite. The distribution of answers among men and women, of different age groups are not substantially different. However, note that only employees of education, culture, science and health most adequately estimate the situation and tend to recognize the influence of the media on attitudes of citizens to interethnic problems (standardized residual is +2.0).

Partly, the conviction of people that their opinions are not influenced by information obtained from the media, is based on the high level of distrust to both public and private media (Table 9).
Only 6.7% of respondents are convinced that the state-controlled media fully and objectively cover ethnic issues. 16.7% of respondents believe that they do it not fully, but objectively, 11.8% – fully but not objectively. And 51% of citizens – more than half! – believe that this information is neither full, nor objective. Every seventh citizen (13.8%) found it difficult to answer this question.

A nearly identical pattern is observed when assessing the quality of information in independent media on inter-ethnic relations. 7.4% of the citizens believe these data are complete and objective, 16.3% – not full, but objective (i.e., in total – about 23% of the positive responses, as in the previous case), 9.9% – full, but not objective, 40.4% – incomplete and not objective. However, in this case, twice as many citizens – one fourth (26%) do not know if to trust or not to trust the media not controlled by the state (private).

The correlation coefficient between the views of Petersburgers about the quality of materials on ethnic issues in the state and private media is +0.502, which shows quite a close relationship between the two indicators. It is people's stereotype to perceive information from private and public sources. The picture is depressing: only 5.3% of citizens trust at the same time information policy covering ethnic issues in the state and private media. And this with the fact that 42.6% of residents at the same time do not trust the information from both sources (Table 10). There is something to think about for leaders of electronic and print media!

From all socio-demographic and status groups there are only two groups with deviations from the average values: students and people with a monthly income of 10 to 15,000 rubles for each member of the family (standardized residuals are +2.4, +1.9) believe that the state-controlled media present information on ethnic relations fully and objectively.

In St. Petersburg since 2006 the Program “Tolerance” has been developed – on the initiative of the city government, – with an active information campaign (apart from cultural and educational events in various parts of the city, it also includes the components of social outdoor and radio adverts). By the autumn of 2012 it was known by one in four (23.9%) adult residents of St. Petersburg. 24.4% of respondents in the survey said that they had heard something about this project, but more than half (51.7%) admitted they had not heard of it. This does not mean that the information was not delivered to them, it is not actualized in their minds. From all socio-demographic parameters of the respondents recorded in the survey (gender, age, education, income, occupation), only one – the kind of professional work – let the differences noted between the groups. Most informed about the “Tolerance” were employees of managerial staff, workers of culture, health, science and education, the military (standardized residuals for these groups are respectively +1.65, +1.9, +1.8). Engineers and technical specialists (standardized residual is +1.8) heard something about the project “Tolerance”. 64.8% of interviewed workers had not heard about the pro-

### Table 9. Estimation by Petersburgers of the integrity and fairness of media coverage of interethnic problems (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Versions of answer</th>
<th>State-controlled media</th>
<th>Media, not controlled by the state (private)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fully and objectively</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not fully, but objectively</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully, but not objectively</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not fully and not objectively</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to answer</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 10. Table of correlation quality assessment information ethnic conflicts in state and private media, St. Petersburg, October 2012 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In your opinion, how state media cover interethnic problems?</th>
<th>In your opinion, how domestic private media cover interethnic problems?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fully and objectively</td>
<td>Not fully, but objectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully and objectively</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not fully, but objectively</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully, but not objectively</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not fully and not objectively</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to answer</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
gram (standardized residual is +2.1). Almost unaware of this program were businessmen (standardized residual for the answer “yes, I heard” is –1.9). These data are even more impressive that migrant workers work alongside with Russian workers on construction sites, much more in the private than in the state enterprises!

At the same time 57.3% of respondents said yes to the necessity of such programs and their support, but 17.1% believe that the problems of inter-ethnic relations should be solved not by social programs, but imposing appropriate laws, and 14.1% convinced that the funding such a project – a waste of public funds. Another 11.5% were unable to say anything definite. Thus, there is a split in the question of value and usefulness of efforts of the Government of St. Petersburg on the harmonization of interethnic relations in a multiethnic metropolis. As in the case with the awareness of Petersburgers about the “Tolerance” project, representatives of almost all socio-demographic groups responded almost the same, except the professional groups. Thus, engineers, technical specialists, Interior Ministry officers and the military to a greater extent than others, tend to believe that ethnic conflict can not be “cured” by social programs (standardized residuals are respectively +2.0 and +2.4) and just because of this their attitude to the “Tolerance” project is rather negative. It was difficult to assess the importance and necessity of this project only for older unemployed respondents over 60 (standardized residuals are +2.0 and +2.2).

It is significant that among all respondents 14.4% exactly know about the program and support it. At the same time, 5.2% of the citizens are aware of the program, but are convinced that ethnic problems should be solved only by legislative measures and 3.3% believe that this program is a waste of money. In this case it is important that the proportion of informed and positively related respondents and informed and negatively related is almost 2:1 (there is general proportion of positive/negative attitude to the program, regardless of awareness about it), that is, there is a balance in favor of positive ratings. 14.3% of citizens heard something about the project and have a positive attitude to the efforts of the city governments to prevent ethnic conflicts. Another 28.6% had never heard of the project, but believe it is needed.

In response to the open question “What are the steps to improve interethnic relations seem to you the most effective?” an absolute minority of 1167 respondents refused to answer or were difficult to answer. Only a few respondents believe that there are no interethnic problems in the country (“all right”; “okay”; “everything is being done”). As well there were very few answers related to the awareness of the respondents about the impossibility to change anything (“too late, it’s the end”; “we are dying (the Russians); in 20 years there will be only migrant workers, that is done – all is useless”).

The most common answer is the identification of the problem with the problem of presence in St. Petersburg of migrants along with the demanding changes in migration policy in Russia, up to prohibition of arrival of recruiting people from abroad and their return to their homeland (“to prohibit completely entry of migrants from Central Asia, they rape our girls, sell drugs, take our jobs, it is a cheap labor”; “should invite only experts with knowledge of the language, culture and traditions of the region of Russia, where they will work”; “well formed migratory policy, the tightening of the laws”; “filter the number of migrants”; “come and leave, do not remain for permanent residence”; “not come here, live well in their own country”; “drive them all in the neck from here”) – more than 60% of responses to the open question. It is the high frequency of such responses to the open question is fixed not only absolute disagreement residents of the politechniko metropolis of St. Petersburg with ongoing official migration policy of the federal and regional authorities, but also extremely low degree of inter-ethnic tolerance to foreign-cultural and foreign-language.

Furthermore, some citizens do not consider tolerance as a means of solving ethnic conflicts. Tolerance is perceived as an inability to protect their interests (“our spineless and tolerance spoils and leads to ethnic conflicts”; “I will always be outraged when migrants from Central Asia come to us with their
Citizens are irritated that programs associated with migrants, carried out at the expense of Russian taxpayers (“to bring up visitors, but not to train at our expense”). It is necessary to tighten control over the health of people entering the Russian Federation (“need them to come with all the necessary documents for health”). “Prohibition of migrant enclaves” and “regulation of interconfessional religious conflicts” are proposed as significant measures.

The smallest irritation in labor migration is caused by Slavs (“Ukrainians and Belarusians are acceptable, to tighten entry for other nations”), attracting only highly skilled labor migrants is considered as a positive scenario (“Russia needs the most skilled workers”).

The employers’ responsibility for the living conditions of labor migrants is particularly emphasized (“to fingerprint migrants, to reserve part of their salaries on their plastic cards for the opportunity to return home, the employer must provide housing and health care for migrant workers and take responsibility for them”) and taking migrants on control by police (“to monitor them”), including their displacement. In the minds of some citizens an image of “alien” is united in a representative of another nationality, country and religion (“we need to tighten immigration policy towards Muslims from all countries”). According to Petersburgers, the indigenous people should be protected by the law and informed what laws govern stay of labor migrants in the Russian Federation (“to inform local residents about the existing laws about migrants”).

Opinions of other respondents are distributed fairly evenly between the following options.

1. There is a complete shifting of the responsibility for solving this problem to the state and officials (“government should think”, “the state should control the execution of the laws”). In particular, it is proposed to change the policy in respect of the Russian-speaking Internet segment (“harder to filter the Internet in Russia in the case of ethnic hatred and its incitement”), criminal legislation should be changed (“tougher penalties for crimes on ethnic grounds”, “tightening the responsibility for all of inciting ethnic hatred”).

2. The necessity to improve the culture and tolerance education of children/students as a mandatory element (“change attitude to them”, “humanity”, “to teach children a daily tolerance and perception of the world as it is”). Optimum alternatives are education in schools, the position of the clergy and preaching tolerance during the services, information campaign in the media (“to teach tolerance since the primary school”, “to educate children in schools, to develop tolerance and educate non-conflict”, “to promote the idea of tolerance and respect for other people through the media”, “the church – to preach tolerance to others, the media must be correct”). According to Peterburgers the media take special responsibility on inciting interethnic conflicts (“the media should tell not about murders, but recall good memories about our common past”, “to parse each particular conflict, and not to generalize”, “information must be given without emotions, no emotional stains in the news”). These responses are especially indicative that run counter to the respondents’ assessment of the degree of influence on their opinions about other nations of information from the media. It turns out that the information always impacts someone else.

3. According to residents, problems of increasing tolerance are successfully solved by cultural education (“more information about another culture”, “to create clubs joining nationalities”), joint public-benefit activities of citizens and migrants (“common community work day – most importantly to do something together”, “joint actions”, “joint activities for the benefit of the city, the state, concerts, uniting people of different nationalities”), i.e., those forms of international education, which were adopted in the Soviet Union. It is significant that such answers were given by middle-aged people.

4. Overall economic stability in Russia is required, which in the end will soften ethnic conflict (“economic stability”).

5. Clear requirements to visitors have been announced to respect local laws and customs, to change attitudes towards girls and women, to speak Russian (“visitors should respect our laws”, “to live by our rules”, “southerners should live according our laws and speak Russian”, “to inculcate tolerance towards women and girls and to teach them”).

6. Notable the fact that not only migrant workers from South Asian republics cause a negative attitude, but residents of other regions of Russia (“to extradite all illegal migrants from Central Asia, the Caucasus, Tajikistan, Chuvash and significantly limit their entry to Russia”). There is not just elementary ignorance of geography, but also the perception of immigrants from other regions of the Russian Federation as “others”.

7. There were few both hidden and open nationalistic statements (“enhance the social status of indigenous people in Russia”, “too much focus on extraneous issues, the emphasis on tolerance, equality and equity leads only to incite ethnic hatred”, “to employ mostly Russian”, “exclude Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan from Russia”, “to restrict the entry of representatives of non-Russian nationalities, as it is dangerous to walk in the Nevsky district in the evenings – non-Russian language around, there are 5 people on a group of migrants, afraid for life”).

St. Petersburg, unlike many cities is not yet divided into districts with radically different levels of quality and style of life. However, some features, based on indicators of significant standardized residuals, of the distribution of respondents living in different administrative districts of St. Petersburg have been revealed. For example, in the Kurortny district ethnic problems...
are discussed in a close social circle (family, friends, work colleagues) to a greater degree than in other districts, (36.8% of residents with an average value in the city of 15.7%). In the Kirovsky district of the city residents are better informed about the project “Tolerance” (32.9% – in the area at 23.9% – of the entire sample). In the Frunzensky district residents to a greater extent than in other areas of the city consider conflicts between rich and poor to be dangerous (36.1% – in the district at 24.7% – of the entire sample). These dangers are more ignored by residents of Kalininsky and Primorsky districts (not dangerous to, respectively, 17.9% and 36.5% of the residents of these areas for the index 8.7% throughout the sampling). To the greatest extent than in other areas of the city residents of Krasnoselsky district are aware of the danger of ethnic conflicts (the answer “very dangerous” was given by 54.7% of respondents in this district with an average of 41.9% of the sample). However, to a greater extent than in other areas of the city, residents of Primorsky district tend to consider such conflicts as not dangerous (23.5% – in the area at 10.2% – on all the sampling). Residents of the Kirovsky district are more aware about the risks of conflict between officials and citizens (47.4% – in the district at 22.8% – in the sample as a whole). Petrodvorets district residents cannot give a definitive opinion on the matter to a greater extent than others (18% – the area at 9.9% – on the sampling in general). Residents of Frunzensky, Krasnogvardeisky and Kronstadtsky districts are more concerned about the risk of conflict between local residents and newcomers (in the Frunzensky district answer “very dangerous” was chosen by 41% with 29.6% – in the sample; the answer “rather dangerous” was chosen in Krasnogvardeisky and Kronstadtsky districts by respectively 42.5% and 66.7% with 31.8% – of the entire sample). However, the residents of the Krasnoselskii district to a greater extent than in other areas, tend to consider these conflicts rather than dangerous (33.7% – an indicator of the area at 21.3% – in the sample as a whole).

To a lesser extent than those in all other areas of St. Petersburg, the residents of Neve-ray region tend to assume the risk of conflict between the Orthodox and Muslims, we are not present (30.3% – an indicator of the area at 12.8% – of the entire sample). To a greater extent than people in other areas, the presence of other national concerned residents Krasnogvardeyskoe region (24.1% said that they are worried about the presence of such persons for the index 34.5% – of the entire sample). In the most difficult to speak on this occasion people in Nevsky and Frunze Raion (undecided respectively 9.1% and 8.2% – in these areas for the index 2.9% – for the entire sample as a whole).

Residents of the Vyborgsky district are less aware of the presence of newcomers from other regions, but residents of Kronstadt and Petrodvorets worry about this most of all (figures for the answer “aware” are, respectively, 7.7%, 33.3% and 19.4% with a 13.5% of the sample as a whole). Similarly, residents of the Vyborgsky district are less concerned about the presence of people of different religion (the answer “worries” was chosen by 8.7% of residents with index 18.5% – for the entire sample as a whole).

Thus, in general sets of St. Petersburg residents on major social conflicts can be considered as stable. Some fluctuations have been fixed since 2008, but the social anxiety of Petersburgers is becoming increasingly widespread. This is especially true about conflict stereotypes associated with the attitude to foreign migrants of other ethnicity and other culture. It should be noted that a number of indicators of the nature of distribution of dangers of social conflicts is more spread out and not localized in specific socio-demographic and status groups. These are quite alarming symptoms, because St. Petersburg as the metropolis fixes the trends which soon will become real not only in the “first” Russia, but also in the “second” Russia.

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4 It is a paper by N. Zubarevich “Perspective: Four Russias”, published November 30, 2011 in the “Vedomosti” newspaper and dedicated to the fundamental differences of living conditions and the mentality of the Russian population, depending on the size of the place of living. “The First Russia” – the inhabitants of cities and industrial centers, “The Second Russia” – the residents of small cities of regional subordination, “The Third Russia” – the inhabitants of towns, “The Fourth Russia” – residents of semi-abandoned rural unpromising villages. In 2007, the first time urban population in Russia exceeded the number of people living in rural communities.


Филиппов В. Р. [Filippov R.] (2009) Этничность и власть в столичном
Elke Murdock

NATIONAL IDENTITY: INTEGRITY AND DIVERSITY IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE.

THE CONSTRUAL OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES WITHIN THE LUXEMBOURG CONTEXT

We live in an increasingly mobile world. Luxembourg with a foreign population of 43% (over 65% in the capital) and three officially recognized languages, spoken throughout the country, can be viewed as a “natural laboratory.” Luxembourg has experienced a vicissitudinous history. Within a short period of time, Luxembourg has changed from being a country of emigration of becoming a target country for immigration. Initially, the iron and steel works attracted foreign populations. Today, Luxembourg is a major financial centre and host to many European institutions. The size of the country, population mix and closeness of the borders also imply that second culture exposure cannot be avoided. How is national identity construed within this context? In this paper the conceptual framework for a planned empirical study will be presented: Three different resident groups which are differentiated by their length of stay in Luxembourg (native Luxembourgers, Luxembourgers with migration background and Expatriates) will be analysed regarding their construal of national identity along the primordialist – situationalist spectrum. Furthermore, biculturalism will be explored, the hypothesis being that the position on the primordialist – situationalist spectrum will influence the bicultural orientation and the perception of second culture exposure as enrichment or threat. Identity Structure Analysis is used as a theoretical framework.

Key words: construal of national identity, resident groups, biculturalism, multinational environment, natural laboratory, primordialism

Introduction

We live in an increasingly mobile world. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has experienced tremendous change over the last century: Luxembourg within its current borders was only established in 1839. Today, Luxembourg has the highest foreign population of any EU country. In the capital of Luxembourg, the resident population is actually in the minority. Within Luxembourg, second culture exposure cannot be avoided. How is national identity construed within such a multinational environment?

Firstly, the unique Luxembourg background will be explained. Secondly, the concepts nation and national identity will be described and approaches to study national identity will be shown. The proposed study uses Identity Structure Analysis (ISA) as theoretical framework. Therefore, a brief introduction into ISA will be provided and the concepts primordialism and situationalism will be explained, as well as their operationalization within the proposed study. Given the multinational background, there is also a higher incidence of dual nationalities or mixed marriages. Therefore, a brief excurse into the study of biculturalism will be given. The different strands will be brought together in the conclusion.

Multinational environment: Luxembourg a “natural laboratory”

Luxembourg can be considered a «natural laboratory» for the study of national identity construal within a multinational environment. Since 963, when Luxembourg was first mentioned – Luxembourg has experienced a vicissitudinous history (for an historical overview see for example G. Trausch „Die historische Entwicklung des Grossherzogtums – ein Essay”, M. Margue and P. Péporté „Medieval Myths and the Building of National Identity: the Example of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, The Uses of the Middle Ages in Modern European States”. (Trausch 2008; Margue, Péporté 2011) Luxembourg experienced different rulers and partitions. The modern Luxembourg, within its current borders, was established in the Treaty of London in 1839, for which the foundations were laid at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Thus the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is a relatively new country and the overt expression of national identity is a relatively new phenomenon.
Economically, Luxembourg has also experienced dramatic change. At the time of the Congress of Vienna, Luxembourg was a relatively poor, agrarian country experiencing emigration. The discovery of iron ore in the South of the country at the end of the last century would change this. The steel works attracted different waves of immigrants (for an overview see Willems and Milmeister 2008). Many of the immigrants stayed and brought their families to Luxembourg. Since the ’70s and to this day, the Portuguese immigrants form the largest minority group within Luxembourg. In an attempt to diversify the industry, the Luxembourg government laid the foundations for Luxembourg to become a major financial services centre. This attracted many foreign financial services providers to Luxembourg and with it an international workforce. Luxembourg is also one of the founding members of the European Union and hosts several EU institutions – attracting many European nationals. This results in the current population mix:

**Figure 1: Luxembourg Population Structure (2011 – estimation January 1st)**

As can be seen, the majority of the foreign population originates from other European countries, even though the “other” category has been rising steadily over recent years. The population mix within Luxembourg is therefore relatively homogenous regarding the *cultural distance* as defined by R. Inglehart and C. Welzel in „Changing Mass Priorities: The Link Between Modernization and Democracy“ (2010). (Inglehart, Welzel 2010, p. 554) The World Value Survey Cultural Map 2005-2008 is included in the Appendix.

The resident workforce is added to by a daily stream of roughly 150,000 commuters who travel in from the neighbouring countries: Germany, France and Belgium. As mentioned above, Luxembourg is a very small country with territorial dimensions of a maximum of 82 km (North – South) and 57 km (East – West). The longest stretch of border is shared with Belgium to the West (148 km), followed by Germany to the East (135 km) and completed by France to the South (73 km). (Le Luxembourg en chiffres 2011, p. 6)

Thus, in a country of this size and a foreign population of 43%, second culture exposure is inevitable. This population mix is even more pronounced in the capital, Ville de Luxembourg, which has a population of 96,750 of which 34% are Luxembourgers and 66% Foreigners, coming from a total of 159 different countries (Government paper, Etat de la population 2011). The City of Luxembourg has even adopted the slogan “multiplicity” for its global branding as the former mayor explains “it reflects the astonishingly cosmopolitan character of this medium sized European capital where over 65% of the resident population don’t hold a Luxembourg passport and whose daytime population more than doubles due to the influx of again mostly foreign commuters”. (Guy Helminger, www.vdl.lu).

Luxembourg has three officially recognized languages, namely Luxembourgish, French and German which are all spoken throughout the country. (Fehlen 2012, p. 41-46) This is quite unlike other countries which are also multilingual, but where language use is determined by region – examples include Switzerland or Belgium. Amongst the resident population, Luxembourgish is spoken at home and in the pre-schools. Alphabetization commences in German at primary school level. Half way through primary school, the language of teaching switches to French. This means that resident Luxembourgers are at least tri-lingual (Dickes, Berzosa 2010).

The inverse proportion between the size of the country and its political impact has been commented on by Stephen George (2000) Professor emeritus of Politics in his analysis of Luxembourg’s EU presidency in 1997: “Luxembourg is a remarkable country. With a population of 410,000, less than the city of Sheffield – it has managed to play an active and valuable role in the process of European integration for over forty years” (George 2000, p. 21). Of course, the size of the population has increased since the 1997 EU presidency and with it also the foreign population. The mix of economic success and population mix has also attracted comment. Francesco Sarracino explains: “This country is characterized by peculiar economic and social conditions: it is the country with the highest GDP per capita in the world, more than 40% of its population is composed by immigrants and about 50% of the workforce is composed by cross-borders”. (Sarracino 2011, p. 1)
These facts and comments taken together show that Luxembourg is indeed a unique country providing an ideal context to study national identity construal within a multinational environment. The indigenous Luxembourg population experiences declining birth-rates and is already in the minority in the capital. (Le Luxembourg en chiffres 2011) Is second culture exposure experienced as enrichment or a threat amongst the resident population? As mentioned above, city management likes to emphasize the cosmopolitan, multicultural flair in its city branding. Is this view shared by the resident population? Luxembourg has also experienced political and economic changes in the course of its history. Is this reflected in a socially constructed understanding of national identity? How is this multinational environment perceived by migrants, who may have made Luxembourg their home and by sojourners for whom Luxembourg is at least a temporary home? How are bicultural identities negotiated?

**Nation and national identity**

Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) asserts that (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality and (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality. Thus “nationality” has been declared to be a universal human right. ([http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr](http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/)

Yet, what is a nation? What characterizes a nation? Within the remit of this paper, only the surface of these big questions can be scratched. For an overview of nation-building within the Luxembourg context and an explanation of the essentialist versus constructivist understanding of nation building I refer to M. Margue and P. Péporté „Medieval Myths and the Building of National Identity: the Example of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, The Uses of the Middle Ages in Modern European States.” (2011). However, a few key points will be pointed out: The term nation can be traced back to the Latin term “natio” which referred to birth, origin or people. In Roman times, the term described “others” or “heathens”. (Rumpel 1991) In the middle – ages, we come across the territorial understanding of the term for the first time. The context was university registration – students had to state where they were from. Today, most historians would agree that nations themselves can be considered a construct. The history of nations is telic and normative. (Helmchen 2005) Symbols play an important role – obvious examples are flags. Michael Billig refers to “banal nationalism” in this context. (Billig 1995) Often, an ideal lays the foundation for a nation – as for example liberté, égalité and fraternité in France. There must also be a willingness to form a nation which often goes hand in hand with a perception of “us” versus “them”. This point is stressed by W. Arts and L. Halman who explain that national identity refers to “perceived distinctiveness, a possibility to distinguish oneself or a group from others”. (Arts, Halman 2005, p. 73) M. Billig emphasizes that Nation-states do not exist in isolation, but in a complex of other nation-states. (Billig 1995) W. Arts and L. Halman point out that nation and nationality have very different meanings from one country to another. In France, for example, nation has always a very strong political connotation. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, “the idea of nation came to have a particularly strong ethnic connotation”. (Arts, Halman 2005, p. 72) Usually, two main interpretations of nation building can be found: One being based on ancestry or lineage (ius sanguinis) and the other based on affiliation or belonging (ius soli). (Schubert, Klein 2006). The anthropologist Clifford Geertz describes a nation as a group based on primordial affiliations, reflecting an understanding based on ancestry. (Geertz 1973, p. 3-30) Michael Billig explains explains that objective criteria such as language, religion or geography cannot be used to predict where state boundaries are: psychological ones are the decisive ones. Nations are in fact “imagined communities” (Benedict Anderson, 2006).

**How study national identity?**

The section above highlights the complexity of the concept “nation” and the process of nation building. The ensuing question is a definition of national identity. Billig describes national identities as “forms of social life, rather than internal psychological states; as such, they are ideological creations, caught up in the historical processes of nationhood”. (Billig 1995 p. 24) Susan Condor explains national identity as the ways in which members of a national group reflexively understand themselves. (Condor 2011) P. Weinreich specifies: “The greater proportion of people, who are born into and experience their childhood within a well-defined peoplehood with a shared socio-cultural history has the ethnic identity of that peoplehood. Often the term “nation” or “ethnic group” is used to refer to a peoplehood of this kind”. (Weinreich, Wendy 2003, p. 27-28)

National identity has been studied in different ways. Susan Condor has been studying the English national identity. (Condor 1996; Condor 2000) In her research she has used semi – structured interviews and self-report questionnaires with open-ended questions. She found that many of her English respondents found it very difficult to speak about nationality and showed a marked hesitation in answering questions. In her interview study, the majority of the respondents denied at some stage the personal significance of national identity. Nearly a fifth refused to answer the question...
about nationality, denying any personal sense of national identity. The discourse analysis showed that respondents often found it difficult or delicate to talk about their country in categorical terms. She found that there was often hesitancy to talk about national self-definition or even an outright refusal of national identification.

Within the Luxembourg context, H. Willems, P. Joachim, C. Meyers, M. Milmeister and C. Weis recognized that there may be a difference between actual and subjective national identity. (Willems, Joachim, Meyers, Milmeister, Weis 2004) In their Luxembourg youth study the authors found out that actual and subjective nationality did not correspond in one third of the cases. They discovered a near perfect match between the actual percentage of Luxembourg youth and those who feel Luxembourgish. This was not the case for the Portuguese participants – 30% were Portuguese, but only 21% said that they felt Portuguese. Interestingly, in that study 10% of the young people felt “European”. Unfortunately, this questionnaire-based study could not explore the reasons behind this choice – true adherence to the political ideal? Political correctness? Protest choice, because the national categories did not suit? These could all be possible explanations. Interestingly also, only 1% chose the dual-nationality option in this study.

As mentioned above, Susan Condor identified a reluctance to talk about nationality, at least English nationality, in categorical terms. For my own research project, I intend to adopt an indirect way of accessing individuals’ construal of national identity – namely their position on the primordial – situationalist spectrum. The theoretical framework is provided by Identity Structure Analysis, which will be outlined in the next section.

Identity Structure Analysis

Identity Structure Analysis (ISA) is conceptualized as a theoretical framework, acknowledging and bringing together elements of several psychological theories. (Weinreich, Saunderson 2003, p. 115-170) ISA has also been translated into a methodological tool (IPSEUS). ISA stresses the continuity aspect between past, present and future and focuses on the individual’s appraisal of the social world. Thus ISA stresses the construal aspect of identity. All these aspects are made explicit in the definition of identity: “A person’s identity is defined as the totality of one’s self-construal, in which how one construes oneself in the present expresses the continuity between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one construes oneself as one aspires to be in the future”. (Weinreich 2003, p. 26)

Identity construal is inherently a dynamic process and ISA is able to incorporate changes in identity structure over time. These changes may be the result of new experiences, expanding networks of people, societal changes, traumatic events etc. At the heart of ISA are two components:

- Entities, that is different facets of self and other important agents or people and
- Discourses in the form of bi-polar statements.

By asking individuals to assess bipolar statements from the perspective of different entities, ISA is able to generate a holistic comprehension of a person’s identity, but in an unobtrusive and non-threatening way. By using bipolar statements, it is acknowledged, that the world is not black and white – usually there is a continuum on which individuals place themselves. The ratings can then be evaluated along polarity (endorsed – non-endorsed pole), strength and evaluation. ISA takes explicitly into consideration that people are as much defined by what they are as by what they are not. Contextual factors are made explicit in the form of entities.

The aspirational self acts as an anchor point for the person’s value system. ISA also acknowledges that the individual’s value system will be influenced by cultural factors as well as the socio-historical era a person is living in. By comparing response patterns across different entities, a response profile of the individual can be built up. These profiles can then be compared across groups.

The locus of ISA lies in the way people appraise their social world: A person’s appraisal of the social world and its significance is an expression of his or her identity. Individuals appraise and interpret the events in which they participate and they identify with other people and social institutions. Every one experiences the desire to make suitable sense of the particular world one engages in – from moment to moment. A fundamental aspect of this process is the striving to make sense of oneself: to comprehend who one is, where one has come from, and the kind of person one aspires to be in the future. This issue of identity and one’s location within the complex world is central to everyone’s being. Appraisal is set within the biological development of individual identity within the socio-historical context of the era in question. Within this framework, ethnic/national identity is then defined as: “…that part of the totality of one’s self-construal made up of those dimensions that express the continuity between one’s construal of past ancestry and one’s future aspirations in relation to ethnicity” (Weinreich 2003, p. 28). Ethnic identity is based in a time-span continuity of generations. Some individuals stress ethnic persistence – ethnic identity would then be perceived as unchangeable. Yet other individuals recognize the situationally constructed aspect of ethnicity. These opposing poles are referred to as the primordialist – situationalist spectrum.
Primordialist versus situationalist spectrum

Primordialism is defined as a sentiment or effect-laden set of beliefs and discourses about perceived essential continuity from group ancestry to progeny, located symbolically in a specific territory or place. Situationalism on the other hand, is defined as “a set of beliefs or discourses about the instrumental and socially constructed nature of the group, in which interpretations and reinterpretations of history provide rationales justifying the legitimacy of a peoplehood” (Weinreich, 2003, p. 119). Those adhering to a situationalist perspective appreciate that nationals are not given entities for all time, but that they are socially situated, constructed and reconstructed in historical time. Situationalist viewpoints emphasize the flux of nation states in historical times.

Primordialism can be understood as the initial lay perspective on nationality and ethnicity as representing the cohesiveness of a peoplehood. It is an emotive “gut feeling” sense of affinity with the people in question. Primordialist sentiments are frequently expressed in people’s everyday discourses about nationality and ethnicity. What needs to be explained is why such sentiments are (still) manifested, when historical evidence provides many counter examples of fluidity and change. Furthermore, why are these primordialist sentiments, often expressed with such intensity and effect? One explanation may be the developmental primacy of primordialism. The primordialist view is modulated by later experience. Developmental primacy may also explain, why people will rarely hold either/or position – but will move along the spectrum. In times of crisis, people often revert back to primordialist views. On the other hand, primordialists may also, for reasons of political correctness, hold situationalist views. These views will not necessarily be held consciously. Yet without reason or incentive for questioning the nature of nationality, people's basic propensity remains an unchanging primordialist perspective. And this is precisely why the study of national identity construal within a multinational context is so interesting, as second culture exposure is inevitable, providing an incentive to question “the initial order.” Which factors (personality factors, biographical experiences, situational or historical contexts, education etc.) facilitate the development of a situationalist perspective? Which people will develop more of a situationalist perspective? Why do they reflect on and question what is initially regarded as being the “natural order of things.”

These opposing viewpoints have been “translated” so to speak into bipolar constructs: Examples of bipolar constructs pertaining to primordialism – situationalism which have been used in previous studies (Weinreich, Bacova, Rougier 2003) are provided in Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primordialist Spectrum</th>
<th>Situationalist Spectrum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Considers nationality as given forever</td>
<td>Is able to adapt to being of any nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knows that descendants will continue the national group</td>
<td>Believes that future generations won't bother about nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believes that national language is absolutely essential to the nation</td>
<td>Believes that a common language is not necessary for national loyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believes that nations develop from common ancestral experience</td>
<td>Believes that nations are the consequence of political decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thinks that it is possible to have only one national identity</td>
<td>Believes that it is possible to combine several national identities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another key feature of Identity Structure Analysis is that contextual factors are taken into consideration. These are captured in the form of Entities. An individual may be different when interacting with the family or at the workplace. Key events (i.e. living in a foreign country) may have influenced him or her. In ISA these aspects can be taken into consideration and are operationalized in the form of entities. Some entities are mandatory – others can be adapted to a specific research context. Examples include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situational Factors</th>
<th>Me as I am at home</th>
<th>Current self</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Me as I am with friends</td>
<td>Current self</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mood states</td>
<td>Me as I am when I am anxious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me when I am acting out of character</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Me when I was a child</td>
<td>Past self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me before I came to this country</td>
<td>Past self</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me as I aspire to be in the future</td>
<td>Future self</td>
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<td>Metaperspective</td>
<td>Me as other people see me</td>
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<td>Aspirational self</td>
<td>Me as I would like to be</td>
<td>Aspirational self</td>
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<td>Contra-aspirational self</td>
<td>Me as I would not like to be</td>
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Biculturalism

Bicultural individuals are those who have been exposed to and have internalized two cultures. (Benet-Martinez, Lee, Morris 2002, p. 1015 – 1049.). Y. Hong, M. Morris, C. Chiu and V. Benet-Martinez stress the ability to switch between cultural schemas, norms, and behaviors in response to cultural cues. (Hong, Morris, Chiu, Benet-Martinez 2000, p. 709-720)

T. LaFromboise, H. L. K. Coleman and J Gerton (1993) identified the following dimensions which an individual may need to develop to become effective in 2 cultures: 1) Knowledge of cultural beliefs and values -the degree to which an individual is aware of and knowledgeable about the history, institutions, rituals and everyday practices of a given culture that govern the daily interactions of its members. 2) Affective dimension – a positive attitude towards both minority and majority groups. 3) The communication ability refers to an individual's effectiveness in communicating ideas and feelings to members of a given culture, both verbally and non-verbally (not necessarily in written form). Language competency may be a major building block in bicultural competence. 4) Role repertoire – that is the range of culturally or situationally appropriate behaviours or roles an individual has developed. 5) A sense of being grounded which largely refers to the experience of having a well-developed social support system. Finally 6) Bicultural efficacy which refers to the “belief or confidence that one can live effectively and in a satisfying manner within two groups without compromising one’s sense of cultural identity”. (LaFromboise, Coleman, Gerton 1993, p. 404). The authors state that encouraging the development of an individual's bicultural efficacy is a vital goal of any program that is designed to enhance his/her performance in a bicultural or multicultural environment. This is why bicultural efficacy, in the form of the question whether individuals consider it possible to have a bicultural identity will be explored within the proposed study.

R. F. Baumeister and M. R. Leary (1995, p. 497) observe in their seminal article that “Much of what human beings do is done in the service of belongingness”. (Baumeister, Leary 1995, p. 497) Susan Fiske depicts belonging as one of 5 basic human motives. She explains: “As a foundation, people first and foremost need to belong (to relationships and groups) in order to survive; the environment to which people adapt is the social group, and culture codifies survival rules in different groups”. (Fiske 2010, p. XX). The question is how people belonging to two different cultural groups negotiate their “need to belong.”

V. Benet-Martinez and J. Haritatos developed a Bicultural Identity Index (BII), which captures the degree to which “biculturals perceive their mainstream and ethnic cultural identities as compatible and integrated vs. oppositional and difficult to integrate”. (Benet-Martinez, Haritatos 2005, p. 1019). The BII focuses on bicultural individual’s subjective perceptions of managing dual cultural identities. How much do their dual cultural identities intersect or overlap? Factor Analysis showed two dimensions: Distance and Conflict. Correlations between these two scores were close to zero. These results indicate that a bicultural individual can perceive his or her ethnic and mainstream cultural orientation to be relatively dissociated (I keep Chinese and American culture separate) while not feeling that they conflict with each other (I don't feel trapped between Chinese and American culture). Similarly, a bicultural can see her/himself as having a combined identity – (I feel Chinese American) whilst seeing the cultures in conflict with each other. (I feel caught between the two cultures). (Benet-Martinez, Haritatos 2005, p. 1028).

As mentioned earlier, the cultural distance between the different migrant groups living in Luxembourg is relatively small. However, alongside the question of bicultural efficacy, the organisation of cultural identities will also be explored within the proposed study.

Conclusion

In the first section the unique Luxembourg situation as “natural laboratory” to study national identity construal within a multinational environment was presented. It can be assumed that national identity will have become salient for all the three groups to be investigated, namely native Luxembourgers, Luxembourgers with migrant background and expatriates, for different reasons. The native population is already in the minority in the capital and national birth rates are declining. The Migrant population has to negotiate the demands of the country of origin and host/new home country. Finally, the Expatriates are confronted with a different way of life, albeit short-term. Given the direct personal experience with fluidity and change, I would predict situationalism to be higher than primordialism in each group to be investigated. In line with the theory, some primordialist sentiments can still be expected. I would also predict that the majority would consider it possible to belong to more than one nationality (bicultural efficacy). Differences can be expected whether this rich second cultural exposure is perceived as enrichment or a threat. Identity Structure Analysis is considered to provide a suitable framework to address the research questions:

Entities and Themes can be adapted to the specific Luxembourg context. Bipolar constructs pertaining to the primordialist – situationalist spectrum
have also been tested in previous research. Assessing bipolar statements for different facets of life is an indirect, unobtrusive way of getting to an individual’s construal of national identity. This is especially important in an area where political correctness or social desirability would otherwise influence response patterns.

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Restitution of Jewish property – a big challenge for the post-communist Europe

Jekaterina Ivanova

RESTITUTION OF JEWISH PROPERTY – A BIG CHALLENGE FOR THE POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE

“Holocaust restitution is not about money. It is about victims. It is about individuals who have waited sixty years for something. Of course it is not about “perfect justice”, a phrase that may never pass one’s lips in the same breath as “Holocaust”. But it is about waiting for some recognition, some voucher to validate the misdeeds that have been pretended.”

When speaking about internal relations between Jewish society and any of the States in the Europe, especially in the Baltic States, we can always find a number of problems which can vary from the smallest up to important unresolved issues. The issue of restitution is one of the most discussed and challenging questions within the development of these relations. Every problem deserves to be analyzed from different angles, but still the core issue is to have a clear vision as to the concept of the problem, to find reasons and consequences, as well to define the victims and victimizers, and of course, to analyze the ways and techniques it is treated with in the course of history. Thus, the given article provides analysis of different scientific theories and visions as to the concept of restitution, provides an overview of the historical peculiarities connected with the problem, describes the current situation in Western and East-Central Europe, analyzing their experience and obstacles delaying the restitution issue.

Keywords: Holocaust, victim, justice, post-communist Europe, political willingness, legislation, Germany, classification, owner, community

The concept of restitution of Jewish property

Consequently, the first step is to understand what restitution is. As it is defined in the Hearing before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives (1998) presented by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, one of the most destructive consequences which still are not completely solved in many countries is expropriation of movable and immovable assets implemented by the Nazi Germany during the WWII. The depth of this problem is hidden in the fact that it is a concern of both – individuals and a great variety of organizations which became victims of the brutal Nazi regime. The major group of victims consisted mostly of Jews, but some of the victims were also Christian communities, homosexuals and others. Moreover, expropriation from the side of Nazi Germany was not the only experience for the countries which remained behind the Iron Curtain – the offense was repeated for a second time, assets were expropriated and taken over by the communist government. Which means this approach would double the term of the victims. The conflicts over the restitution of Jewish property can be divided into two phases – after 1945 and after 1990. (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1998, p. 15).

Thus, restitution is probably the easiest legal technique how to remedy injustices caused by the Holocaust. Millions of Jews who have been victims of genocide have never forgotten the irreversible consequence of the Holocaust. In addition, the Holocaust was the largest theft, leaving people without their holdings of assets, institutions, and the restitution of property must be a key legacy of the residues of processing element. (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1998, p. 17).

Speaking about the concept of restitution from the perspective of its definition the core meaning is “the act of restoring to the rightful owner something that has been taken away, lost, or surrendered.” (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2012).

But, still, in order to understand the essence of such a term as restitution and to draw the main outline of the problem connected with this notion it is not enough to understand only the linguistic definition, it is important to analyze the facts which take their roots deep in the past – the situation during the WWII. According to data provided in the First Global

1 Bazyler, Alford, (ed), 2006:34

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Report on Restitution of Jewish Property 1952-2004 (2005), about 6 million Jews were killed during the Holocaust and 9 million of Jewish assets were privatized or destroyed. In this regard it is important to speak not only about such assets as houses, flats, apartments, which are real estate assets, but also about gold, the pieces of art, jewelry, bank accounts, prohibitions, savings in different currencies and investments. (Steering Committee on Restitution of Rights of Jewish Property 1952-2004, 2005, p. 12). Stuart Eizenstat, who was appointed by the U.S. President Bill Clinton to coordinate the activities of the Committee of the U.S. government to identify the Holocaust victims, has found out that the losses of Jewish assets was estimated at 150 billion U.S. dollars. However, the misappropriated assets are only part of the total material losses, which amounts to 230-250 billion U.S. dollars. This estimate includes the amount of appropriated property, loss of income and wages for forced labor. (Steering Committee on Restitution of Rights of Jewish Property, 1952-2004, 2005, p. 12).

The following definition provides a clear understanding of the core meaning of the "Holocaust restitution" by showing its double-sided nature, "Holocaust restitution is not about money. It is about victims. It is about individuals who have waited sixty years for something. Of course it is not about "perfect justice", a phrase that may never pass one's lips in the same breath as "Holocaust". But it is about waiting for some recognition, some voucher to validate the misdeeds that have been pretended." (Bazyler, Alford 2006, p. 34). From my point of view, it is obvious from the definition given above that the issue of restitution consists of both, moral sufferings and financial claims, which cannot be discussed separately. This means the problem combines three participants – a triangle of victims, those who victimized, and the State, which can be shown as the following scheme.

Victim  Victimizer State

It is important to have this vision because it shows the links between all the participants and their roles in the process of restitution. My vision is as follows, claims of the victims, historical perspective (research made by specialists in order to find out the truth), and the current position and responsibility for the past events of a particular State – legal system, recognition of history, etc., are interrelated issues in the process of restitution.

How to construct the model of restitution? Different visions and theories

Consequently, different theories of how to construct the model of restitu-
Classification of Jewish assets to be restituted

According to the report of the experts from the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1996) (an independent U.S. Government agency created in 1976) – specialists working for the government of the U.S. in order to analyze the legal basis, as well to introduce amendments for European governments to resolve the existing uncertainty and disagreements, repayable Jewish assets are classified into several categories:

- **The first category is private property.** However, at the territory of almost all post-Soviet countries continuous attempts of limiting legislation working on behalf of this type of restitution by adding additional conditions are quite frequent. One of the most obvious examples of these attempts is the fact that the claimant upon certain property must have a local citizenship, permanent residence in this country or have resided for a certain number of years. The struggle for the abolition of such restrictions is one of the most important tasks for the international organizations working on the issues concerning restitution of Jewish property at the territories of post-Soviet world.

- **The second type of property is property of the Jewish community,** also known as Jewish social property. National Jewish organizations and some Western political institutions are quite responsive exactly to this kind of property restitution. In these cases the heirs are local Jewish communities.

- **Sometimes the third category of property is identified** – it has no heirs or in some cases it is abandoned, rundown property. In terms of restitution, this kind of Jewish property is considered to be the most difficult to fulfill the procedure of its restitution. (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1996).

According to the data provided in the First Global Report on Restitution of Jewish Property 1952-2004 (2005) and presented by the Steering Committee on Restitution of Rights of Jewish Property, nowadays we can say that there was a great variety of Jewish property taken from Jewish communities during the WWII - property which has both historical and moral values. The following assets can be mentioned:

- synagogues, batei midrash [prayer and study halls];
- yeshivot [Talmudic academies], schools;
- mikvaot [ritual baths];
- old age homes, orphanages, hospitals;
- rabbinical residences, community offices;
- cemeteries, chevra kadisha [funeral and pre-burial] facilities;
- as well apartments, houses and lands that had been donated to, or were otherwise owned by the communities. (Steering Committee on Restitution of Rights of Jewish Property, 1952-2004, 2005, p. 19).

German model

According to the historian Israel Gutman (1990), in the period from 1933 until 1938, transfers of Jewish owned enterprises to German ownership was “voluntary”. In 1933 there were about 100,000 Jewish owned enterprises in Germany, but during the period mentioned before Jews experienced enormous pressure from the side of Nazi Germans to sell their business. As a result, by the spring of 1938, 60% to 70% of Jewish businesses had been liquidated pursuant to the Decree on the Registration of the Property of Jews of 26 April 1938. The following legislation was the beginning of total prohibition of all economic activity of Jews. (Gutman 1990, p. 1255).

In his Encyclopedia of Holocaust Israel Gutman (1990) explains that afterwards, Germany has paid enormous amounts of money to the victims of Nazi regime. Since 1952, Germany has paid over 50 billion U.S. dollars to Holocaust survivors, pursuant to federal indemnification laws. The Jewish Agency presented its first claim in September, 1945 to the Allied governments. Later various legislation projects dealing with reparations enacted, the core goal of these projects was restitution of real estate. The turning point in the process of restitution was the founding of the state of Israel in 1948. The Israeli government put enormous efforts to the restitution of expropriated Jewish property. However, it cannot be omitted that Israeli did this together with the major world Jewish organizations (later organized as the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany). The
position of the Allied powers was quite clear as it turned all claims to be with the West German government. Consequently, on 18 March 1953, an agreement was approved by all parties. East Germany did not recognize any of such claims until 1990. Finally, under the pressure of circumstances and clear position of world Jewish organizations the German government established a multibillion dollar fund to compensate those individuals who were forced laborers under the Nazi regime and lost their assets. Many Germans believed that this action closed the book on Holocaust restitution. But it was not true, because that indemnity was limited; it did not include many survivors, particularly in Eastern Europe, and excluded many crimes, such as slave labor. (Gutman 1990, p. 1255-1259)

The situation with Germany is not a cliché but still a good example how the local government is dealing with the existing problem by working out the plan of actions. The damages made by the Holocaust are enormous for all European Jewry, but the difference is how the particular government is acting in order to resolve the problem. The reality is that more than sixty years passed after the end of the Holocaust, but Jewish communities in the post-communist Europe are still struggling with the question of how to reclaim the properties which were taken from them during the Nazi and Communist regimes. (Block 2009).

### Jewish restitution as a challenge for the post-communist Europe

The next aspect which is essential in defining a problem is to find reasons of delay, and to understand the polar difference between West and East. First of all, it should be mentioned that the political division of Europe into East and West after 1940s has also exerted a particular influence on the process of restitution. Nowadays, when discussing the delay of the process of restitution many experts and scientists place Western Europe as a good model of how to resolve the existing problem of restitution, saying that at these territories the process has been completed and no conflicts will arise between the Jewish and local societies. But, on the other hand, they blame post-Soviet states for being passive and having taken half-hearted measures in order to resolve the problem of restitution. Quite often the main opinion concerning the issue of restitution at the post-Soviet territories defines the situation as unwillingness of the local governments to make a dialogue, where both parties – government and Jewish society – must be involved. But, the reality is quite opposite, Western Europe and post-Soviet states cannot be put together on the same scale of measurement, which means it is completely wrong to compare these parts of Europe simply because of different historical and political experience. Thus, the post-Soviet states were unable to raise the problem of restitution immediately after the end of the WWII like it has happened in many Western European states. The reason of this passiveness and silence lasting for so many years is their Soviet experience. First of all, until they became independent from the Soviet regime, historical facts have been concealed, quite often only inaccurate information sources were available. Due to the strong Soviet ideology it was prohibited to speak publicly at the level of politics about the problems of restitution because the ideology of private property was treated as the core of all social evils. The situation in Western Europe was totally different, where the return of Jewish property became a self-evident process – restoration of Jewish rights started immediately after the WWII, or even at the time, as it was done by the Dutch and Norwegian governments. It should also be noted that there have been many reasons which led into such a huge gap between timeline of restitution, the political and economic ones. The main logical explanation for the immediate restitution in the post-war period was as follows – what had been kidnapped or stolen must be returned. Later, in the 1980s, in particular, the issue concerning the moral compensation appeared as well. However, many scholars consider that even Western European countries cannot be placed as ideal models in this regard, according to Martin Dean, Constantin Goschler, and Philipp Ther, in Western European countries there was a mixed result, very often the surviving Jews met difficulties in recovering their stolen property. This led to a renewed wave of restitution claims in the 1990s. (Dean 2008, p.5).

According to the scholar from Centre for European Studies of the University College in London Julia S. Wagner, the Soviet Union, the Baltic States, and eastern Poland, in comparison, massive property transfers had already taken place already during Sovietization. Furthermore, in Poland and the Soviet Union from the beginning the policy regarding the restitution issues was characterized by the use of murderous violence, where regulations on expropriation were sometimes only issued after Jewish owners had been deported or killed already. In Eastern Europe, the relationship between murder and robbery was much closer. Tatjana Tonsmeyer, writing on Germany’s eastern European allies, notes that "governments in Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania had considerable freedom of action in comparison to the occupied states. Anti-Semitism was widespread in these predominantly agricultural societies, with weak non-Jewish middle classes, young educated, but often frustrated elites, and churches with an inclination towards traditional Judaism". Thus, the process of restitution was carried out radically but not comprehensively when it did not suit the respective governments. (Wagner 2008, p. 90-91).
Conclusion

Furthermore, one more aspect should be discussed before coming to the conclusion what does it mean – restitution issue. I would totally agree with the idea that among other factors playing an important role in the process of restitution of Jewish property, the precise chronology of the Holocaust should be taken into regard when searching for the solutions. According to the scholar mentioned above – Martin Dean, in Western Europe the aim of expropriation of Jewish property was to secure Jewish wealth prior to deportations, especially in the form of business, etc. But, on occupied Soviet territory much of expropriations were done directly on the killing sites. For example, in Latvia “the registration of Jewish property was even conducted retrospectively, in the wake of grisly massacres, in a largely vain attempt to claw back items from the local population.” (Dean, Goschler, Ther, 2007, p. 21). Thus, this fact also explains the current difference between Western post-communist Europe in the process of restitution of Jewish property. In general terms we cannot call the process of expropriation of Jewish property conducted in Western Europe a mass theft or robbery, simply because it was a secure measure, a kind of necessity. Unfortunately, the post-communist Europe is a contradiction to the West in this regard due to many facts. First, in the post-communist Europe it was a mass robbery in more terms than in the West; it was accompanied by mass murders and in some cases happened chaotically and without any legal basis and registration. Most probably this is one of the reasons why afterwards for Western Europe it was much easier to start the process of restitution and to make it natural and not so problematic. For the West it was more natural to accept the fact that expropriated property must be given back to the owner just because the procedure of expropriation was more legal and understandable than it was in the post-communist Europe.

To sum up, restitution of Jewish property is a complex issue, very problematic and sensitive for everyone being involved in it. Basically, the problem should be discussed by looking at victims, victimizers and the particular State, which means following this scheme helps to have a vision of the problem from different perspectives. Moreover, Western Europe and post-communist Europe have to be discussed separately simply because of historical gap between them and also different political experience. And, finally, it is quite obvious that the conflicts over the restitution of Jewish property offer penetrating insights into the values and structures of European societies.

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